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ABSTRACT
Give Peace a Chance: The Origins of Territorial Autonomy
Arrangements in Multiethnic States. (August 2007)
Renat Shaykhutdinov,
B.A., Boğaziçi (Bosphorus) University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Alexander C. Pacek
This research explains the formation of territorial autonomy regimes, 
arrangements enabling ethnic groups to express their distinct identity. The origins of 
territorial autonomy arrangements is an important topic due to the great potential of such 
institutions to prevent ethnic strife or reduce ongoing conflict. While the literature has 
explored the consequences of autonomy regimes, its contribution to our understanding of 
the origins of territorial autonomy is limited. In answering why territorial autonomy 
regimes are adopted, I develop a theory that focuses on the bargaining strategies of 
ethnic groups. Specifically, I posit that nonviolent bargaining strategies adopted by 
ethnic groups influence national leaders’ decision-making processes. In this dissertation, 
I also address the question of why ethnic groups employ peaceful, as opposed to violent, 
tactics. Hypotheses derived from this theorization are tested using 197 ethnic groups in 
95 states. In the empirical analysis I use data from 1945 to 2000 and employ the duration 
model and the modified Heckman selection model as my primary statistical methods. To 
trace the process of territorial autonomy formation I use a case study conducted in the 
iv
Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation. The results suggest that while groups 
with access to easily extractable resources choose to employ violent strategies, ethnic 
collectivities who use peaceful protest tactics are in fact more successful in obtaining 
territorial autonomy arrangements from central governments. 
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE ORIGINS OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY 
ARRANGEMENTS IN MULTIETHNIC STATES*
In today’s world, there are more than 2,000 ethnic groups but less than 200 
states. This situation leaves the majority of ethnic groups without states of their own and 
renders most of the states today multiethnic in nature1. As many ethnic groups strive to 
attain their own homelands, while most central governments oppose such moves, ethnic 
conflict and its management remains a very pertinent issue today. As a matter of fact, 
ethnic conflict was frequent during the Cold War and incrementally increased by the end 
of the period (Gurr 1994:350). In 1994 alone, eighteen out of the total of twenty-three 
wars were contested as a result of ethnic rivalries (Gurr 1994:350).
Scholars and policy makers have long been preoccupied with finding ways to 
govern ethnic diversity and manage ethnic conflict. In this pursuit some have suggested 
that states should disregard cultural differences altogether as has been the norm until 
1990s (Gurr 2000). Those on the other extreme have proposed partitioning existing 
states along ethnic lines. Although such recommendations could arguably be considered 
as viable options for preventing and resolving ethnic strife, neither of them is 
normatively appealing. Both of these solutions would satisfy the aspirations of only one 
contending side and leave the other party less than pleased. There are, however, middle 
                                                          
* This dissertation follows the style of American Political Science Review.
1 As (Toft 2003) claims, two-thirds of all independent states have three or more concentrated minorities on 
their territories (27).
2ground solutions for managing ethnic conflict, which aim to transform the calculus of 
the game between states and ethnic groups from zero-sum to a win-win situation. By 
preserving ethnic diversity within the society, designers of power-sharing institutions 
aspire to retain the territorial integrity of the state. In this chapter, I examine one of the 
most important power sharing institutions—territorial autonomy. My question, precisely, 
is why and how these institutions are established.
It is important to study the formation of territorial autonomy due to the 
propensity of such institutions to decrease ethnic conflict (Rothchild and Hartzell 2000). 
Knowing how these institutions have been formed in the past could help policy makers 
to design future institutions to mediate ethnic conflict. Furthermore, formation of 
autonomy regimes presents a theoretical puzzle. Some multiethnic states chose to adopt 
them, while others do not. For instance, while the Gagauz people of Moldova have 
received an autonomy deal from the central government in Chişinău, the Hungarians in 
Romania and Slovakia and the Ruthenians in the Ukraine have not. It is not immediately 
clear why autonomy was established in the former case but not in the latter.
Although policy makers have resorted to autonomy for a long time, the interest in 
this institution as a possible conflict-managing mechanism has been on the rise only in 
recent years (Gurr 1994; Nordquist 1998; Lapidoth 1997). Such interest, furthermore, is 
largely balanced by the insufficient attention to autonomy in the work of social 
scientists. Most of those who study autonomies have focused on the conceptual and legal 
aspects related to this institution, leaving the issue of autonomy’s causes and effects 
largely unexplored. Consequently, while we know that these regimes are adopted, there 
3is little scholarly understanding on how and why. While the consequences of autonomy 
is an important topic of study, to fully understand it we need to understand the origins of 
autonomy regimes first, as the way autonomy is established could explain its subsequent 
performance. In answering why and when territorial autonomy regimes are adopted, I 
develop a theory that focuses on the bargaining strategies of ethnic groups. Specifically, 
I posit that nonviolent bargaining strategies adopted by ethnic groups influence national 
leaders’ decision-making processes. The theoretical importance of this dissertation, 
therefore, is that it will fill this gap in the literature by suggesting and testing a theory of 
the origins of territorial autonomy regimes.
In the rest of this chapter, I will clarify relevant concepts—ethnicity and 
territorial autonomy. Next, I will present additional reasons for studying territorial 
autonomy and briefly examine the current state of literature on this topic. Finally, I 
provide a brief roadmap for the rest of the dissertation.
Understanding Ethnicity
Defining ethnicity has been difficult (Sollors 1996). According to a survey, four 
of five social scientists and anthropologists were in favor of leaving this term undefined
(Isajiw 1974). Those researchers that leave the concept undefined do not provide any 
reasons for doing so. However, according to Isajiw (1974), a good reason for not doing 
so related to two dangers. One is that the definition may be too narrow and, therefore, 
inapplicable to ethnic groups under interest or too broad and, consequently, deprived of 
any substantive meaning. Nevertheless, efforts have been made to define this concept. 
4Drawing on a common definition, by ethnicity I mean subjective perceptions of common 
origins and kinship among a group of people. Such perceptions could be expressed via 
race, religion, language, or even culture. This definition is consistent with Horowitz’s 
conceptualization of ethnicity, which is based on the ascribed differences among the 
groups, “whether the indicium is color, appearance, language, religion, some other 
indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof” (Horowitz 1985:17-8).
The element of subjective perception of belonging to a particular group is in line 
with Gellner’s (1983) definition of a nation. To Gellner, recognition by the person and 
others that s/he belongs to the national group (along with the element of shared culture) 
is a major delineating characteristic of the group2.
Although one of the advantages of this definition is its breadth, an objection 
might be raised against inclusion of such seemingly different characteristic as race into 
the notion of ethnicity along with language, religion, and culture. Arguably, color-based 
relations are different as they are more conducive to conflict due to their ability to arouse 
more intense sentiments and solidarity among the group members than other types of 
ethnic differences (Horowitz 1985:42). It is also argued that color differences provide a 
strong and trustworthy sign of identification in contrast to other features of groups, 
which is another reason why it should not be considered in the same category with 
language, and religion (Horowitz 1985:42).
                                                          
2 Overall, this definition is also consistent with the understanding of ethnicity by Lee, Lindström, Moore, 
and Turan (2002). They combine conceptualizations by both Gellner and Horowitz and define ethnicity on 
the basis of “ascriptive differences that the members of the group and others see as salient to their identity” 
(3).
5Both concerns require an accurate empirical investigation to be fully addressed, 
yet Horowitz (1985) drawing on anecdotal evidence has shown that the first argument 
“mistakes the indicator for the substance of the relationship” (Horowitz 1985:42). In 
fact, the hierarchies of ethnicity are possible without color-based differences. The 
examples of Tutsi and Hutu in Burundi, Tausang and Luwaan of the Philippines, Osu 
and Ibo in Nigeria, and Burakumin and other Japanese show that differences other than 
color are more important in inter-group relations (Horowitz 1985:42-3). Furthermore, 
the stigma that color-based relations are deterministic for group solidarity and inter-
group conflict does not seem to be supported historically, as the initial difference 
between the masters and slaves in North America was based mostly on religion. The 
North American English were described as “Christians”, while the slaves were called 
“heathens” (Horowitz 1985:43).
By 1680s, however, the black-white dichotomy replaced the former typology, as 
many blacks became Christian. Even though the advantage of color vis-à-vis religion 
was its visibility and permanency, it is likely to be more important only in the ranked 
systems, where the ruled group attempts to escape its identity (Horowitz 1985:44). I, 
therefore, consider race as just another category around which ethnic identities are built.
Other scholars might argue that the notion of ethnicity is just another conflation 
of the concepts of language and culture. It is true, as defined above, that the perception 
of common bonds, which defines ethnicity, could be expressed through the notions of 
language and culture. However, ethnicity is distinct from both culture and language. 
Culture is rather a loose term, which could be expressed at different levels of 
6aggregation, in which ethnicity is just one. As arguably one of the most influential 
studies that has recently reasserted the concept of culture in political science claims,
“Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct 
cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity” (Huntington 1996 (1993):2). In this 
typology, the highest and broadest cultural grouping of people is civilization. In other 
words, ethnicity can be defined by culture. However, it is just an instance, or one level,
of culture, which is a broader and looser concept than ethnicity. Second, an ethnic group 
can have different cultures. Ironically, it is Huntington as well, who implies this. 
According to him, there are “torn countries”, which while having a degree of cultural 
homogeneity suffer civilizational divides. Turkey, “the most profoundly torn country”
(20) represent a prototypical example with its division over “modern, secular, Western 
nation state” (19) and “Middle Eastern Muslim society” (19). Mexico, “the most 
immediate torn country” (20) is another example with its “North American-oriented 
leaders” (19) and “those who hold Mexico to be a Latin American country” (19-20). 
“Globally the most important torn country” (20), Russia is divided over the question of 
whether it “is part of West or the leader of a distinct Slavic-Orthodox civilization” (20).
In all of these countries, cultural divides are observed within the dominant ethnic groups. 
This difference once again emphasizes distinction between ethnicity and culture.
Similarly, the fact that different ethnic groups can speak the same language, as,
until very recently, did Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, and those belonging to the 
same ethnic group may speak different, at times very distinct, dialects, shows the 
concepts of language and ethnicity are not the same either.
7Understanding Territorial Autonomy
A viable and meaningful territorial autonomy is characterized by two aspects. 
The first element is the existence of a legal document—constitution, agreement, or 
statute—that recognizes the establishment of territorial autonomy as such and is 
accepted by the governing bodies both of the central state and the ethnic territory. The 
second aspect of territorial autonomy is that the autonomous government enjoys taxing 
and spending authority. Both of these features encompass the notion of power sharing 
that lies at the heart of territorial autonomy arrangements. Thus, they provide a means 
for ethnic groups different from the preeminent group in the country to express their 
distinct identity, and, hence, are consistent with other definitions of autonomy3. 
Although the notion of territorial autonomies could be used in a non-ethnic context, the 
focus of this study is on the ethnically-based territorial autonomies.
Territorial autonomy is related to, but distinct from, federalism in important 
ways. Despite the wide debate on the nature of federalism (such as being democratic or 
not, e.g., Kahn 2002; Stepan 2004), most scholars of federalism would agree that, at the 
very least, federal arrangements involve constitutional guarantees for subnational 
autonomy at least in one policy area for the units composing the state (Elazar 1994; 
                                                          
3 The first part (legal codification) of this definition is based on an idea expressed by Lapidoth (1997). The 
second (fiscal powers) has been inspired by Rothchild and Hartzell (2000) suggestion that territorial 
autonomies could be conceptualized in terms of centralized and decentralized federations.
The definition adopted in this study is superior to others, in part due to its relatively clear and easy way 
of identifying territorial autonomies. In contrast, Rothchild and Hartzell’s (2000) definition, for instance, 
does not provide a clear criterion for distinguishing an autonomy regime from federalism as they treat 
federalisms with autonomy arrangements as similar to federalisms without. Their criteria for regional 
autonomy—presumably non-federal type of autonomy—are also ambiguous.
8Riker 1964). Territorial autonomy could, therefore, be partly construed as a narrower 
conceptualization of federalism, which is specifically designed to accommodate ethnic 
differences. However, territorial autonomy cannot be extended to all instances of 
federalism as some federations are of non-ethnic or semi-ethnic nature. In this sense, 
federalism is “larger” than territorial autonomy.
Yet, it is also important to note that territorial autonomy is not limited to the 
cases of federal arrangements as some unitary states can grant territorial autonomy (e.g. 
Italy, Finland, Georgia, and the Ukraine). Unlike in truly federal states, formal 
provisions for territorial autonomy in such states are limited only to certain territorial 
units, but not to all. In this sense, therefore, territorial autonomy is a broader concept 
than federalism. Following this discussion, I would depict the relationship between 
territorial autonomy and federalism in the following way (Fig. 1):
Fig. 1. Relationship between Territorial Autonomy and Federalism
         FEDERALISM
          TERRITORIAL
AUTONOMY
Ethnic Federations, Ethnic Units of “Mixed” Federations
9Although my definition of autonomy is distinct from others, it is possible to find 
a common denominator between it and other conceptions of territorial autonomy. At 
heart of the concept of autonomy lies the notion of power sharing between the central 
government and a certain group or region. This feature of autonomy allows the group or 
region to enjoy a degree of self-government within the state4. Through the mechanism of 
self-government autonomy aims at granting groups different from the preeminent group 
in the country the means to express their separate identities (Lapidoth 1997:33).
This is true for the two major types of autonomy regimes used by political 
scientists—cultural (personal) autonomy and territorial autonomy regimes5. As evident 
from its name, personal autonomy applies to the members of a particular group 
regardless of the territory of the state in which they live (Lapidoth 1997; Lijphart 1977)
allowing them to practice their distinct cultures and life-styles. The non-territorial nature 
of personal autonomy has been viewed as an advantage, because it could apply to all 
members of the target group residing in the state (Lapidoth 1997:40), while excluding 
non-members. Examples of cultural autonomies are widespread in the today’s world. 
They include the Sami autonomies in the Nordic countries of Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden (Myntti 2002). The Law on Cultural Autonomy has also been adopted in Russia 
in 1996, and reestablished in Estonia in 1993, Latvia in 1991, and Lithuania in 1989 
(MINELRES: Minority Electronic Resources). In territorial autonomies, on the other 
                                                          
4 A number of studies imply that. See, for example, Rothchild and Hartzell (2000:261), Heintze (1998); 
also cited in Stroschein (2003) and Cornell (2002).
5 Although distinction between territorial and other kinds of autonomy are never clear due to the 
omnipresent ‘spatial’ dimension in any autonomy (Safran 2000:12), scholars nevertheless do distinguish 
the concept of personal, or cultural, autonomy (Lapidoth 1997:37), contrasting it to territorial autonomy 
(Lijphart 1977:43).
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hand, a certain territory inhabited by an ethnic group is vested with self-governance over 
the issues important to this group (Brunner and Küpper 2002:21).
There are might be concerns that cultural autonomy is easily conflated with 
democracy. While democracy almost certainly makes establishment of cultural 
autonomy easier, there are instances of cultural autonomies in non-democratic contexts, 
such as Ottoman Empire. Moreover, not every democracy is conducive to cultural 
autonomy for minority ethnic groups. French democracy, for example, provides only 
limited opportunities for its ethnic minorities to express their distinct identities, as did 
Turkish democracy to some of its minorities for a long time. Many also claim that the 
Baltic nations of Estonia and Latvia also “suppress” their Russian non-citizens. 
However, even in less than minority-friendly democracies, laws / agreements on cultural 
autonomy specify both concessions granted to minorities and criteria for an ethnic group 
to be eligible for such concessions. In Estonia, for instance, “National minority cultural 
autonomy may be established by persons belonging to German, Russian [citizens of 
Estonia], Swedish and Jewish minorities and persons belonging to national minorities 
with a membership of more than 3,000” ("The Law on Cultural Autonomy for National 
Minorities (unofficial translation)" 1995, Article 2, point 2). In Turkey, 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall…have an 
equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any 
charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other 
establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their 
own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein ("Treaty of 
Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923" 1924, Article 40).
11
Why Territorial Autonomy?
Although personal and territorial autonomy could complement each other and are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, in this dissertation I focus on territorial autonomy 
due to the fact that ethnic groups usually demand territorial, rather than personal, 
autonomy; furthermore, while personal autonomies are primarily concerned with culture, 
language, education and religion, territorial autonomies, in addition to those, also 
involve a broad array of economic and social affairs (Lapidoth 1997:39-40). In addition 
to, and in connection with, socioeconomic issues, territorial autonomy entails politico-
institutional arrangements, which hardly apply to the instances of personal autonomy. 
This renders the consequences of territorial autonomy much more far-reaching than 
those of personal, or cultural, autonomies (Cornell 2002).
A more important reason for studying territorial autonomy is its potential to 
manage ethnic conflict and maintain peace. Although there is no conclusive evidence as 
yet regarding the impact of territorial autonomy on ethnic conflict, in my view the 
negative findings encountered in the empirical studies (Cornell 2002; Roeder 1999), 
however, are driven by their focus on the communist world where territorial autonomy 
in the majority of cases were implemented without consent of ethnic groups in question 
(Cornell 2002; Stepan 2004). In contrast, studies that find a positive effect of territorial 
autonomy on the likelihood of peace (Rothchild and Hartzell 2000; Hartzell and Hoddie 
2003) are more representative, as they are global in nature and focus on negotiated and
12
agreed upon territorial autonomies, which I consider to be true territorial autonomy and, 
therefore, study in this dissertation.
The State of the Literature
While many practitioners and scholars emphasize the merits of territorial 
autonomy regimes, we still do not know much about the determinants of autonomy. 
Although some scholars of power sharing and consociationalism explicitly identify 
autonomy as an element of a stable consociational democracy (e.g., Lijphart 1977), they, 
nevertheless, do not study autonomy on its own merit. The literature that explores 
territorial autonomy as an individual phenomenon has been dominated by scholars with 
background in law and jurisprudence6. Despite an important contribution of this work to 
describing and clarifying the concept of autonomy and its use in international and 
domestic law, these studies show little systematic empirical examination of the origins 
and consequences of autonomy. A more recent wave of scholarship includes only two 
studies completely devoted to examining the consequences of autonomy7 and one study 
that focuses exclusively on the origins of territorial autonomy regimes8. The findings and 
theoretical arguments of each of these studies that examine the consequences of 
autonomies are diametrically different leaving this area open for further study. The study 
that examines the origins of autonomy arrangements, on the other hand, limits itself to 
                                                          
6 See, for example, the volume edited by Suksi (1998). Many contributors to this book are legal 
professionals. Lapidoth (1997) constitutes another example.
7 These are Rothchild and Hartzell (2000) and Cornell (2002). Roeder (1999), in contrast, studies 
autonomy within a broader framework of power-sharing arrangements.
8 van Cott (2001). Nordquist (1998) is concerned with durability of territorial autonomies.
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one region of the world making its global applicability problematic. In general, 
therefore, studies on ethnically divided societies with some exceptions largely ignore the 
question of territorial autonomy formation, as many of them “center… too much on 
examining the best outcomes, as opposed to looking at the ways these outcomes evolve 
through bargaining processes” (Sisk 1996:18).
Although some scholars exclude the idea of federalism from their definition of 
territorial autonomy altogether (Nordquist 1998), federalism remains an important part 
in my conceptualization of territorial autonomy as I consider all “ethnic” federations and 
ethnically-based units of “mixed” federalisms as territorial autonomy, provided that they 
satisfy the criteria for territorial autonomy specified above (Fig. 1).
William Riker is still widely recognized as the most renowned authority on the 
topic of the origins of federalism. The implicit assumption of his theory of the formation 
of federal arrangements relates to subunits’ agreed incorporation into would-be 
federations. In the Rikerian federal bargain, the side offering the bargain does so in order 
to increase territorial control, e.g. through aggression, or to prevent external military or 
diplomatic threat. By the same token, those who accept the offer, are interested in 
protecting themselves from the external threat—either military or diplomatic; they may 
also be eager to use the opportunity to engage in the potential aggression by the 
federation, according to Riker (1964:12). Acknowledging Riker’s contribution, Stepan 
(2004), however, takes an issue with the essence of his argument claiming that “as 
comparativists, we must recognize that some of the most important federations in the 
world emerged from a completely different historical and political logic” (33). He agrees 
14
that the origins of the United States and Swiss federalisms, which he conceptualizes as 
“coming together”, comply neatly with Riker’s theory. Nevertheless, Stepan sees 
“coming together” as just one instance in the broader categorization of the ways 
federalism come into being. In addition to “coming together”, he introduces “holding 
together” and “putting together” categories of federations (33). Typically, “holding 
together” are formerly unitary regimes, such as India, Belgium, and Spain, which arrive 
to “the constitutional decision that the best way to “hold together” in a democracy would 
be to devolve power and to turn their threatened polities into federations” (33-34). The 
third category, “putting together”, comprises the instances of “nonvoluntary, 
nondemocratic federation formation” (35), which includes the Soviet Union.
In a very recent contribution to this literature, (Ziblatt 2004) seemingly 
transcends these categories suggesting his own theory of federalism’s origins. 
Specifically, his theory diverges from the existing account of the formation of federalism 
in that 1) federal (and unitary) states can be formed through a combination of coercion 
and compromise; and 2) the degree of infrastructural capacity of the subunits 
determines whether they will be preserved in the future federal state as constituent units 
or stripped of their powers completely and thrown into the wastebasket of history in a 
new unitary setup. This work implies that 1) the ideal categories of “putting together” 
and “coming together” federations are blurred as both ways could be used together in 
establishing one federal state; and 2) the degree of a priori institutional capacity helps 
preserve the units within the larger state, since they can act as credible negation partners
and are capable of delivering benefits sought by the state-builders which makes it logical 
15
for the leader of the expanding state to preserve the institutional distinction of the newly 
incorporated entities.
The innovative ideas suggested by Ziblatt have been qualitatively tested in the 
context of the nineteenths-century Italy and Germany. However, the projects of “coming 
together” federations discussed in the modern period have been relatively few (e.g., the 
Tito-Dimitrov discussions on the Balkan Federation) and whenever formed, were short-
lived (e.g. the United Arab Republic). As currently inviolability of international borders 
by other states is a norm rather than an exception (Hurd 1999), development of 
undemocratic “putting together” instances of federations is unlikely. While providing an 
interesting account for the federal formations, this study, however, excludes the cases of 
“holding together” federations, which have a profound current relevance relatively to 
other forms of federations and autonomy arrangements.
In this dissertation, therefore, I develop a theory that explains primarily the 
formation of “holding together” arrangements. In developing this theory, I adopt the idea 
that autonomy arrangements should be construed as outcomes of bargaining processes 
(Riker 1964; Rothchild and Hartzell 2000; Sisk 1996; van Cott 2001; Ziblatt 2004). I, 
therefore, identify a major factor responsible for the formation of territorial autonomies –
bargaining tactics of ethnic groups. In addition to contributing to the understanding of 
the origins of autonomy regimes, it is my hope that my focus of this research on peaceful 
bargaining as a means of conflict resolution will also enhance the dialogue between the 
subfields of comparative politics and international relations and aid in bridging the gap 
between them. Moreover, my examination goes beyond federations as it is applicable for 
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the formation of territorial autonomies in unitary states as well. In doing so, it bridges 
the well-recognized gap that the federal and ethnic politics literatures in comparative 
politics have largely developed separately (Stepan 2004).
The plan for the rest of the dissertation is as follows. In Chapter II, I suggest a 
theory of peaceful tactics and autonomy formation. I subsequently derive hypotheses 
from this theory and test them using 196 ethnic groups in 95 states over the period of 
1945 to 2000. I then discuss the results and relate them back to theory. The results 
obtained from the chapter raise the question why a minority of rational ethnic 
collectivities still opts for violent tactics in face of more effective peaceful strategies. I 
tackle this question, both theoretically and empirically, in Chapter III. Drawing on the 
previous literature, I suggest that formation and endurance of both peaceful and violent 
movements depends on availability of resources that could be used by ethnic 
entrepreneurs for distributing to the members of their organizations. The major feature of 
such resources is high value and easy extractability. Items, such as oil, drugs, and 
diamonds, are considered primary sources of these commodities. I use statistical method 
to test the theory, present results, and discuss the findings. In Chapter IV, I trace the 
process of territorial autonomy formation using a case study of the Republic of Tatarstan 
in the Russian Federation. The results from the statistical and case study chapters 
suggest that peaceful protest tactics are in fact influential motivators for national leaders’ 
decisions to grant autonomy to ethnic collectivities. I conclude in Chapter V outlining 
policy implications of this dissertation for state, group, and international actors and 
suggesting avenues for further research.
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CHAPTER II
GIVE PEACE A CHANCE: NONVIOLENT PROTEST AND THE CREATION 
OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY ARRANGEMENTS
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I have clarified the concepts of ethnicity and territorial 
autonomy central to the dissertation, dwelled on the reasons for studying territorial 
autonomy formation, and briefly reviewed the literature on this subject. Specifically, I 
have pointed out that the institutions of territorial autonomy serve as an effective means 
of maintaining peace within ethnically-divided states. This result has been attributed to 
the capacity of territorial autonomy arrangements to address the security concerns of 
ethnic groups by providing them with a degree of local control over social, political and 
economic issues. Further augmenting the conflict management capacity of autonomy 
arrangements are the opportunities these institutions often provide for minority 
representation within the central government (Hartzell 1999; Rothchild and Hartzell 
2000).9
While the existing literature on territorial autonomy has emphasized its potential 
value as a conflict management tool, the question of exactly how the institutions of 
territorial autonomy are first formed has been largely unexplored. In this chapter, I 
develop the argument that the particular strategies employed by aggrieved ethnic 
                                                          
9 For a more skeptical view of the conflict management capacity of territorial autonomy arrangements, see 
Lake and Rothchild (2005).
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communities play an important role in determining whether or not these groups achieve 
autonomy.  My core finding is that groups that employ peaceful protest strategies tend to 
enjoy more success in achieving their goals in comparison to those collectivities 
favoring the use of violent tactics.
 The chapter is organized as follows.  I begin by discussing the state of literature 
regarding formation of territorial autonomies noting the predominance of hard power 
factors in explaining success of territorial autonomy formation. Subsequently, I provide
a theoretical discussion that challenges this view and posits that the expected 
relationship between nonviolent action and autonomy formation is stronger. I then 
conduct an empirical test of my hypotheses employing a data set comprised of 
observations for 196 ethnic groups from 95 countries.  I conclude by considering the 
policy implications of this research.
Peaceful Demands and Territorial Autonomy: Existing Explanations
As noted in chapter I, I consider a territorial autonomy to have emerged if a new 
institutional arrangement meets two criteria. First, there must be the existence of a legal 
document—constitution, agreement, or statute—that recognizes the establishment of 
territorial autonomy and is accepted by the governing bodies of both the central state and 
the territory.  Second, the newly established territorial unit’s local government must have 
taxing and spending authority. These two elements encompass the notion of power 
sharing that lies at the heart of territorial autonomy arrangements. They each provide a 
means for ethnic groups, distinct from the dominant community, to express their identity 
19
and are thus consistent with established definitions of autonomy. Although the notion of 
territorial autonomies could be used in a non-ethnic context, in this dissertation I elect to 
focus exclusively on the creation of ethnically-based territorial autonomies.
In Table 1, I present a list of groups in which territorial autonomies emerged 
during the time period under analysis. To identify these instances of autonomy I 
employed Elazar’s (1994) Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, 
Confederal and Autonomy Arrangements and Keesing’s Contemporary Archives.
Table 1. Ethnic Groups under Provisions for Territorial Autonomy between 1945–
2000
Name of the Group Country Name
Period of Territorial 
Autonomy
Jurassians Switzerland 1979–
Basques Spain 1978–
Catalans Spain 1978–
South Tyrolians Italy 1992–
Sardinians Italy 1948–
Karachay Russia 1993–
Ingush Russia 1993–
Buryat Russia 1993–
Tuvinians Russia 1993–
Yakut Russia 1993–
Tatars Russia 1994–
Crimean Russians Ukraine 1991–
Afars Ethiopia 1991–
Oromo Ethiopia 1991–
Somalis Ethiopia 1991–
Tigreans Ethiopia 1991–
Amhara Ethiopia 1991–
Xhosa South Africa 1976–
Southerners Sudan 1979–1982, 1991–
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Table 1 Continued
Name of the Group Country Name
Period of Territorial 
Autonomy
Kashmiris India 1949–1989
Mizos India 1986–
Tripuras India 1988–
Assamese India 1985–
Nagas India 1960–
Baluchis Pakistan 1973–1974, 1985–
Pashtuns Pakistan 1973–1974, 1985–
Sindhis Pakistan 1973–1974, 1985–
Mohajirs Pakistan 1973–1974, 1985–
Azerbaijanis Iran 1946–1946
Tibetans China 1951–1959
Turkmen China 1946–1950
Gagauz Moldova 1994–
Serbs Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995–
Bouganvilleans Papua New Guinea 1976–1986, 2000
Scots United Kingdom 1998–
Among cases in which aggrieved groups have gained territorial autonomy, there 
are notable instances in which acts of violence preceded the state’s willingness to reach 
an accord with the relevant ethnic community. This proved to be the case in Kosovo as a 
violent resistance movement among ethnic Albanians influenced the Serbian 
government’s decision to grant autonomy to the region; similarly, acts of terrorism 
provided the impetus for Spain’s government to establish an autonomous region for the 
Basque ethnic community.
There is an obvious logic behind the expectation that violent movements would 
be associated with the granting of territorial autonomy. Given that terrorism, riots and 
acts of war are simultaneously high risk and costly behaviors, these tactics signal a high 
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level of resolve on the part of the ethnic group seeking autonomy.  The willingness of 
activists to sacrifice their lives for their cause puts a country’s leadership on notice that 
the desire for autonomy is genuine and that it is an issue requiring immediate attention.
This anticipated relationship between violent tactics and autonomy formation is 
consistent with an influential Rikerian theory on the origins of federalism. Riker implies 
that governments are unable to take a full control of their territories due to, in part, their 
military incapacity, leading to the failure to establish fully-centralized states (Riker 
1964:12). Similarly, bargains on the formation of territorial autonomies in Latin America 
between central governments and ethnic groups were aimed at ending armed struggles 
that challenged governing regimes or took place when the regimes faced crises of 
legitimacy and governability (van Cott 2001).
The research presented in this study, however, suggests that while violent tactics 
may at times be effective in pressing for territorial autonomy, a far more common 
pattern is for violent tactics to foster a domestic and international environment 
increasingly hostile to accommodating the interests of the aggrieved ethnic communities. 
In this sense, groups prove more likely to achieve their goals if they favor the use of 
peaceful tactics such as boycotts and demonstrations.10 For example, Tatars in Russia, 
Eskimos in Canada and Scots in Britain attained a degree of autonomy from the central 
governments using nonviolence as their political action strategy.
                                                          
10 Walter (2006) addresses the issue of territorial autonomy formation.  However, her study does not 
consider the influence of protest tactics on the success or failure of autonomy movements.
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While violent tactics might result in territorial autonomy, their success is limited 
by the reactions they engender among the relevant government’s leadership, domestic 
public, and the international community. While violence may garner domestic and 
international attention for an autonomy movement, it also has the effect of preventing 
representatives of these movements from appearing as sympathetic figures worthy of 
assistance. With the resort to arms, the perceptions of groups employing violent tactics 
become transformed from ethnic activists to extremists and terrorists.  I further develop 
this argument below.
Factors Associated with the Creation of Territorial Autonomy Arrangements
While my theoretical focus is on the strategies employed by ethnically-based 
autonomy movements, I recognize that this is not the only influence on the eventual 
success or failure of these efforts. In what follows, I describe tactics and other factors 
likely to play a role in the trajectory of these movements. 
Movement Tactics
The strategies associated with autonomy movements form the central focus of 
this study. My argument is that the most effective autonomy movements will be those 
that emphasize nonviolent tactics.  These tactics have the advantage of garnering 
attention for the concerns of ethnic groups without the liability of provoking the 
animosity or distrust created by violent conflict.
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While not addressing the specific issue of territorial autonomy formation, an 
established literature does describe the potential for nonviolent tactics to serve as an 
effective means of making demands on government (e.g., McAdam and Tarrow 2000; 
Sharp 1973:110; Zunes 2000). These studies equate the nonviolent tactics used by group 
activists to political “jiu-jitsu” intended to throw their opponents off balance, weaken 
their power, and cause repressive policies to rebound (Sharp 1973:110).
One of the major “jiu-jitsu” assets at the disposal of nonviolent movements is 
their moral advantage vis-à-vis violence (Gurr 2000:156). From an ethical standpoint, 
many leaders should find it difficult to justify repressive policies against nonviolent 
groups, resulting not only in the failure to strengthen their position but also in the 
possibility to weaken it (Gurr 2000:111). The emphasis on nonviolent tactics thus has 
the potential to divide governments over the question of whether repression is an 
appropriate response to the movement (Sisk 1996:675; Zunes 2000:184). Further, 
political leaders should prove less concerned about the consequence of reaching a 
compromise with a nonviolent group as such groups are perceived less threatening to 
leaders’ personal security (Zunes 2000:184).
In the context of the evolving international norms of justice, nonviolent action 
also has the potential to shape world opinion about a conflict as is evident in the cases of 
South Africa (Klotz 1995; Zunes 2000:184) and the Philippines. In the Philippines, for 
instance, the choice of Washington decision makers to withhold their support from the 
Marcos regime and instead favor the peaceful movement challenging the regime proved 
critical (McAdam and Tarrow 2000). In this sense, nonviolent protesters can effectively 
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use the international media to reach out to distant publics and garner international 
sympathy for their cause (Gurr 2000:156).
Aware of the moral power of nonviolence, governments might try to discredit 
nonviolent groups. Governments, for instance, utilize agents provocateurs (Seidman 
2000:166; Zunes 2000:184) to instigate violence. High-ranking officials can also 
condone paramilitary organizations and death squads designed to exterminate the leaders 
advocating nonviolent tactics often with the support of police and the military (Zunes 
2000:185).
Nonviolent actions, therefore, are likely to be more successful when the universal 
norms of justice are not only internationally recognized but also abided by by the 
contending government (Seidman 2000). In this sense, British adherence to the value of 
fair play proved crucial for Gandhi’s satyagraha campaign (Gurr 2000:158). Success of 
Gandhi’s policy of nonviolence was spelled by the British Viceroy’s acknowledgement 
that the colonizing power was reduced to helplessness by Gandhi’s movement (Gurr 
2000:157-158). The British could not do anything against Indians without being villains 
(158). In other words, the British were restrained by their norms defining the acceptable 
and unacceptable governance. In contrast, the failure to accept the universal norms by 
the apartheid government precipitated a much turbulent path of transition where peaceful 
tactics were at times mixed with violence (Seidman 2000).
Even when a government rejects universal values, nonviolent action may still 
empower activists in several important ways. According to an influential scholar of 
nonviolent movements, Gene Sharp, in order to effectively work, punishing sanctions 
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must cause fear and willingness to obey. Lack of fear and presence of overriding 
loyalties, however, imply persistence of action on the part of protesters in spite of 
repression (Sharp 1973:110-1). Since many who engage in nonviolent action realize the 
possibility of repression and are willing to fearlessly endure it, the long-run success of 
repression is questionable.
In addition to emphasizing the lack of fear, persistence of peaceful protest can 
also demonstrate the limits of opponent states’ capacities to resist long-term demands by 
overcrowding prison cells (Sharp 1973:111). Even in the short run, protesters can learn 
to “disrupt the smooth functioning… [of the system] with boycotts, strikes, and 
demonstrations without exposing individual leaders to arrest, or provoking immediate 
police attacks” in the face of well-equipped modern armies of highly industrialized states 
(Seidman 2000:164).
While nonviolent activists might be exposed to repression, their chances of 
facing governmental wrath are less than that of violent groups (Sharp 1973:110). In 
comparison to violent tactics, more people support peaceful expression of demands and 
grievances. Since protesters compose a large proportion of the general population and 
are likely to express public opinion, the odds of singling out one person by the 
government for the purpose of repression is much lower in nonviolent movements than 
in a violent action (Sharp 1973).
This logic arguably applies to the “Yellow Revolution” in the Philippines where 
the Catholic Church, many members of the middle and upper class, even some 
institutions, such as the Junior Chamber of Commerce, normally suspicious of 
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insurgents, came together to protest the Marcos regime and its practices (McAdam and 
Tarrow 2000:152-3). On the day when the Philippine dictator took presidential oath for 
another term, Corazόn Aquino was sworn to the post in another part of the town. Most 
citizens pledged their support to Aquino, as they thought the elections were rigged. By 
the time Marcos left office, he controlled little outside of Malacanang Palace (Zunes 
2000). While public opinion about elections was crucial in mobilizing people, it was 
rational for any single individual to take part in the peaceful protest, as the chances of 
being singled out for punishment within a large and growing movement were negligibly 
low.
By contrast, the use of violent tactics may indicate a high degree of resolve on 
the part of ethnic activists but also has the potential to present these groups as unreliable 
partners in the future governance of the state. Given that violent strategies call into 
question the government’s “monopoly on the legitimate use of force,” a country’s 
leadership has justifiable reasons to doubt that the conflict will definitively end with the 
granting of autonomy. There remains the equally plausible scenario that the political 
success associated with earlier acts violence will instead encourage future armed conflict 
on the basis of new and more extreme demands. This is especially relevant in light of the 
arguments that possession of territorial autonomy by ethnic groups enables them to 
develop both the institutional capabilities and motivation to press further for a full-
fledged secession from the “parent” state (Cornell 2002).
For governments confronting violent autonomy movements, I anticipate that the 
most common reaction among the leadership will take the form of repression intended to 
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bring an end to the rebellion. Opportunities for support from the international 
community should also be limited with the resort to arms as both states and international 
organizations prove reluctant to meddle in violent internal disputes with implications for 
a state’s sovereignty. Such reluctance might stem from the concerns about legitimacy of 
foreign interference and the threat to an intervener’s self-interest (Hurd 1999).
Moreover, many states have maintained that they not negotiate with terrorists. This 
would thus make negotiating difficult if the group becomes violent and might act as a 
check for group leaders to think carefully about if they want to escalate their protests 
into violence or not.
In summary, my theoretical expectation is that the least successful autonomy 
movements will tend to be those that employ violent tactics. While bloodshed may 
increase the level of attention accorded an autonomy movement, it should also limit the 
potential sympathy for ethnic activists that might otherwise be forthcoming from either 
the state or international actors. In contrast, nonviolent strategies are associated with 
higher odds of territorial autonomy formation.
In order to represent the different strategies that groups might adopt to demand 
autonomy or independence from the state I employ a total of four indicators drawn from 
the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set. The first two indicators reflect the tactics of 
nonviolence associated with either autonomy or independence movements. The 
distinction between group claims for a territorial autonomy as opposed to the calls for an 
outright independence is introduced to capture the nature of group demands in a more 
nuanced way. Values for these variables range from one to five if collectivities use 
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peaceful tactics ranging from public statements, boycotts, to peaceful public 
demonstrations. The minimum value reflects instances in which the efforts of elites were 
confined to public statements pressing for autonomy or independence. A value of five 
indicates the holding of demonstrations involving at least 100,000 people.11
A second set of variables reflects instances in which groups seek either autonomy 
or independence through violence. Among collectivities using tactics including terrorism 
or war to signal such demands, the score for this indicator ranges between one and seven 
with the scale representing increasing degrees of violence. The minimum value identifies 
those cases in which activities were limited to sporadic terrorism; the maximum value 
indicates the existence of a protracted civil war.12
In many instances, ethnic groups opt to employ both violent and nonviolent 
tactics simultaneously. The MAR dataset indicates that 59 (or 30.10 percent) of all 
collectivities I include in this analysis chose a mix of strategies to make their case for 
either autonomy or independence. For these cases, I include only the value associated 
with violent tactics and record a score of zero for peaceful activities. This coding 
decision is based on the expectation that both states and the international community will 
                                                          
11 A value of zero is assigned to the group when no protest is in evidence; a two reflects acts of symbolic 
resistance, including sit-ins, sabotage, and blockage of traffic; a three signifies small demonstrations, 
rallies, strikes, and/or riots with a total participation of less than 10,000; a four is assigned to the instances 
of medium demonstrations with the total number of participants of less than 100,000. Although the MAR 
scale of the rebellion variable reflects the action of groups, which, in certain instances, might follow the 
actions of states, the scale captures primarily groups’ behavior. Complete information concerning this 
coding scale is available from the MAR website at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data.asp.
12 A value of zero is recorded if the group has not engaged in protest activity; a group is scored with a two 
if conducts terrorist campaigns; a three reflects local rebellions; a four signifies small-scale guerilla 
activity; a five is assigned to intermediate guerilla activity; a six reflects large-scale guerrilla activity. 
Complete information concerning this coding scale is available from the MAR website at 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data.asp.
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tend to focus on violence as the most pressing threat and thus discount the significance 
of any peaceful efforts taking place at the same time.
The following are the two alternative hypotheses that I investigate:
H1a: The use of nonviolent tactics by an ethnically-based movement increases 
the odds that an autonomy arrangement will emerge.
H1b: The use of violent tactics by an ethnically-based movement increases the 
odds that an autonomy arrangement will emerge. However, the increase in the 
odds of autonomy formation by violent tactics are lower than those caused by 
nonviolent strategies.
To conduct the preliminary test of the difference between effects of peaceful, as 
opposed to violent, strategies employed by ethnic collectivities, I used a contingency 
table and the Chi Square Test of Independence. I selected only the groups that express 
demands for either independence or territorial autonomy. I employ the MAR dataset, 
discussed in further detail below, as my primary data source. I present the frequencies 
for ethnic group tactics and territorial autonomy formation in Table 2.
Table 2. Frequencies for Ethnic Group Tactics and Territorial Autonomy 
Formation
Autonomy 
Formed
Autonomy Not 
Formed Total
Peaceful Only 9 18 27
Violent Only 1 1 2
Both 11 54 65
Neither 5 98 103
Total 26 171 197
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As the table indicates, of the total 27 groups demanding increasing degree of 
self-governance peacefully 9 (33.33%) autonomy receive territorial autonomy. In 
contrast, only 11 out of 67 groups that express their demands, at least in part, violently, 
or 17.91% receive territorial autonomy arrangements. The Chi Square statistic associated 
with these data (2.638) yields a probability of only 0.10 that territorial autonomies are 
formed independently from the tactics employed by ethnic groups. Based on these 
results, one, therefore, may conclude that autonomy formation depends on group 
strategies.
To subjugate the results presented above to a more stringent analysis, the model 
should be tested against the rival explanations. In an effort to simplify the discussion, I 
categorize these indicators as those that define: (1) the nature of the dispute, (2) the 
characteristics of the government, and (3) the groups demanding autonomy.
Nature of the Dispute
To represent the nature of the dispute I consider the degree to which the 
international community has chosen to involve itself in efforts to resolve the conflict.
International Mediation
Beyond the tactics of the groups themselves and their relative capabilities vis-à-
vis the central government, the involvement of actors outside states also often plays a 
role in shaping the nature and trajectory of interethnic disputes.13  Most relevant to the 
                                                          
13 On this topic, see Lake and Rothchild’s 1998 edited volume. 
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concerns of this study is the literature pointing to the capacity of mediators to identify 
means of peaceful compromise that either prevent or bring hostilities to an end (see, for 
example, Bercovitch and Houston 1996).
Depending on the source of their authority, mediators bring different advantages 
to the bargaining table.  Mediators representing states have a greater potential to deploy 
resources (both financial and coercive) that might facilitate or sustain a deal; by contrast, 
mediators representing international organizations such as the United Nations have 
fewer assets at their disposal, but are typically trusted to behave as unbiased referees of 
the conflict resolution process (Rothchild 1997).
In order to represent the potential for international mediation to heighten the 
development of territorial autonomy arrangements, I recorded all cases of mediation of 
these disputes identified by either Bercovitch (2000) or Keesing’s Contemporary 
Archives.14  I then constructed two dichotomous indicators representing the different 
capacities of mediators. A first indicator identifies the presence or absence of mediation 
efforts by state representatives; a second measure notes whether or not mediators 
representing international organizations took part in efforts at conflict resolution.
The following hypothesis is investigated:
H5: The presence of both kinds of international mediators to resolve a dispute 
between ethnic communities and the state increases the odds that an autonomy 
arrangement will emerge.
                                                          
14 Referencing Keesing’s Contemporary Archives proved necessary for those cases of interethnic dispute 
that did not appear in Bercovitch’s study. 
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Government Characteristics
With the items described below, I take into account core characteristics of the 
governing regime under which the autonomy movement takes place. I include these 
factors based on an expectation that a country’s system of government and the resources 
at its disposal should prove critical in shaping the reactions of a country’s leadership to 
ethnic-centered demands for either autonomy or independence.
Level of Democracy
Regime type defines the potential that exists for members of the public to 
influence government decision-making. Not surprisingly, opportunities for the public to 
play a role in the policymaking process tend to be greatest in those states that enjoy the 
highest levels of democracy. Democratic states are also credited with forging a culture of 
toleration that allows for diverse cultures to live together within the context of a single 
state. 
Further, democratic institutions are thought to discourage contestation over the 
structure of political institutions and decrease the potential for violence (e.g., Dassel and 
Reinhardt 1999:67). In long-standing democracies, elite preferences for repression are 
reduced, since historically they have been able to address successfully group grievances 
and challenges (Gurr and Moore 1997:8). Historical patterns and institutional constraints 
make it costly for state leaders to use force against their citizens opting instead for 
conciliatory means to redress grievances.
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My expectation is that the easy accessibility of the leadership should have the 
effect of making democratic regimes more responsive to demands for ethnic autonomy. I 
measure the level of democracy within a state drawing on data from the Polity IV 
project.  Measures vary between -10 and 10 with lower values reflecting the least 
democratic states.
H6: The higher the level of democracy within a state, the higher the odds that an 
autonomy arrangement will emerge.
Government Economic Capabilities
If regime type determines whether decision makers are available to the public, 
state capabilities should shape the degree to which leaders feel compelled to 
accommodate these demands.  Governments with ample access to key resources may 
consider themselves sufficiently powerful to simply ignore or suppress ethnic-based 
autonomy movements.  The central aspect of state power I consider in this study is the 
country’s overall level of economic wealth.
A state’s level of wealth has important implications for the ability of ethnic 
groups to achieve territorial autonomy. As impoverished states have a limited capacity to 
resist the demands of ethnic groups, the claims for territorial autonomy are more likely 
to materialize in poorer states than in wealthier polities. To capture a state’s level of 
economic growth, I employ a measure of the state’s Gross Domestic Product per Capita 
derived from the World Bank.15
                                                          
15 These data were obtained from Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) dataset.
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H7:  The higher the level of economic development within a state, the lower the 
odds that an autonomy arrangement will emerge.
Stability of Political Institutions
In addition to regime type and economic capabilities of central states, the 
stability of national political institutions is another factor with the potential to influence 
the odds of territorial autonomy formation. Specifically, in stable political systems, 
ethnic collectivities generally do not enjoy an opportunity to shape political institutions. 
In stable majoritarian democracies, groups are likely to be outvoted, while in lasting 
authoritarian regimes they can be similarly ignored, coercively silenced or prevented 
from voicing grievances altogether. However, in unstable political systems abundant 
with legitimacy crises, such groups have the potential to be more assertive. Feeling more 
empowered, groups in such systems can shape the content of new constitutions by 
pressing for territorial autonomy when such crises occur (van Cott 2001).
To measure the stability of political institutions I count the number of years from 
the time when a constitution was enacted until the year it was discontinued. On average, 
the overhaul of the entire constitution weighs much more than introduction of one single 
amendment in the supreme document of the land. Admittedly, the collection of 
amendments might equal the change of the entire constitution with respect to its impact
on institutional stability. However, the critical mass of comparable amendments are not 
likely to accumulate over a short period of time.
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For cases that do not show constitutional formation during the period (e.g., 
Bahrain), the number of years since independence were employed. The data were coded 
using Jackman (1993), and updated through the Constitution Finder of the University of 
Richmond and CIA World Factbook.
H8:  The higher the level of stability of political institutions, the lower the odds 
that an autonomy arrangement will emerge.
Ethnic Group Characteristics
A final category of variables consider the characteristics of the groups seeking 
autonomy in an effort to account for particular community characteristics with the 
potential to either enhance or disadvantage their movements.
Power Factors
The conventional arguments explaining territorial autonomy formation and, more 
generally, concessions of central governments attend to military and demographic 
capabilities as the main conditions for such institutional arrangements to take place. The 
classical Rikerian theory of the origins of federalism assigns an important role to the 
balance of military capabilities of territorial subunits and central governments in the 
process of federalization and territorial autonomy formation. This argument implies that 
if the military strength of the central government by far exceeds the military capabilities 
of subnational entities, the central government is in a position to abandon the federal 
idea in favor of a unitary state (Riker 1964). By extension, as the military balance 
between the central government and territorial units approach parity, federal 
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arrangements and institutions of territorial autonomy beneficial to ethnic groups should 
be more likely to emerge.
Recognizing that military strength is only important to the extent that it reflects 
the balance of power between groups opposing one another, I measure the ratio that 
exists between the men under arms for the relevant ethnic group and the government.  
Employing data from the Military Balance and Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute Yearbooks, I identify values ranging between zero (in the case of US 
Hawaiians) and .74 (in the case of Armenians in Azerbaijan). This means that for every 
10 men under arms in the regular army of Azerbaijan, there are 7 armed ethnic 
Armenians willing to fight government forces. The minimum, maximum, mean values 
for this and other variables used in the analysis as well as their standard deviations are 
given in Appendix A.
H2: The stronger the military power of an ethnic group, the higher the odds that 
an autonomy arrangement will emerge.
Population and Settlement Pattern
State leaders should be more predisposed to consider groups with particular 
characteristics that appear to legitimate claims to a degree of self-governance. Chief 
among these attributes is population size relative to the country as a whole. Groups with 
large populations may justifiably claim that the shared interests of a large number of 
individuals should be accommodated through government policy; it is also the case that 
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autonomy movements for larger populations might engender efforts at accommodation 
by leaders concerned about the potential for widespread unrest (van Cott 2001:52).16
Yet not all ethnic groups with large populations are distributed within a state in 
such a way that autonomy is a viable option.  In the case of Malaysia, for example, the 
substantial Chinese minority population has never sought autonomy given that they are 
widely dispersed throughout the state.  The settlement pattern most likely to favor the 
creation of autonomy appears in those instances in which groups are concentrated within 
a single region in which they enjoy majority status (Toft 2003). By contrast, the least 
favorable pattern would be those instances in which a community is spread across the 
country in such a way that they cannot easily mobilize and it remains unclear exactly 
what territory would constitute their homeland.
My measure of the relative population size of each ethnic community is derived 
from the MAR data set and indicates the percentage of the country’s total population that 
belongs to the relevant ethnic group.  My measure of settlement pattern is similarly 
based on MAR. Values range between zero to one with the highest value representing 
the most concentrated settlement pattern for regional majority groups.
H3: The greater the size of an ethnic group’s population relative to the country as 
a whole, the higher the odds that an autonomy arrangement will emerge.
H4: The larger and more concentrated an ethnic group’s population in the region, 
the higher the odds an autonomy arrangement will emerge. 
                                                          
16 A reverse relationship, however, is also possible. Groups smaller in size in comparison to the rest of the 
state may gain autonomy as they are generally understood to be less threatening by state elites (van Cott 
2001).
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Resources of Ethnic Territories
The final indicator I include is the presence of economic resources within the 
ethnic group’s homeland.  The local availability of valuable assets such as oil, diamonds 
or industries are significant as they can serve as an important source of leverage in the 
negotiations with state leaders over the formation of territorial autonomy. In the Russian 
experience, for instance, wealthier regions were much more assertive in their 
relationships with the federal government than relative poorer units (Kahn 2002).
For their part, state leaders have incentives to negotiate a stable relationship with 
wealthy regions at least for two reasons. First, an important task of central 
governments—successful redistribution of resources across the country—critically 
depends on the revenues effectively collected from economically powerful subnational 
units and territories. Although substantial devolution of fiscal and political powers to 
economically-developed units might strain central governments’ budget, devolution of 
powers may also result in a more effective resource extraction. Second, central 
governments grant substantial autonomy to economically powerful regions to preserve 
the very unity of the state (Treisman 1999). If not given the desired powers, such units 
have the potential to tear the state apart.
I again draw on the MAR data set to identify those ethnic homelands with 
substantial economic resources and complement the missing data. Values for this 
variable range from zero to one. To note one example, Yakuts in Russia are designated 
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with a score of 1 based upon the substantial diamond mining industry present within 
their territory.
H9: The presence of significant economic assets in ethnic homelands increases 
the odds an autonomy arrangement will emerge.
Empirical Analysis
I now turn to a discussion of the empirical tests intended to identify the effect of 
protest tactics on the formation of institutions associated with territorial autonomy. 
Case Selection
In the statistical analysis I consider the potential of an autonomy arrangement 
emerging for each ethnic group listed in the MAR dataset for the years between 1945 
and 2000. Since peaceful strategies are likely to be successful when the threat of 
violence is vivid (Gurr 2000), I select ethnic groups who are “at risk” of rebellion to 
properly test the propositions presented above. My sample includes minority groups that 
constitute at least one percent of their country’s population or have 100,000 members or 
more. Groups included in this study reside in the countries with a population of at least 
500,000 and have either benefited or suffered from discriminatory practices or have 
mobilized in defense or support of its perceived interest. This constitutes a total of 197
ethnic communities within 95 states.17
                                                          
17 Only relevant groups, i.e. those with a potential to demand only a part of the state’s territory, are 
included in this study. For this reason, only those groups classified by MAR as ethnonational, indigenous, 
ethno-class, religious sect, or national minority are included in the analysis.
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Note that, while all groups within the analysis are considered to have the 
potential to participate in protest activity, this does not mean that they have actually 
engaged in such movements. In fact, among the general population, aggrieved people 
who do not protest or rebel are “[b]y far the larger category” (Lichbach 1995:12). 
In this respect, my dataset corresponds to the general population distribution. In 
my sample, the number of years spent by groups in peace constitutes 90% (6,522) out of 
the total 7,253 years. Although 67 (34%) ethnic communities were engaged in violence 
at least at some point between 1945 and 2000, many (27 or 14%) employed strategies of 
peaceful protest or were not involved in any significant political action at all (103 groups 
or 52%). For example, Russians in Belarus and Azerbaijan, Slovaks in the Czech 
Republic, and Germans in Kazakhstan are representative of ethnic groups within the 
MAR sample that were “at risk” but have not mobilized based on demands for autonomy 
or independence.
A unit of analysis in this dataset is group-year. Such statistical setup allows to 
treats each of the 197 groups at every year between 1945 and 2000 as a separate, though 
related, case.
Method
I use a duration model to test my expectation that groups employing peaceful 
protest tactics have the greatest potential to gain territorial autonomy. Duration models 
assess the influence of the independent variables on the amount of time (in this case, as 
measured in years) before a particular event occurs. From within the family of event 
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history models, I chose to employ a Weibull distribution for my statistical analysis. In 
this instance, the reason behind employing the Weibull distribution is the expectation 
that autonomy arrangements are more likely to form soon after an autonomy movement 
emerges rather than proving unrelated to the passage of time.18 Observation for a group 
starts from year 1945. The dependent variable – formation of territorial autonomy – is 
measured as a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if territorial autonomy is 
formed and 0 if it does not exist.
Due to the concerns that individual country effects may bias statistical results, in 
addition to the control variables specified above, I also control for country effects
through clustering in the empirical analysis presented below. The results from the 
analysis that accounts for country effects are not significantly different from the model 
that does not include such influences.
Results
I present the results of my statistical analysis in Table 3. All variables related to 
autonomy and independence movements have a positive and statistically significant 
influence on the formation of autonomy arrangements. This suggests that the tactics 
                                                          
18 In an effort to address concerns that the assumptions tied to the Weibull distribution may not be 
appropriate to the formation of autonomy arrangements, I also tested the same variables employing a Cox 
events history model.  The Cox model makes no assumption about the effects of the passage of time on the 
odds of the relevant event occurring.  The findings when employing the alternative specification are 
consistent with those produced by the Weibull model.
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employed by groups seeking greater levels of self-rule play a critically important role in 
determining the central government’s response to these demands.
Which of these nonviolent and violent tactics proves most effective in 
encouraging autonomy formation? Column four in Table 3 addresses this question by
indicating how variations across the values of each tactic affect the probability of 
territorial autonomy formation.19 The most notable aspect of these results is that peaceful 
demands for the increased autonomy prove to be the single most effective strategy for 
groups seeking such an accommodation20. As the model indicates, increasing this 
variable one unit from its mean value of .09 heightens the probability of territorial 
autonomy formation by 118 percent.  Nonviolent demands for independence are also 
successful in securing territorial autonomy. Heightening peaceful secession demands one 
unit from its average value of 0.04 enhances the odds of territorial autonomy formation 
by 107 percent (Table 3).
                                                          
19 The substantive influence of the variables of interest on the likelihood of autonomy formation is 
assessed by dividing the “revised” hazard rate by the “base” hazard rate. The “revised” hazard rate is 
calculated after the increase or decrease on the variable of interest from its mean (for continuous variables) 
or mode (for dichotomous variables) level. A “base” hazard rate is calculated when all the variables in the 
model are kept at their empirical average or model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:27).
20 Different models were run for groups that achieved independence (such as Slovaks in Czechoslovakia or 
Croats in Yugoslavia). These groups were coded both as if they have achieved autonomy and as if they 
have not. No significant differences in the results have been observed in these models.
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Table 3. Determinants of Territorial Autonomy Formation, 1945-2000
Variable Coefficient
Hazard 
Ratio
Revised Hazard Rate/ Base 
Hazard Rate
.78** 2.18**Peaceful Autonomy Demand
(.19) (.41)
2.18
.73** 2.07**Peaceful Independence 
Demand (.22) (.46)
2.07
.44** 1.55**
Violent Autonomy Demand
(.12) (.19)
1.55
.27* 1.30*Violent Independence 
Demand (.10) (.13)
1.30
Nature of the Dispute
1.05 2.84
Mediation by a State
(.75) (2.13)
2.84
-.84 .43Mediation by an International 
Organization (1.03) (.44)
.43
Government Characteristics
.03 1.03
Democracy Level
(.04) (.04)
1.03
.10 1.10Economic Development of 
the State (.08) (.09)
1.10
-.01 .99 .99Stability of Political 
Institutions (.01) (.01)
Ethnic Group Characteristics
-.50 .61Groups' Capability Ratio 
(vis-à-vis the state) (4.28) (2.59)
.61
-.69 .50Groups' Population Ratio 
(vis-à-vis the state) (2.44) (1.22)
.50
.62 1.86Concentrated Majority in the 
Region (.58) (1.08)
1.86
.17 1.18
Resources in the Region
(.54) (.63)
1.18
-362.38**Constant
(100.39)
Subjects 203
Autonomies Formed 24
Number of observations 7253
Log pseudolikelihood 41.077347
Wald chi2(13) 105.62
Prob>chi2 0.0000
Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. All significance tests are two-tailed.
**p=<.001, *p<.05
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The capacity of nonviolent movements to secure territorial autonomy 
arrangements becomes most apparent when compared to the effects of violent 
independence and autonomy movements. While one-unit shifts (e.g., from inaction to 
verbal demands) in the value for peaceful independence movements increased the odds 
of autonomy formation by 107 percent, comparable violent movements (e.g., from 
inaction to political banditry and sporadic terrorism) increase the odds of autonomy 
formation by a much more limited 30 percent. 
A similar result is apparent when comparing peaceful and violent movements 
demanding territorial autonomy. A one unit change in the intensity of peaceful 
movements increases the odds of autonomy formation by 118 percent, while comparable 
measures for violent movements prove much lower, at 55 percent. It is also notable that 
the threshold of statistical significance for violent independence demand variable is 
lower than that of both indicators of nonviolent strategies (Table 3).
Superior effects of peaceful tactics on territorial autonomy formation are also 
highlighted by statistical tests of difference between the coefficients. In the model (Table 
3), the estimate of peaceful autonomy demands is different from both the violent 
independence and violent autonomy demands at .004 and .064 levels, respectively. 
Peaceful independence demands are statistically different from violent independence 
demands at less than .061 level, although the coefficient of peaceful independence 
protest fails to achieve statistically significant difference from the estimate of violent 
autonomy demands at .190 level. However, three out of four pairs of variables exhibit 
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statistically significant levels of difference between the peaceful and violent strategies, 
supporting the central theoretical argument.
To further illustrate the contrasting success rates between peaceful and violent 
movements, I present a visual representation of these results in Fig. 2.  The horizontal 
axis on the graph indicates duration of time from year 1945 to year 2000. The vertical 
axis denotes the hazard rates. Hazard is the slope of the survival curve, or instantaneous 
failure rate, which represents how quickly territorial autonomies are formed. In other 
words, hazard rates depicted in the graph show the probability that an ethnic group that 
has not enjoyed territorial autonomy up to time t will attain it during the interval t+∆. 
The function represented by the solid line is constructed for a group that demands both 
autonomy and independence peacefully. The function shown by the dotted line 
illustrates the rate of autonomy formation for the group which demands autonomy and 
independence violently. All other variables in the model are held at their mean or mode 
values.
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Fig. 2. Hazard Rates of Territorial Autonomy Formation in the Context of Peaceful 
and Violent Group Tactics
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Other explanatory variables are held at their empirical average (continuous variables) or mode values (dichotomous).
Hazard Rates of Territorial Autonomy Formation
in the Context of Peaceful and Violent Group Tactics
The graph indicates that the rate of groups expressing peaceful demands to gain 
autonomy reaches approximately .3 almost immediately following the articulation of the 
demand. In contrast, groups that employ violent strategies have rates of gaining 
autonomy less than .1 at the start of the movement. In fact, the solid line representing 
peaceful tactics has higher rates of autonomy formation than the broken line at any given 
point in time. Strikingly, the lowest rate of autonomy formation attainable through 
nonviolent means (approximately .3 in year 1945) is higher than the highest rate of 
autonomy formation achievable by violent strategies (close to .2 in year 2000). While 
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both lines in the graph rise throughout the period, the solid line (representing peaceful 
groups) does so faster than the dotted line (representing violent groups). In other words, 
while the rate of obtaining autonomy is steadily increasing for groups employing 
violence, those using peaceful tactics consistently enjoy higher rates of success. 
None of the other variables appear to be statistically significant. Specifically, 
mediation by states and international organizations may not be effective due to the self-
selection of international mediators into the “difficult” cases. In other words, 
international mediators tend to intervene in the serious conflicts that involve significant 
violence. However, such intervention might not relieve the strife, since the dispute 
between central government and ethnic group has progressed to an irremediable degree.
Economic development of the state may have two different effects canceling 
each other out. On the one hand, a poorer state, in contrast to a wealthier central 
government, has a limited capacity to oppose the demands of ethnic groups for territorial 
autonomy. On the other hand, even if impoverished polities allow the formation of 
territorial autonomies, they have insufficient material base to help build the institutions 
of territorial autonomy or provide the necessary fiscal powers to the local authorities in 
order to do so.
Instability of political institutions within the central government, as hypothesis 7 
states, provides an opportunity for ethnic groups to establish territorial autonomy within 
the state. The insignificant results of my findings can be explained by a countervailing 
tendency of the general instability on the national level to prevent the establishment of 
viable subnational institutions.
48
Similar to the control variables elaborated above, the factors representing ethnic 
groups’ power propensity and settlement patterns are not significant either. The opposite 
influences of these factors may provide insight to the insignificant findings for these 
variables as well. Ethnic groups that boast large and territorially concentrated 
populations may advance legitimate demands for the autonomy forcing governments to 
accommodate their claims. However, it may also be the case that autonomy movements 
for larger populations (or those residing compactly on a given territory) might increase 
the concerns of national leaders. National policy makers may fear that provision of 
territorial autonomy would not appease ethnic groups, but provide them with higher 
capabilities for further demands and continuing unrest (van Cott 2001:52).
Although hypothesis 9 postulates that the presence of significant economic assets 
in ethnic homelands increases the odds an autonomy arrangement will emerge, the 
results indicate that the impact of this variable is not statistically significant. Devolution 
of fiscal and political powers to resourceful regions may lead to a successful extraction 
of resources from the ethnic territory and the subsequent enrichment of central 
governments’ coffers. Second, devolution of power, e.g. formation of territorial 
autonomy, could be used as a tool by central governments to appease economically-
powerful regions. While these considerations provide incentives for central governments 
to grant territorial autonomy, the desire  of national leaders to control every policy area 
on the subnational level (Riker 1964), especially lavish resources, may preclude 
establishment of territorial autonomies.
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Democracy variable does not yield expected results in my statistical analysis 
either. The explanation to this finding lies in the different dynamics of interaction 
between ethnic groups and central governments as observed in democracies and 
authoritarian regimes. Unfortunately, these dynamics cannot be captured by the “main 
effect” of the democracy variable. Consequently, I split my sample into democracies 
(POLITY score > 5) and autocracies (POLITY score <  – 5) to obtain the effect of ethnic 
groups’ tactics contingent on the level of democratization of central governments.
As Table 4 indicates, democracies tend to give a positive response to nonviolent 
expressions of autonomy demands. A one unit change in the intensity of peaceful 
movements increases the odds of autonomy formation by 82 percent. In contrast, 
democracies respond negatively to the demands for a full-fledged independence. A one 
unit increase in peaceful secession demands decreases the likelihood of territorial 
autonomy formation by more than 99 percent. None of the violent demands variables is 
statistically significant. This implies that democracies are responsive only to peaceful 
demands. Yet, to achieve territorial autonomy within democracies peaceful demands are 
not sufficient. Groups striving to attain ethnic homeland have to express only reasonable 
demands that do not threaten territorial integrity of a democratic polity.
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Among other factors, mediation by international organization in democracies 
surprisingly has a negative effect on territorial autonomy formation decreasing its odds 
by almost 100 percent. Due to their relatively limited capacities, international 
organizations are likely to mediate most serious cases, which, in turn, may be too grave 
to be promptly resolved by a third party. Group capability and population ratios have a 
negative effect on the formation of territorial autonomy in democracies. One unit 
increase in both factors is associated with more than 99 percent reduction in the odds of 
territorial autonomy formation. This outcome is in line with the discussion above, which 
points out that democracies do not respond well to violent demands for an increased self-
governance. In other words, larger group capabilities are not likely to push democracies 
to grant autonomy concessions to ethnic groups. 
In contrast, concentrated groups which constitute majority on a given territory 
are 494 percent more likely to attain territorial autonomy (Table 4). Such groups have
certainly the ability to mobilize larger capabilities than dispersed collectivities in their 
drive for autonomy. However, this outcome is better explained by the legitimacy that 
such groups enjoy in the eyes of decision makers in democratic states (Toft 2003)21.
                                                          
21 Testing the theory using only post-Cold War cases produces the results that similarly support the 
proposed theory. Hazard ratios for peaceful self-governance demands are in the expected direction (2.21 
for secession demands and 3.11 for autonomy demands) and statistically significant at less than .001 level. 
The violent independence demand variable is not statistically significant (p=.531) with a hazard ratio of 
1.17. The violent demand for autonomy is statistically significant (p=.043). However, its hazard ratio –
1.42 – is much lower than that for both peaceful independence and peaceful autonomy demands.
51
Table 4. Determinants of Territorial Autonomy Formation in Democracies,
 1945-2000
Variable Coefficient
Hazard 
Ratio
Revised Hazard Rate/ Base 
Hazard Rate
.60** 1.82**Peaceful Autonomy Demand
(.24) (.44)
1.82
-25.40** .00**Peaceful Independence 
Demand (1.20) (.00)
.00
.09 1.10
Violent Autonomy Demand
(.26) (.28)
1.10
.10 1.10Violent Independence 
Demand (.17) (.18)
1.10
Nature of the Dispute
3.11 22.41
Mediation by a State
(2.75) (61.61)
22.41
-28.66** .00**Mediation by an International 
Organization (2.24) (.00)
.00
Government Characteristics
.06 1.06Economic Development of 
the State 1.12 (.13)
1.06
-.00 1.00 1.00Stability of Political 
Institutions (.01) (.01)
Ethnic Group Characteristics
-139142.70** .00**Groups' Capability Ratio 
(vis-à-vis the state) (18272.02) (.00)
.00
-6.77** .00**Groups' Population Ratio 
(vis-à-vis the state) (3.21) (.00)
.00
1.78* 5.94Concentrated Majority in the 
Region (1.03) (6.11)*
5.94
.11 1.12
Resources in the Region
(1.06) (1.19)
1.12
-517.05**Constant
(144.36)
Subjects 150
Autonomies Formed 12
Number of observations 2568
Log pseudolikelihood 22.51983
Wald chi2(13) 3720.53
Prob>chi2 0.0000
Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. All significance tests are two-tailed.
**p=<.05, *p<.1`
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Table 5 represents the results for territorial autonomy formation in authoritarian 
regimes. In contrast to democracies, authoritarian regimes respond very negatively to 
peaceful expression of demands for higher self-governance. For both peaceful autonomy 
and independence demands, one unit increase in the intensity of demands results in 
almost a 100 percent decrease in the odds of territorial autonomy formation. Similarly, 
when groups express limited demands for self-governance, i.e. autonomy, autocratic 
regimes tend to revoke, rather than grant, the freedoms for such collectivities. A one unit 
increase in the violent demands for territorial autonomy is associated with a 99 percent 
decrease in the odds of territorial autonomy formation. It is only when groups express 
their desires violently and bluntly demand an outright independence authoritarian 
regimes grant territorial autonomies. A one unit increase in violent independence 
demands results in a 105 percent increase in the likelihood of territorial autonomy 
formation.
It is not surprising that autocratic regimes enjoying higher state capacity are more 
confident in denying territorial autonomies to ethnic groups. As the results indicate, a 
$1,000 increase in the per capita income within an authoritarian state decreases the 
likelihood of territorial autonomy formation by 89 percent (Table 5). The fact that 
groups’ population ratio is associated with a positive influence on the formation of 
territorial autonomy arrangements indicates that autocracies respect power rather than 
peaceful demands. The status of a concentrated majority within a territory tends to 
decrease the likelihood of territorial autonomy formation for ethnic groups in a non-
democratic setting. I link it to the idea that legitimacy ethnic collectivities enjoy by 
53
virtue of being concentrated majorities in a region tends to intimidate authoritarian 
regimes forcing them to refuse the formation of an institutionalized ethnic homeland on 
the given land.
Table 5. Determinants of Territorial Autonomy Formation in Autocracies,
 1945-2000
Variable Coefficient
Hazard 
Ratio
Revised Hazard Rate/ Base 
Hazard Rate
-14.37** .00**Peaceful Autonomy Demand
(1.52) (.00)
.00
-7.85** .00**Peaceful Independence 
Demand (.72) (.00)
.00
-5.28** .01**
Violent Autonomy Demand
(1.44) (.01)
.01
.72** 2.05**Violent Independence 
Demand (.15) (.31)
2.05
Nature of the Dispute
.39 1.48
Mediation by a State
(.55) (.81)
1.48
1.21 3.35Mediation by an International 
Organization (.82) (2.75)
3.35
Government Characteristics
-2.19* .11*Economic Development of 
the State (1.22) (.14)
.11
-.00 1.00Stability of Political 
Institutions (.00) (.00)
1.00
Ethnic Group Characteristics
-3.49 .03Groups' Capability Ratio 
(vis-à-vis the state) (3.04) (.09)
.03
2.46** 11.66**Groups' Population Ratio 
(vis-à-vis the state) (.74) (8.68)
11.66
-16.45** .00**Concentrated Majority in the 
Region (.70) (.00)
.00
3.26** 26.05**
Resources in the Region
(1.21) (31.45)
26.05
-457.91*Constant
(245.52)
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Table 5 Continued 
Variable Coefficient
Hazard 
Ratio
Revised Hazard Rate/ Base 
Hazard Rate
Subjects 120
Autonomies Formed 3
Number of observations 2921
Log pseudolikelihood 8.3805756
Wald chi2(12) 24027.34
Prob>chi2 .0000
Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. All significance tests are two-tailed.
**p=<.05, *p<.1
Conclusion
In this chapter I have dealt with the major question of this dissertation, namely, 
why territorial autonomies are formed. I have found previous literature on this topic 
sparse and unsatisfactory as it primarily dwells on the factors associated with violence in 
order to explain formation of territorial autonomy arrangements. Drawing on the body 
literature that deals with nonviolent resistance, I, in contrast, have proposed that states 
are more responsive to the needs of ethnic groups that employ nonviolent tactics.
This proposition then has been empirically tested using duration analysis model. 
The statistical analysis suggests that nonviolent movements are indeed more effective at 
achieving territorial autonomy than ethnic groups that employ violence. The results 
further suggest that success of peaceful tactics varies across regimes types. Specifically, 
in democratic polities group demanding territorial autonomy through peaceful means are 
likely to achieve it, whereas in authoritarian context this proves not to be the case.
55
While this chapter increases our knowledge and understanding of the origins of 
territorial autonomy formation by proposing and testing an innovative idea, it, however, 
raises an important question. As has been shown above, 27 ethnic groups express their 
demands for an increased self-governance peacefully, while 67 have employed violence 
at some point in time. If the theory and results suggested in this chapter are correct, then 
why so many rational ethnic collectivities choose to employ violence? I address this 
question in the subsequent chapter claiming that their choice of tactics is contingent 
upon groups’ initial strength.
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CHAPTER III
BETWEEN PEACE AND VIOLENCE: RESOLVING THE STRATEGY 
DILEMMA OF ETHNIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS
The question that arises from the previous chapter is why do some ethnic 
collectivities employ violence, when it appears that peaceful strategies are more 
effective? In other words, what determines the choice of peaceful, as opposed to violent, 
tactics by ethnic groups? I deal with this question in this chapter. To answer this 
question, I employ the general rational choice / collective action framework, which 
represents the state of the art in the extant literature on ethnic strife. In doing so I adhere
to the idea presented and tested in the previous chapter that peaceful strategies are the 
most effective tools for achieving territorial autonomy. In this chapter, I further develop 
this idea by examining the constraints on the choice of peaceful tactics forcing ethnic 
groups to employ violence. While some of these limits, such as the level of 
democratization of the polity, have been discussed in the previous chapter22, below I 
study in greater detail the factor of initial strength largely responsible for the choice of 
violent, as opposed to peaceful, tactics.
In this chapter I assume that any ethnic group is engaged in a two-level decision-
making process. First, members of ethnic collectivities have to decide whether to engage 
in a collective action or not. Subsequently, those groups that elect to voice their 
discontent are faced with the choice of tactics – whether to express their grievances 
                                                          
22 The results from the previous chapter suggest that governments’ level of democracy influences success 
of peaceful tactics. It would reasonable to suggest, therefore, that ethnic group leaders may rationally 
calculate the chances of their success based on the level of democratization while choosing their tactics.
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peacefully or violently. The current literature largely overlooks the second level of group 
decision-making. Instead, most scholars are concerned with explaining either general 
collective action or, more exclusively, violent group behavior.
Although the question of strategy choice has received only limited attention in 
the current literature on mass violence, the insight from this body of work is helpful in 
elucidating the distinction between peaceful and violent action adopted by ethnic groups. 
Accordingly, below I draw on the relevant literature to discuss the factors affecting both 
levels of decision making. I specifically emphasize valuable and easily extractable 
resources, which contribute to private material benefits, as one of the most pertinent 
determinants in the choice of political tactics.
Relative Deprivation Argument
An important literature on civil and ethnic conflict developed since 1970s sees 
psychological factors, especially, relative deprivation as a major force beneath violent 
behavior (see, e.g., Gurr 1971). The seminal work by Ted Robert Gurr  Why Men Rebel 
(Gurr 1971), in particular, proposes a connection between perceived deprivation and 
frustration in its frustration-anger-aggression theory. Gurr further elaborates on the 
frustration-aggression proposition positing that “the grater the frustration, the greater the 
quantity of aggression against the source of frustration” (9). These postulates provide 
basis for his initial proposition regarding political violence, that the magnitude of 
political violence directly depends on the intensity of deprivation (9).
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The theory further details four psychocultural variables that determine humans’ 
levels of discontent – perceived discrepancy between expectations and capabilities, 
importance of the affected values, the number of other satisfactions to fall back, and the 
quantity of the alternative ways to satisfy one’s discontent. Specifying the importance of 
time, it is also claimed that anger denied expression in the short run intensifies before it 
quiets (Gurr 1971). This theory has  been empirically tested and received some support 
in quantitative studies (Gurr and Moore 1997).
Rational Choice/Collective Action Framework
Building on the argument developed in the relative deprivation literature, the 
collective action framework sees injustice and deprivation as constant incentives and 
necessary conditions underlying collective violence (e.g., Collier 2000; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Lichbach 1995). Despite importance attributed to relative deprivation, 
scholars adhering to this framework place much of the explanatory power on the 
opportunities to rebel.
In general, current rational choice models suggest that it is inherently irrational 
for any single member of a group to engage in a collective rebellion even in the presence 
of objective grievances. Group members realize if they act collectively, they may attain 
public good that benefits everybody within the group. However, the indivisible nature of 
public goods and high cost of rebellion pose a significant obstacle to the very formation 
of a collective violent action. In particular, an individual group member is able to receive 
benefits even if she does not engage in a collective action because she cannot be 
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excluded from receiving collective goods. Moreover, uncertainty regarding the 
involvement of other group members in the rebellion suggests an inherently high cost 
associated with the upheaval (Tong 1991:87; Lichbach 1995). If an individual ethnic 
group member engages in a rebellion, she may find herself alone bearing the costs of 
police or military brutality as other group members abstain from rebelling. Hence, the 
safest and most rational outcome is not engaging in rebellion at all.
Despite their seeming irrationality, rebellions, nevertheless, do occur. The major 
challenge that scholar have faced in this respect is the question how collective action is 
overcome by group members (e.g., Lichbach 1995). The extant literature on the subject 
has made substantive progress offering various explanations that enrich our knowledge 
of how collective action is circumvented. Below I examine in greater detail an important 
factor related to the opportunities of ethnic groups for collective action – their private 
material benefits. In doing so, I draw on the “greed vs. grievance” literature and the 
notion of the “weapon of the weak” suggested by Scott (Scott 1985).
Private Rewards/Selective Incentives and Collective Action
Organizations formed to carry out collective action—protest or rebellion—are 
the primary entities providing selective incentives through their institutional structure. 
Lichbach distinguishes between self-governing rebel institutions and externally 
organized groups, both of which offer private rewards to their members. There are five 
techniques provided by self-governing rebel institutions that maximize selective 
incentives and six offered by externally organized groups. The methods practiced by 
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self-governing organizations are “conspiracy of silence”, absence of formal organization, 
covert struggle, small scale resistance, and clandestine, surreptitious, and concealed 
opposition (Lichbach 1995:228). These organizations emerge spontaneously and are 
especially prominent in peasant dissent (228), as well as in “the structure of mafias, 
peasant armies, social bandits, and base areas” (229).
More relevant for the contemporary long-standing ethnic rebels and protesters 
are externally organized groups. Political entrepreneurs within those groups realize that 
they need to design a peculiar organization to be able to carry out three important 
duties—1) acquire resources; 2) secure the inflow of new members; and 3) keep current 
membership (Lichbach 1995). Fulfillment of the last two tasks critically depends on the 
entrepreneurs’ ability to offer private rewards, i.e. on their first task. Normally, resources 
are obtained and distributed through 1) plundering, 2) expropriating from those outside 
the organization and giving to those inside, 3) privatizing a certain issue, good, or 
grievance of interest to group members, 4) challenging the central government’s 
monopoly on state institutions by establishing local (proto)governments serving on 
behalf of the group’s supporters, 5) seeking patrons who could provide such private 
rewards, and 6) selectively awarding expensive resources to the professional and high-
value elites while providing cheaper private rewards to others (Lichbach 1995).
Therefore, rebellions might arise due to the aspirations of rebels to grasp material 
wealth through illegal means (Collier 2000). Grievances in this process play only a 
secondary role, if any, according to collective action theorists. Although grievances 
might exist, revealing them in an empirical analysis is argued to be problematic and at 
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times misleading. Successful rebel groups, for instance, may not admit that they are 
concerned about material benefits, concealing their behavior and true intentions by 
expressing the grievances of deprivation. Moreover, it has been pointed out that some 
entrepreneurs within rebel groups may even be convinced by their own propaganda of 
grievances (Collier 2000). Further, as pointed out above, formation and survival of rebel 
groups heavily depend on recruitment. Hence, to boost the numbers of participants, 
leaders of such groups could play up grievances as a motivating factor. Similarly, as the 
size of the group grows, the marginal returns from membership in the rebel group 
diminish. Consequently, the rhetoric of grievances could be used in order to compensate 
for the reduction in divisible material resources (Collier 2000).
In the end of the day, it is valuable and easily extractable resources that make the 
largest contribution for breaking down the collective action problem and precipitating 
rebellion. These resources include drugs, oil, diamonds as well as metals, such as gold. 
Significant resources can be obtained directly from the areas where ethnic groups live, 
but might also be made available by “patron” ethnic kins and diasporas from abroad.
It is also reported that rivalry for the control for such commodities encourages 
violence between groups. As Tilly points out, Jamaica’s position as the place with the 
highest murder rate in the Caribbean is in part due to the clashes between armed gangs. 
The frequency of such shootings is, in turn, explained by the important position of 
Jamaica in the trafficking of cocaine to the United Kingdom and the United States (Tilly 
2003:71). In America’s inner cities, according to Courtwright, crack has similarly 
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“produced violent disputes over rip-offs and territories, and financed the acquisition of 
automatic weapons” (Courtwright 1996).
This explanation is important for our understanding of violent rebellion as a 
general collective action phenomenon, but can also be employed to explain the 
distinction between peaceful protest and violent tactics. In other words, groups with a 
more limited access to easily extractable resources would have to resort to tactics other 
than violence. The metaphorical notion of the “weapons of the weak” borrowed from 
James C. Scott (Scott 1985) is especially pertinent in this regard. In his study of 
Malaysian villagers, Scott examines symbolic resistance by weak groups. Such 
resistance is short of an open and public defiance, such as invasion of the landlord’s 
land. Instead, weak groups employ only minimal standards of politeness, gossiping, 
generating a bad reputation for the rich among the villagers. What is implied here is the 
impression of compliance for the sake of minimizing the substance of the prescribed 
behavior (Scott 1985:26).
Similar behavior is seen in other social contexts. A study of Soviet labor in the 
1980s connected the reluctant compliance of the Soviet labor force with the falling 
productivity of labor in the country (Oxenstierna 1990). More, in the literature on 
American slavery, in the conditions of a costly violent behavior, stubborn resistance was 
largely confined to “foot dragging, false compliance, flight, feigned ignorance, sabotage, 
theft, and, not the least, cultural resistance” (Scott 1985:35). Such actions fall under the 
category of peaceful strategies.
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H1: The choice of strategies by group entrepreneurs depends on the level of 
resources for private rewards available to rebel/protest group members. Limited 
resources available for redistribution lead peaceful protest as the primary resistance 
tactic. Abundant resources available for redistribution prompt group entrepreneurs to 
select violent protest as the resistance strategy.
As noted above, valuable and easily extractable resources include oil, drugs, 
diamonds, metals, such as gold, and can be obtained directly from the areas of ethnic 
homeland and/or through ethnic kins and diasporas living abroad.
Oil data are obtained from Fearon and Laitin (2003). This variable is 
dichotomous and ranges between 0 and 1. A group is assigned a value of 1 if oil 
constitutes more than a third of the exports of the country, in which the group lives; 0 is 
given to all other instances. Mizos in India is an example of ethnic collectivities with 
low access to oil (0). In contrast, Shi’is in Saudi Arabia are among the groups with the 
highest availability of oil resources (1).
Good comparable data on illegal cultivation and transportation of drugs are not 
available23. Therefore, raw agricultural products’ share in exports of the countries where 
groups reside is used as a proxy for groups’ ability to cultivate drugs. Koreans in Japan 
is an example of groups with the lowest access to such resources (0 percent); Chinese in 
Vietnam are assigned the highest score of 86 percent. These data are obtained from 
World Development Indicators. Data on production and the reserves of diamonds are not 
                                                          
23 Personal email correspondence with officers at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) of the United Nations Office at Vienna (UNOV), Austria.
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reported by the producing states due to commercial considerations. This factor, 
therefore, is not analyzed in this chapter empirically. Export share of metals and ores are 
used as a proxy for groups’ access to other valuable mineral resources, such as gold and 
silver. Biharis in Bangladesh is one of the groups that have the lowest score of 0 on this 
indicator, whereas Bolivian groups (such as Lowland Indians) are assigned the highest 
value of 92. These data are obtained from World Development Indicators as well.
I have also used the general variable on the availability of natural and manmade 
resources in the specific territories, in which groups live. For this variable I have used a 
dichotomous indicator from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data complemented by 
Monica Toft.
Data on kins living abroad comes from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset as 
well. Variable GC10 (Transnational dispersion—kindred groups) is used to capture this 
factor. Value 1 is assigned if the group does not have a kin adjoining an international 
border; a 2 is given to groups that have close kins across the border in countries that do 
not adjoin groups’ regional bases – groups with no regional bases are coded as such; 
groups that have no close kins in states that adjoin groups’ regional bases are assigned a 
score of 3; if the group has a close kindred across the border that adjoins its regional 
base, the group receives a score of 4; 5 is assigned to groups that have more than 1 close 
kindred across the international border in countries that adjoin groups regional base. 
Kumyks in Russia are one of the groups that is given the lowest score of 1, whereas 
Baluchis and Arabs in Iran are examples of ethnic groups that have the highest score of 
5.
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Alternative Opportunity Explanations: Income, Settlement Patterns, 
Mountainous and Forested Terrain, and Cold War 
Current academic work has identified a number of other opportunity variables 
responsible for collective action by ethnic groups. For instance, it has been claimed that 
per capita income is associated with the lower likelihood of civil wars. First, it serves as 
a proxy of the general state capacity, including the military, financial and administrative 
capabilities of the central government. Second, more developed states are able to 
penetrate deeper into the countryside and the remote areas by building a stronger web of 
communication, such as roads. Further, recruitment of young males as guerilla warriors 
become easier in the conditions of lower per capita income in the state (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003).
H2: GDP per capita tends to increase the likelihood of ethnic mobilization and 
violence.
The measure of economic development, GDP per capita, was obtained from 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) (http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/). These data are adjusted to 
1985 constant US dollars.
An important study by Monica Toft examines the influence of geography on 
ethnic leaders’ choice of violence (as opposed to peaceful tactics) and posits that group 
concentration and its share within the population of the state is an important predictor of 
strategy choice (Toft 2003). As her study contends, geographical settlement patterns 
foster legitimacy and capability for ethnic groups’ claims and actions.
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H3: Large ethnic group population is associated with the increase in the 
likelihood of violence. Low ethnic group population corresponds to peaceful protest.
Data for the size of ethnic groups are extrapolated using the MAR time points. 
The lowest population ratio of a group relative to the state is among the Karachay in 
Russia—0.05; the largest is among the Black Moors in Mauritania. In the case of 
demographic variables, for a number of years, the data for ethnic groups are extrapolated 
using the initial MAR time points.
H4: Concentration of ethnic groups and their status as regional majorities 
facilitates violent action. Dispersion of ethnic groups and their minority status is likely to 
be associated with nonviolent protest tactics.
To capture this variable I am using the MAR data complemented by Toft (2003). 
Arabs in Iran are an example of a regionally concentrated majority group, whereas the 
Karachay in Russia are not a concentrated regional majority. Values range from 0 to 1 
with 1 representing the most concentrated settlement pattern for regional groups.
Similarly, scholars have suggested that mountainous or forested terrain, as well 
as separation of ethnic territories by water or land from the seat of the central 
government, may precipitate violent rebellion (Fearon and Laitin 2003).
H5: Mountainous and forested terrain increases the likelihood of violence. Un-
forested areas and plains are conducive to peaceful action.
Fearon and Laitin’s MTNEST variable (estimated % of mountainous terrain) 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003) is used to capture the mountainous terrain variable. The 
minimum score for this variable in the dataset is 0.00. Groups, such as Poles and 
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Russians in Lithuania are assigned this score. Lhotshampa in Bhutan have the highest 
score of 94 percent. Since data on world forests are not available for the time frame 
under consideration, this factor is not included in the final equation.
Presence of the Cold War is another variable that provides an opportunity for 
ethnic groups to engage in collective action and rebellion. During the Cold War one 
superpower had incentives to help insurgents in the third countries, the governments of 
which, in turn, had been supported by the rival superpower. For instance, while the US 
government supported rightist regimes in Latin America, the Soviet Union and Cuba 
helped armed insurgents (Fearon and Laitin 2003:82). Moreover, the fact that the Soviet 
Union supported governments in Eastern Europe under the “Brezhnev doctrine”  (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003:82) as the U.S. sponsored radio stations encouraged East European 
publics to rebel against their communist governments, makes the arguments for such 
support elsewhere in the world quite plausible. If anything, therefore, the aftermath of 
the end Cold War era would negatively affect eruption of ethnic conflicts24 (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2000). Under the circumstances of the severed funding and the lack of 
resources to wage wars, rebellious ethnic groups and states alike have more incentives to 
stop fighting.
H6: Incentives for ethnic groups to employ peaceful tactics are higher in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. The resort to violent action is more common during the Cold 
War.
                                                          
24 As Fearon and Laitin argue, increase of civil wars in the early 1990s was not due to the effects of the 
Cold War, but rather due to disintegration of the USSR. Immediately after that, however, a sharp decline 
in the number of ethnic wars is observable.
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Years between 1945 and 1988 have been coded as the Cold War era. Post-1989 
period has been designated as the post-Cold War years.
Discrimination and Grievances
In accordance with the relative deprivation argument, higher levels of economic, 
cultural, and political grievances may be associated with the greater odds of political 
mobilization and ethnic strife. Consequently, I control for the discrimination and 
grievance factors as well.
H7: Ethnic group grievances are associated with the greater likelihood of 
political mobilization and violence.
Ethnic groups’ dissatisfaction with their economic, political, and cultural status is 
approximated by the salience of the idea for greater territorial autonomy and even 
independence among ethnic group members. To capture the salience of territorial 
autonomy I have used MAR variables AUTGR4/AUTGR5. Value 0 is assigned if the 
group does not have an autonomy grievance, score 2 is given if the issue of lesser 
importance/salience, 3 is assigned if the issue is significant/relative importance unclear, 
4 – if the issue is highly salient/important to most within the group. The variable 
representing independence grievances takes score 1 if independence grievances are 
present and 0 if none have been detected. MAR variable AUTGR3 was used to code this 
variable for the 1980s-90s. For both variables, missing data for the decades preceding 
1980 were complemented using Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. If no contradictory 
information was found, the data from the archives was extrapolated to the rest of the 
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decade, as public sentiment within the group regarding autonomy or independence 
grievances were likely to persist. If no information was found in a decade regarding 
territorial autonomy, no autonomy or independence demands were recorded.
Democracy
Democratic polities grant people a number of important civil liberties, including 
the rights to vote, freedom of association and immunity from persecution. Tolerance of 
minority cultures and languages are arguably more widespread in democratic polities 
than in autocracies. Therefore, states’ respect for civil liberties is likely to result in a 
lower level of repression and less grievances.
H8: Collective action and violence are more likely in autocracies than 
democracies.
The democracy variable is constructed by combing autocracy and democracy 
scores employing variables from Polity IV project. Data are obtained using Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) (http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/).
Ethnic Fractionalization 
It has been argued that multiethnic societies are in general prone to conflict. 
Monica Toft (Toft 2003), for instance, has shown that in ethnically diverse polities 
conflict is more likely due to the negative precedence, such as secession, set by some 
ethnic groups. Central governments in multiethnic societies are keener to prevent such 
precedents, increasing the odds that groups’ demands turn violent. Similarly, Barbara 
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Walter (Walter 2006) connects violence in multiethnic states to the desire of central 
governments to keep tough reputation. The analysis of literature by Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) similarly concludes that ethnically fractioned societies are violence-prone.
H9: Ethnic fractionalization is associated with higher levels of political 
mobilization and violence.
The number of politically-relevant ethnic collectivities present in the country is 
used to operationalize the ethnic fractionalization score. Minorities at Risk dataset 
complemented by Monica Toft has been employed as the data source for this variable.
Case Selection and Method
In the statistical analysis I consider the potential of violence for each ethnic 
group listed in the MAR dataset for the years between 1945 and 2000 that may express 
discontent.  This includes minority groups that constitute at least one percent of their 
country’s population or have 100,000 members or more. Groups included in this study 
reside in the countries with a population of at least 500,000 and who either benefit or 
suffer from discriminatory practices or have mobilized in defense or support of its 
perceived interest. This constitutes a total of 197 ethnic communities within 95 states.25
The question that the statistical analysis helps elucidate is why some groups 
choose to employ violent strategies, while others use peaceful tactics. To test the theory 
one might be tempted to select only those groups who are engaged in collective action, 
                                                          
25 Only those groups classified by MAR as ethnonational, indigenous, ethno-class, religious sect, or 
national minority are included in the analysis.
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both peaceful and violent. Consequently, the sample employed for testing the hypotheses 
discussed above would not be randomly selected. This is problematic, as there might be 
some included and omitted variables that influence both selection of cases into the 
sample as well as the ensuing outcome. In other words, there might be an unmeasured 
(and immeasurable) variable, such as an innate propensity of group members for 
dissatisfaction, which, along with the measured variables, influences selection of cases 
into the model (the “selection”, or “collective action”, model), but also explains the 
choice of violent strategies (the “outcome”, or “strategy choice” model) as also do 
measured factors. In this case, standard statistical methods, such as logit and OLS would 
yield inaccurate estimates (Sartori 2003).
This problem of the “two-step models” is not unique to this study. As Sartori 
mentions, many interesting phenomena in politics follow this pattern. These include the 
choice of going to war and the subsequent decisions to vote or select a new form of 
government after the war. An increasing number of studies, therefore, are using 
statistical methods to circumvent the selection bias problem. Chief among them are the 
Heckman Selection Model and its derivatives (e.g., Heckman 1974). The Heckman 
Selection model, however, requires an extra explanatory variable for the selection stage, 
but not for the outcome model. Theoretically, and as shown above, it is difficult to come 
up with an extra factor that influences groups’ decision to engage in a collective action, 
but does not explain groups’ aggressive behavior from nonviolent tactics.
Sartori (2003) offers a more appropriate method to circumvent this issue. She 
develops a maximum likelihood estimator for the identical factors that influence both the 
72
equation of interest as well as the selection model with binomial dependent variables. 
This statistical technique is used to test the hypotheses stated above. Due to the concern 
that regional effects may bias final results, I also control for five geographical zones –
Western Europe/North America, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Northern 
Africa/Middle East26.
Table 6. Determinants of Collective Action (“Selection”) and Strategy Choice 
(“Outcome”) Models
        Selection Outcome
Private Material Rewards
.52*** 0.71**
Access to Oil
(.11) (.24)
.00 .04***Access to Raw Agricultural 
Products (.00) (.01)
.01*** .00
Access to Metals and Ore
(.00) (.01)
-.35** -1.54***Resources in the Ethnic 
Homeland (.10) (.26)
.05** .24***
Presence of Kins across Border
(.02) (.06)
Opportunity Variables
.02** -.04
GDP per Capita
(.02) (.04)
.61** -1.75**
Population Ratio
(.22) (.64)
.05 3.51
Regional Concentration
(.12) (8.14)
.18** -1.05***
Regional Majority
(.09) (.27)
-.01*** -.03***
Mountainous Terrain (%)
(.00) (.01)
-.78*** .14
Cold War
(.10) (.21)
                                                          
26 Eastern Europe has been excluded as a reference category.
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Table 6 Continued
Relative Deprivation Selection Outcome
.49*** .88***
Autonomy Grievances
(.05) (.09)
-.23 -.86**
Independence Grievances
(.15) (.26)
-.04* .01
Ethnic Fractionalization
(.02) (.03)
.01* -.02
Democracy Score
(.01) (.02)
-.01 -10.4
Constant
(.26) (11.5)
Number of observations 1878
Wald chi2(20) 407.73
Prob > chi2 0.00
Log likelihood -187.6397
Results
As the results indicate (Table 6), there is a pattern of similarity between the 
selection model and the outcome model of interest in terms of the effects of the causal 
factors. Two variables representing private material benefits – access to oil and presence 
of ethnic kins across border are significant and in the expected direction. Among other 
opportunity variables, population ratio and regional majority status are statistically 
significant as well. However, access to raw agricultural products is significant only in 
the “outcome” model, while access to metals and ore are statistically different from zero 
solely in the “selection” model.
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Moreover, the “outcome” model that predicts the eruption of violence, as 
opposed to peaceful action, exhibits a more limited number of statistically significant 
factors than the “selection” model. These factors are access to oil, the relationship to the 
kins abroad, presence of manmade and natural resources in the ethnic homeland, 
population ratio, mountainous terrain, regional majority status, and autonomy 
grievances.
There is also a difference in the magnitudes of the effects of the variables in both 
models. Among the private rewards/selective incentive variables, access to oil enhances 
the likelihood of being “selected” into a collective action by 19.85 percent. A one-
standard deviation shift in the exports of ore and metals from the mean score of 10.61 
results in a 5.83 percent positive change in the odds of ethnic groups selecting to engage 
in a collective action. Increasing the value of cross-border kins by one standard deviation 
from its mean of 3.16, which approximately corresponds to having no close kins in states 
that adjoin groups’ regional bases (3), to 4.67 (approximates to groups that have more 
than 1 close kindred across the international border in countries that adjoin groups’ 
regional base) is associated with a 2.82 percent rise in the likelihood of collective action. 
Other opportunity variables—resources in the homeland, population ratio, mountainous 
terrain, and regional majority, exhibit influence on probabilities of collective action in 
the following magnitudes. Access to general manmade or natural resources in the region 
decreases the likelihood of group involvement in collective action by 18.66 percent. One 
standard deviation increase in the group – state population ratio from the mean of 12:100 
to 29:100 is associated with a 3.81 percent increase in collective action. Regional 
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majority status of ethnic groups results in a 6.64 percent enhancement in the probability 
of collective action. Cold War, as hypothesized is associated with a 30.02 percent 
increase in the likelihood of collective action.
In contrast, in the “outcome” model, varying statistically significant factors 
individually by one standard deviation (or one unit for dichotomous variables) while 
holding other factors constant at the mean or mode, does not show a substantive increase 
in the likelihood of groups employing violent, as opposed to peaceful, tactics. In fact, the 
likelihood of violence remains at a level close to 0 percent despite a shift in any 
statistically significant factor. However, when all factors in the model are increased by 
one standard deviation (one unit for dichotomous variables) a substantial increase in the 
odds of ethnic groups selecting violent tactics is observed.
Variables associated with grievances – level of democratization and autonomy 
grievances – have different effects on the formation of collective action. While a one-
standard deviation change in the democracy score (from its mean of .16 to 7.28) leads to 
a 4.13 percent decrease in the likelihood of collective action, a one-standard deviation 
shift in autonomy grievances (from the mean of 1.37 to 2.23) is associated with 16.06 
percent increase in the odds of collective action. Increasing ethnic fractionalization by 
one standard deviation from its mean (of 4.77 to 6.80) leads to a 41.15 percent rise in the 
odds of collective action.
76
Discussion and Conclusions
These empirical findings reveal the importance of material rewards and selective 
incentives in explaining both the group decisions to mobilize and engage in violence. 
The effect of these variables is especially vivid in explaining the first stage of ethnic 
group decision making, in which groups elect to take part in a collective action or 
abstain from it. The statistical significance of two important private material rewards
variables – access to oil and support of kindred groups across the border – is also evident 
in the second stage of decision-making, which involves the choice between peaceful and 
violent strategies. However, the magnitude of those effects depends on the underlying 
conditions informed by other variables. When all other explanatory variables are kept at 
their mean or mode levels, the substantive influence of private rewards and material 
benefits on the likelihood of groups choosing violent strategies is close to 0 percent. 
However, if a hypothetical authoritarian state (Polity = – 10) located in Western Europe 
is assumed to be a home to two ethnic groups, the group that has access to oil is 5.26 
percent more likely to choose violent tactics than a nonviolent strategy. Under such 
circumstances (Polity = – 10 and Western Europe = 1), proximity of kin groups across 
the border (one standard deviation shift from the mean) enhances the odds of resorting to 
violence, as opposed to peaceful tactics, by almost two percent. After adding the 
condition of an extreme salience of autonomy grievances (Autonomy Grievances = 4), 
access to oil increases the likelihood of groups choosing violence tactics by 25.19 
percent. Under the increased grievance condition a one standard deviation shift in the 
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cross-border support of ethnic kins enhances the odds of electing violent strategies by 
13.77 percent.
These results thus suggest that ethnic groups choose violence when they have 
both incentives and opportunities for doing so. Specifically, access to easily extractable 
resources under the condition of grievances is among the key factors explaining the 
distinction between violent and peaceful protest strategies.
It is curious to see that in both equations, amount of mountainous terrain exhibits 
statistically negative results – in the direction different than expected. This finding points 
to the idea that mountains prove to be an obstacle for the occurrence of collective action, 
and violence, in particular. Central governments usually have better intelligence than 
ethnic groups, and are almost certainly in possession of higher military capabilities. 
Natural borders, such as mountains and rivers, while providing an opportunity for ethnic 
groups to engage in violence, make it also difficult for them to concentrate the necessary 
forces for a prolonged action. The statistical analysis shows that this effect is superior to 
the one hypothesized in the extant literature.
It is also curious that the access to the general manmade and natural resources 
shows a significant result in the direction opposite than expected. These results are likely 
to suggest that ethnic territories with an extensive industrial potential are generally 
wealthier and have more to lose by engaging in collective action and violence, 
specifically, than groups with no such opportunities. 
According to Hypothesis 2, GDP per capita tends to increase the likelihood of 
ethnic mobilization and violence. Contrary to the expectations, the findings show that 
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income levels do not play any significant role in explaining mobilization and strategy 
choice by ethnic groups. It is likely that income has a mixed effect on strategy choice 
canceling out any significant impact on the eruption of violence and collective action, 
more broadly. While for some group members income provides an opportunity to rebel, 
others view their standard of living as a costly commodity to lose, if they chose to 
engage in violence.
While showing a similarity between the two levels of ethnic groups’ decision-
making, this statistical analysis also points to a difference between them. Specifically, 
ethnic collectivities seem to take a more holistic approach in their choice of tactics 
(second, or “outcome” level) than in the decision to engage in collective action (first, or 
“selection” level). However, private material resources, such as access to easily 
extractable resources, are among the key factors explaining both levels of decision-
making. A major policy implication of this dissertation, therefore, relates to the 
relationship between ethnic entrepreneurs and incentives they are able to provide to their 
group members. To the extent that halting access to easily extractable resources, such as 
oil and drugs, is possible, the production and supply routes for these items should be 
severed to reduce the likelihood of violence. Similarly, remittances and aid from the kins 
abroad should be checked to ensure that they are not used for acquisition of lethal 
weaponry. This, however, does not mean that opportunity of engaging in a legitimate 
political action should be limited. If peaceful protest is seen as a credible alternative to 
violent expression of political demands, then groups should be ensured an opportunity to 
do so.
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In addition to the opportunity/private rewards factors, the findings also show that 
democracy is associated with a decrease in collective action, due to its potential to 
resolve controversial issues within the established processes and institutions. 
Strengthening democratic institutions of central governments, therefore, might be a 
policy that nation-level decision makers could entertain, if they would like to reduce the 
chances of ethnic groups’ mass mobilization.
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CHAPTER IV
PEACEFUL TACTICS AND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY FORMATION: THE 
CASE OF TATARS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The Rationale for the Chapter
In the previous chapters I developed and statistically tested a theory, which 
suggests that nonviolent tactics employed by ethnic groups are more likely to result in 
the formation of territorial autonomy than violence strategies. The purpose of this 
chapter is to trace the process of a group’s action and the government’s reaction. In other 
words, I am interested in how territorial autonomy is formed when ethnic group uses 
peaceful tactics. In order to unpack “the black box” of territorial autonomy formation, I 
use the case of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation. Specifically, I employ systematic 
data on (1) the grass-roots protests organized by the Tatar intellectual elites and (2) the 
official public statements expressed by the Tatar political elites directly to the Russian 
government. I then observe the changes in the position of the Russian government 
toward granting territorial autonomy to Tatarstan. Examination of these data establishes 
a causal mechanism between peaceful protest, on the one hand, and central government 
concessions, on the other. In particular, the sequence of these events enables me to draw 
positive conclusions regarding the temporal condition for causality when peaceful 
demands come before the central government’s concessions. Second, observation of 
protest events allows me to establish correlation between (a) peaceful demands and (b) 
Muscovites’ concessions—another condition for causality. For any scientific research 
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three conditions for causality should be met: 1) the cause should take place before the 
effect, 2) the variables – cause and effect – must be correlated, and 3) the observed 
relationship between variables should not be attributed to a third factor (Babbie 1986; 
Bunge 1963). The three conditions are consistent with King, Keohane and Verba’s 
definition of causality: “the causal effect is the systematic difference between the 
systematic observations made when the explanatory variable takes one value and the 
systematic component of comparable observations when the explanatory variables takes 
on another value” (King et al. 1994:81-82). In this chapter, I have an explicit variation 
on the theoretical variable of interest – peaceful protest – and the explained phenomenon 
– concessions from the central government, which culminated in the formation of 
territorial autonomy. Both of these variables vary over time. My focus on one spatial 
location over a relatively short period of time ensures that other potentially relevant 
control variables are held constant.
In this chapter, therefore, I illustrate the theoretical and statistical part of the 
dissertation more intuitively and interpret the behavior of both parties through causal 
criteria. In the rest of the chapter, I first briefly present the case of Tatars and Tatarstan –
specifically, its suitability for this study and historical background information. I then 
specify the major political actors, provide conceptual and operational definitions and 
data sources for the major variables examined, and study their relationship as a sequence 
of peaceful demands for autonomy and central government’s reaction. I conclude with 
the policy implications of this chapter’s results.
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Case Selection
The policies of perestroika initiated by Gorbachev gave ethnic groups within the 
Soviet Union an opportunity to express their grievances. In addition to the former Soviet 
Union and post-communist Europe, the issue of ethnicity became increasingly salient in 
much of the rest of the world. While most of the well-known ethnic demands are violent 
in nature, a far more common practice for ethnic groups, however, is to express their 
concerns peacefully. As Gurr (2000:155) shows, out of 275 politically significant ethnic 
groups, in 1998, 40% used techniques of nonviolent struggles, in contrast to more than a 
third did not engage in any recognizable political action, and only 21 our of 57 rebellious 
communities that were involved in medium or large-degree wars. The case of Tatars in 
the Russian Federation who employed nonviolent strategies and are examined in this 
chapter is, therefore, more generalizable with respect to ethnic group action globally 
than that of the Chechens or East Timorese who employ violent tactics.
Many nonviolent movements resulted in the significant concessions granted by 
central governments in the transitional polities. In post-communist Russia, for instance, 
the federal government allowed the formation of a number of negotiated territorial 
autonomies in response to peaceful demands expressed by the representatives of ethnic 
territories. The leading role in starting this process is almost unanimously attributed to 
the Tatar initiatives. Therefore, to understand the interaction between peaceful demands 
and the concessions granted by the central government in the Russian context, it is 
inexorably necessary to trace the process of political relationships between the Tatars 
and the central government in Moscow.
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The case of Tatarstan is generalizable beyond the post-communist world. Many 
governments granted concessions to ethnic groups as a direct consequence of peaceful 
action employed by ethnic collectivities. As Gurr (2000) points out, nonviolent political 
activism of Native Americans resulted in the repeal of the long-standing opposition of 
the Canadian government against the formation of a Native American territorial 
autonomy. Consequently, in April 1999, the autonomy was eventually established in the 
northern territory of Nanavut. Similarly, in late 1999, the German government made it 
easier for millions of legal Turkish residents to acquire German citizenship due to the 
efforts of German and Turkish activists (Gurr 2000:155). The establishment of the home 
rule in Scotland and Wales in 1998 is largely attributable to the relentlessly peaceful 
actions by the representative of both ethnic groups. Although these cases do not exhibit a 
one-to-one correspondence to Tatarstan in Russia, to understand how concessions were 
formed and granted in these instances, it is helpful to examine the case of Tatarstan. 
Autonomy was granted earlier to Tatarstan than to all of these cases, which might have 
been benefited from the Tatar example, as the Model of Tatarstan had attracted a 
worldwide attention as soon as it was negotiated.
Background Information on Tatars and Tatarstan
Tatarstan is located in the eastern part of the East European Plain at the 
confluence of the Volga (İdel) and Kama (Çulman) rivers. Tatars who speak a version of 
the Kypchak Turkic language as Bashkirs and Chuvash (Tanrısever 2001:46) boast a 
rich political tradition. One of the first Tatar states, Volga Bulgaria, was seen as 
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powerful in Eastern Europe. It adopted Islam as the state religion by 923 AD and 
became the northernmost corner of Islam in the world. Following the Mongol conquests 
of the 13th century, much of Bulgaria was destroyed and under Batu Khan eventually 
became a part of the Tatar state Golden Horde. During the 13th and 14th centuries Tatars 
controlled the Russian lands extending their rule as far west as Kiev (McAuley 1997:42-
43). Largely due to the internal quarrels, the Golden Horde collapsed and was replaced 
by a number of Tatar Khanates (Tanrısever 2001:46). The most influential and powerful 
among them was the Kazan Khanate. Much of the history of the Kazan Khanate was 
marked by its rivalry with the Russian territories united under the Muscovy. In this 
struggle, the balance of power eventually shifted to the Russian Moscovite side. Despite 
the efforts organized by the last ruler of the Khanate – Queen Soyembika – Kazan fell to 
the forces of Ivan the Terrible in 1552. Following the conquest, the repressive policies of 
the czarist regime led to the destruction of mosques, seizure of property, building of 
churches and monasteries (Davis et al. 2000:205). The policy of the imperial Russia was 
to co-opt the Tatar aristocracy via religious conversion (Tanrısever 2001:46). However, 
only a small portion of Tatars adopted Orthodox Christianity (Tanrısever 2001:46). 
Consequently, the locals who did not convert were forced to relocate 30 kilometers away 
from Kazan and the riverbanks (Faller 2002:82). As the Russian peasantry was 
transferred to the area [and exempt from serfdom, which was in place in the rest of the 
Moscovy], Tatars found themselves expelled from their rural areas to arid lands (Faller 
2002:82). Division of the Tatar territories and suppression of the Islamic religion 
continued until the time of the rule of Catherine II (McAuley 1997:42).
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Although Kazan became a center for missionary activity, Slavic colonization, 
and Moscow’s assimilation efforts accompanied by sporadic Tatar revolts against 
Russification, an understanding between the two groups developed with respect to 
mutual benefit and cohabitation (Toft 2003:46). Tatars were increasingly becoming 
mediators between the Christian imperial core and the Turkic peoples conquered more 
recently contributing to their coexistence (Toft 2003:46).
Their central geographical location within Russia and social role allowed Tatars 
to enjoy a relative prosperity that led to the establishment of a large Tatar middle class 
(Toft 2003:46-47). Tatars exhibited high literacy rates, developed national consciousness 
and grew concerned about “de-Tatarization” and the challenges to the Tatar way of life 
(Toft 2003:46). By the end of the 19th century, they agreed that a Tatar homeland should 
exist in the middle Volga region (Toft 2003:46). By the end of the czarist rule, Muslim 
Tatars were able to acquire political representation in the Russian Duma and assert their 
aspirations for self-government. The Idel-Ural state (1917-1918) uniting Tatars, Bashkirs 
and the Finno-Ugric people of the area was formed during the World War I, but proved 
to be short-lived as Bolsheviks took over. Political repression of the 1920s-30s 
suppressed the Tatar national movement (Iskhakov et al. 2005:11). The entire Tatar 
intelligentsia was purged in 1930s due to the accusation of bourgeois nationalism (Faller 
2002:82).
By the end of the Soviet period Tatarstan had become one of the most 
industrially developed areas of the country (Gorenburg 2003:20). It produced 50% of all 
Soviet trucks in one of the largest factories in the USSR. By 1970s the republic was the 
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largest producer of oil in the Soviet Union (Gorenburg 2003:20) with an industrial 
potential superceding that of the three Baltic republics. In spite of the industrial 
developments, the borders of Tatarstan formed by Soviet ethnic engineered were 
explicitly designed to divide Tatars and weaken the Tatar identity laying ground for the 
expression of the ethnically driven demands by the end of the Soviet rule (Toft 2003:48).
Key Players
The Tatar forces are represented by two key players within the republic – Tatar 
nationalizing intellectual elites who organized peaceful protests and the Tatar political 
elites. The Russian side relevant to this study consists of the Russian federal government 
as well as Russian pro-unitary groups within Tatarstan. The two sets of Tatar elites and 
Russian pro-unity groups largely defined the political landscape in Tatarstan and 
Tatarstan’s relationship with Moscow during the period of transition (Giuliano 2000; 
Kondrashov 2000; also implied in Toft 2003) Constituents, or target populations, for 
each of these forces included almost the entire population of Tatarstan and, in the case of 
the Tatar elites, also the Tatars living outside the republic.
Both intellectual and political elites have always pressed for the greater 
autonomy for Tatarstan. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, I define both of them 
as the core players expressing Tatar group demands. The interests of both sets of elites 
converged during the early period of the autonomy movement. Over time, political elites 
grew more politically relevant while the significance of the intellectuals and their groups 
vanished. Yet, the strategies employed by both sets of actors have been overwhelmingly 
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nonviolent. Below I briefly describe the nature, evolution, and the emergence of political 
tactics of both groups. I also examine in brief the pro-unity factions.
Tatar Intellectual Elites
Both intellectual and political elites in Tatarstan were, to a higher or lower 
degree, the products of what Giuliano (2000) calls “an overt, publicized strategy of 
nativization (korenizatsiia) and a covert strategy of Russification” of the ex-USSR (304). 
Nativization led to the increased social mobility of the minority titular populations in the 
republics, but it also meant that titular nationality groups had to play by the rules of the 
game, which implied education in Russian and communication in Russian at work. As 
noted,
By the 1980s, for many of the Tatar intelligentsia, using Russian in public 
had come to seem entirely normal, because most of the urbanized cultural 
elite were what is known locally as second, third, or fourth generation, 
Tatars whose parents, grandparents, or great-grandparents had moved 
from countryside to city. Many of them spoke Russian as their first (and 
often only) language (Giuliano 2000:304).
The urban Tatar intelligentsia became quite isolated from the Tatar culture and 
was advocating the need for language revival. Hence, the founders of the first non-state 
nationalist organization Tatar Public Center (TOTs) (Tatarskii Obshchestvennyi Tsentr –
TOTs, or Tatar İçtimağıy Üzäge – TİÜ) were Russified Tatars (Giuliano 2000:304-305). 
The issue of language revival did not attract much support from Tatar-speaking Tatars, 
most of whom resided in the countryside. For Tatars living in the countryside the fear of 
being deprived of the native language did no exist as they spoke a fluent Tatar. It has 
been also explained that a cleavage in social status took place between the urban and 
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rural Tatars, “as a psychological divide, a rural inferiority complex a different way of 
thinking”, which resulted in a very limited support of the nationalist aspirations shared 
by the urban Tatars (Giuliano 2000:306). Hence, the national organizations did not make 
much attempt to reach out to them.
Tatar Political Elites
Despite their inferior status in the eyes of the urban intellectual elites, it was 
mostly the Tatar-speaking Tatars from the countryside who came to play an important 
role in the political elite of Tatarstan. These elites were formed under the leadership of 
the Tatar communist party obkom (republic or oblast’ level Communist Party committee, 
or branch) first secretary Tabeev who ruled Tatarstan in the 1960s and 1970s. During his 
term in office he brought to Kazan people from the local and city administrations 
through the practice of “gathering your own people [zemlyaki] around you” (Giuliano 
2000:307). “They spoke Tatar as their first native tongue, usually received their early 
education in the countryside, then moved to a career in the local administration” (307).
There exists some discrepancy in the numbers of active members within these 
organizations. According to the pro-Russia movements, the number of TOTs included 
around 3,000 “permanent activists”, whereas the self-estimated number as of October 
1989 was no less than a million in the USSR (Kondrashov 2000:127). Toft (2003:52)
mentions that the number of TOTs activists was 2,000 at its peak, for splinter extreme 
groups İttifaq and Azatlıq about 300 and 500, respectively, and pro-Russian Soglasie just 
50.
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Russian Pro-Unity Groups
It was recommended that a statement as to what was at the heart of the Russian 
movement in Tatarstan is included. The paragraph was edited as follows: “The Russian 
pro-unity movement was represented by the groups of Soglasie, Democratic Party of 
Russia, and the parliamentary group called Narodovlastie (Giuliano 2000:308). They 
were opposed to both Communist era political elites and Tatar nationalists and presented 
the idea of unity with Russia (Giuliano 2000:308). These Russian groups have been 
widely regarded to be of pro-democratic nature (e.g., Kondrashov 2000:183-4). 
However, the existence of the “extreme groups on the other [Russian] side” pointed out 
by Toft (Toft 2003:51), implies that the only commonality that lies in the heart of such 
movements is their opposition to Tatar nationalism and unity with Russia.
Although the three forces – Tatar political and intellectual elites as well as pro-
Russian unity movements – might be treated as distinct, they have aligned with each 
other at various points in time. This is especially true for the Tatar political and 
intellectual elites, as the Tatar political elite seemed to tolerate and condone the 
demonstrations of the intellectuals-formed organizations. Although TOTs joined forces 
with the pro-Russian movements against the ruling presidential elite in 1992 when the 
interests of the two Tatar groups diverged (Fomenko 1992), “…during 1989 and early 
1990, differences between the ruling elite and the reformers, either the party clubs or 
Tatar organizations, or between the reformers themselves did not dominate the 
relationships. All, at this time, shared a common aim: the acquisition of Union republic 
status” (McAuley 1997:55-56).
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Cooperation between the Players
The mutual collaboration of the Tatar intellectual elites with both the Tatar 
political establishment and the pro-Russian forces awes a large part to the moderate 
nature of the largest Tatar nationalist organization – TOTs. Despite the fact that some 
see TOTs adopting an “extremely nationalist stance in a rambling thirty-six article 
declaration” (Kahn 2002:111), other observers claim that 
Although TOTs champions Tatar interests, it continues to advocate the 
equality of different ethnic and religious groups, including the many 
ethnic minorities residing in the Tatar ASSR. For example, a TOTs 
resolution of this [1989] summer called for the publication of Chuvash-
language newspapers in the Tatar ASSR…(Russians and Jews have their 
own branches of TOTs) (Schamiloglu 1989:11).
Toft also argues that 
The largest nationalist organization, Tatar Public Center (Tatarskii 
Obshchestvennyi Tsentr, TPC) was, in fact, a moderate, group whose 
agenda sought the enhancement of Tatarstan’s regional and economic 
status, and not the advancement of a distinct Tatar identity. Though its 
platform called for Tatar as the republic’s language and for the cultural 
and spiritual consolidation of all Tatars within the Soviet Union, its main 
agenda was to achieve greater economic sovereignty (Toft 2003:51, 
emphasis as in original).
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty also calls the organization “moderate 
nationalist Tatar Public Center” (RFE/RL 2005).
This does not mean that more extreme national organizations did not exist. 
Smaller groups that split from TOTs - İttifaq and Azatlıq – seem to be such, yet as Toft 
shows they “never drew large following” (51) and their demands for “Tatarstan for 
Tatars”, calls for a ban on Tatar-Russian marriages and extension of citizenship rights 
for any Tatars living outside of Tatarstan were “counterbalanced by equally extreme 
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groups on the other side” (51). The Tatarstan branch of Zhirinovskii’s Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia is a good example.
Despite the existence of splinter groups, I consider (1a) Tatar intellectual elites, 
(1b) Tatar political/presidential elites and (2) pro-Russian unity movements as the main 
forces on the political scene of Tatarstan. The Tatar group interests are represented, as 
noted above, by the first two groups. Throughout the period, there was a shifting balance 
of forces among them. In general terms, however, between 1988 and 1992, the 
nationalist movement “set the agenda” (McAuley 1997:54), but from 1992 
“[n]egotiation with Moscow over the republic’s resources came to be determined by 
[ruling] elite interests” (McAuley 1997:54).
Conceptual and Operational Definitions and Data Sources
Independent Variable: Ethnic Group Strategies
The major independent variable in this study is strategies that ethnic groups 
employ to express their demands for greater autonomy. This variable takes on three 
major values – 1) peaceful protest, 2) violent protest, and 3) nonevent. Peaceful protest 
refers to the expression of discontent through such means as public statements, boycotts, 
or nonviolent public demonstrations. In contrast, violent demands involve the use of 
weapons intended to kill people. They range from the acts of sporadic violence to 
engagement in civil wars with the central government. Both peaceful protest and violent 
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demands are distinguished from nonevents if the occurrences that satisfy these criteria 
are observed in the data sources.
The values on the independent variable are conditioned by two sets of actors –
Tatar intellectual elites that organized grass-root rallies and demonstrations and Tatar 
political establishment represented by the Shaimiev government. The importance of the 
first group was especially salient in 1988-1992, whereas in the subsequent years the 
latter group dominated political processes in the republic. To trace protest activities 
organized by the first group, Beissinger (2002) and Gorenburg (2003) data are used. 
Figures by both Beissinger and Gorenburg allow inferences on the number of protests. 
Both examine events that involve a minimum of 100 persons. Both data sources exclude 
strikes and petitions since few strikes were driven by national sentiment (Gorenburg 
2003:121). Moreover, neither strikes nor petitions regularly appear in the republic press 
used in the analysis27. From Beissinger’s data I exclude demonstrations organized only 
by the Russian side or those having explicitly non-national demands. To draw on the 
largest possible amount of data, I use both data sources.
Protests data – including events and nonevents – are valid for the entire period of 
1988 to 1994, although the presence of events only derived from the available data 
                                                          
27 Beissinger defines a protest event using the following criteria: “(1) it was a voluntary gathering of 
persons with the purpose of engaging in a collective display of sentiment for or against public policies; (2) 
it involved a minimum of one hundred persons; (3) it was bounded by space and time (that is, occurred in 
a specific location during a limited time period); (4) the number of participants was not restricted by the 
organizers of the event (that is, it was not a conference, convention, or other restricted organized meeting); 
and (5) it did not have as its primary purpose the infliction of violence by its participants (that is, was not a 
mass violent event)” (2002:462).
To Gorenburg (2003), a demonstration is “a voluntary, nonviolent gathering of persons for the purpose of 
engaging in a collective display of sentiment for or against a public policy” (120).
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sources that satisfy the coding criteria are confined to the period of 1987 / 198828 to 
1992. Beissinger and associates reviewed 150 different sources to code protests of the 
Tatar and other nationalities in the ex-USSR for the period of 1987 – 1995 (Beissinger 
2002). Gorenburg used three primary data sources: Komorova’s chronology of “ethnic 
events” (1989-1991), Beissinger’s (2002) database of protest events discussed above, 
and newspapers from the region (1988-1993).29 Gorenburg acknowledges the existence 
of protest events after 1992. However, by the end of 1992 already, participation in 
protests declined with an average of 200 people. “In 1993, participation declined even 
further, as the media ceased to pay attention to the nationalist movement, while the 
movement itself became increasingly preoccupied with internal conflicts” (Gorenburg 
2003:126). Those events, therefore, were both of much less importance as well as out of 
reach for coders. The absence of protest events after 1992 in the codings of both 
Beissinger and Gorenburg conform the general idea expressed by Kondrashov (2000)
that the period of 1988-1992 captures the life-span of the Tatar nationalist movement. In 
his view, this time interval “represents a clearly defined page in the history of the Tatar 
national movement…[as it] was marked by the revival of Tatar nationalism and its 
desperate attempt to implement the vision of a Tatar nation state, which ended in 
apparent failure and crisis of the movement” (Kondrashov 2000:x).
                                                          
28 1987 for Beissinger, 1988 for Gorenburg.
29 Sovetskaia Tatariia (renamed Respublika Tatarstan), Vecherniaia Kazan’, Kazanskie Vedomosti, and 
Komsomolets Tatarii/Molodezh’ Tatarstana.
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To capture the official public statements expressed by the second set of actors –
the political elites embodied in the Shaimiev government – directly to the Yeltsin 
government I use the White Book of Tatarstan. The book contains the official documents 
concerning the developments of Tatarstan’s state sovereignty including statements 
concluded in the aftermath of individual negotiations between the delegations of the 
Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation. According to its editor, Rafael 
Khakimov, The White Book encompasses the most relevant and important documents 
signed by one or both parties to negotiations30. The White Book of Tatarstan is also used 
as the primary data source for tracing the concessions of the Yeltsin government to 
Tatarstan – the dependent variable.
Dependent Variable: Response of the Central Government
The qualitative nature of the chapter allows a more nuanced coding of the 
dependent variable than does statistical analysis. For the purposes of this chapter, the 
dependent variable is defined as the response of the central government to the group’s 
demands. There are three theoretically possible response outcomes – 1) positive 
response by the central government, i.e., concessions; 2) preservation of the status quo; 
and 3) negative response by the central government expressed in the repeal of previously 
granted concessions or repression. Central governments’ concessions range from a mere 
recognition of the group and its representatives as legitimate actors to the full or partial 
satisfaction of groups’ other demands. The highest value on the scale of concessions is 
                                                          
30 Personal communication with Rafael Khakimov. July 10, 2006.
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the full-fledged settlement of territorial demands through the formation of a territorial 
autonomy or an independent state with powers acceptable to both sides. On the other 
hand, the lowest values on governments’ negative response are swift policies of cultural 
assimilation and physical extermination of the group members.
Group demands and governmental responses are examined in five phases. I 
follow Hafeez Malik’s (1994) four chronological periods of negotiations and also 
examine the period immediately prior to negotiations when the onset of peaceful protests 
was observed.
Phase I: Period Prior to Negotiations
At the dawn of Gorbachev reforms, the Soviet Tataria was a peaceful province of 
the Russian heartland. Tatars were deemed a group successfully assimilated into the 
larger culture (Kondrashov 2000). In this part of the Soviet Union, grievance and 
conflict were hardly expected to ever take place. However, the seeming national stability 
of the Soviet regime started to shatter with the ascent of Mikhail Gorbachev to the 
highest post within Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As Lapidus, et al. (Lapidus et 
al. 1992) argue, the “revolution from above” resulted in unintended consequence for the 
emergence of potent national movements in the different corners of the USSR. Already 
by July 1987, as Beissinger (2002) shows (relying on Dawson (1996)), environmental 
demonstrations were held in Kazan alongside with Estonia, Leningrad and Irkutsk. This 
was the start of ecological mobilizations that would overlap with nationalist claims (65). 
Although the Gorengurg data (Figure 3) does not classify this demonstration as national 
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in character, I tend to side with Beissinger (Figure 3) on this issue, since much of the 
national discourse was intertwined with the environmental rhetoric in the early period of 
the national movement.
Fig. 3. National Protest Frequency in Tatarstan, 1987-1992
The first formal meeting of core national activists took place on June 27, 1988, to 
organize Tatar Public Center (Tatarskii Obshchestvennyi Tsentr (TOTs), or Tatar 
İçtimağıy Üzäge (TİÜ)) (Schamiloglu 1989:11). The activist core of 11 people was 
elected from among 200 members  (Iskhakov 1992:6). On October 15, 1988, some 800-
900 demonstrators gathered at the Kazan Kremlin to observe the date (Beissinger 
2002:263). Although their relationships have been bumpy at first, key players within the 
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political elites allowed TOTs to hold its founding convention in February 1989 
(Beissinger 2002:263) and officially register as a public organization in July 1989 
(Kondrashov 2000:124). The aims of nationalists were to acquire Union republic status 
within the Soviet Union, revive the use of the Tatar language and spiritually revitalize
the Tatar people (McAuley 1997:55-6).
From summer 1989 on, one can see the nationalist discourse being developed in 
the republican media by TOTs. From 1989, the Public Center has also organized street 
campaigns. The issues that dominated street campaigns – rallies and demonstrations – in 
1989, as in 1987, were environmental in nature. Specifically, the rallies were held 
against the construction of large industries in the republic, especially, the central 
government’s plans to build a nuclear plant in the heart of Tatarstan. TOTs was able to 
utilize these meetings to underline the idea that Tatarstan was completely subsumed to 
Moscow bureaucrats who cared neither about its environment nor about the republic as a 
whole. (Kondrashov 2000:124-5). Consequently, the Tatar nationals supported by the 
members of other nationalities pressed for greater political freedoms, upgrading of the 
republic’s status to that of the Union republic and even independence as a solution to 
republic’s problems (McAuley 1997:54). At its second congress, in February 1991 TOTs 
for the first time pressed for a full-fledged independence (Beissinger 2002:266). It is not 
surprising then that between 1988 and 1992, the nationalist movement “set the agenda” 
(McAuley 1997:54) in the republic.
The Tatar nationalist demands were not limited to grassroot protests. Tatar 
political elite took a number of steps that complemented those protests. For instance, at 
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its meeting on June 14, TOTs adopted a petition addressed to both Gorbachev and 
Yeltsin requesting that Tatarstan be given the status of a Union republic within USSR 
outside of Russia. This petition was read by a Tatar deputy at the Russian Congress of 
People’s Deputies in Moscow. The Congress adopted the Russian republic’s Declaration 
of Sovereignty from the USSR. Yet, the Tatar prime minister at the time – Sabirov –
voted against it citing the fact that the problems of national territories were not 
adequately addressed (Sabirov 1990:1). Sabirov raised these issues with Boris Yeltsin 
and thought that Yeltsin started to have a deeper understanding of these problems. 
Specifically, the Council of Nationalities was formed for the first time within the 
framework of the Russian republic representing the interests of the national entities in 
deliberations of the important documents (Sabirov 1990:1).
A month later, in August, the proposed text of a Union treaty between Tatarstan 
and the USSR was published in the republic press31. By December 1990, the Tatar 
Parliament adopted a petition on the Union Treaty (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). In 
the petition, Tatarstan declared its readiness to be a co-founder of the Union making no 
reference to its subordination to the Russian republic. By the end of the month, the Tatar 
Declaration of Sovereignty was adopted. This, however, did not mean that the authorities 
of the USSR or those of the Russian republic would accept the Declaration of 
Sovereignty by Tatarstan.
                                                          
31 ("Poekt: Dogovor Tatarskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki s Soiuzom Sovetskikh 
Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik o razgranichenii polnomochii mezhdu Tatarskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi 
Respublikoi i Soiuzom Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik”. (The Draft of the Treaty between the 
Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Delimitation of the 
Jurisdictions between the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)" 
1990).
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Yeltsin was quick to respond to the mounting, yet, peaceful pressures coming 
from Tatarstan. He traveled to the republic in late summer and held a number of visits
with the representatives of economic enterprises, intelligentsia, and parliamentary 
deputies. Yeltsin responded positively to the republic’s demands, although in rather 
symbolic terms. During a briefing at Kazan University (August 6-8, 1990) 32 he was 
asked a question regarding the right of nations for self-determination. Yeltsin’s response 
was concise but clear – “I would like to remind you the Declaration of the rights of 
peoples of Russia signed by Ul’yanov [Lenin] on November 2, 1917. In its article 2 it 
states that the peoples of Russia have a right to a free self-determination, up to secession 
and the formation of an independent state”33. On several occasions, Yeltsin implied that 
he would not oppose the decisions adopted by Tatarsan’s parliament that might lead to 
an overarching self-determination. “Whatever the Supreme Soviet of Tataria decides is 
its own issue. If it defines that land, natural and mineral resources of Tataria are her own 
property, then we should recognize this decision by the Supreme Soviet” (2). “The 
[current] law of RSFSR [Russian republic] should be executed. [But] when you adopt a 
decision on the sovereignty and the supremacy of the laws of the Tatar republic or state 
over the Russian, then go ahead” (2). It was also during this visit when Yeltsin made a 
legendary and even idiomatic announcement inviting Tatarstan and, indeed, other 
republic to “take as much sovereignty as they could swallow” (Malik 1994; Røysi 
2004:44).
                                                          
32 ("Natsional'niy Muzei Respubliki Tatarstan: Muzei Tatarstana: Lenta Vremeni" 1990)
33 ("B.N El’tsin: “Ia videl sdes’ tol’ko dobrye glaza” (B.N. Yeltsin: “I Saw Here Only Kind Eyes”)" 1990, 
author's translation)
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Yeltsin could afford making such symbolic gestures as he did not yet possess a 
sole and legitimate control over the resources within the Russian republic. During the 
visit in Tatarstan, he, in effect, gave away the powers, which were still under the 
jurisdiction of the Gorbachev-led Soviet Union. In addition, by making promises to 
Tatarstan, Yeltsin could gain political leverage for himself as a leader of the Russian 
republic over Gorbachev in the struggle with the Soviet leadership over power 
distribution within the Russian Soviet Federated Republic (RSFSR).
Despite Yeltsin’s efforts, Shaimiev and the republican political elite cooperated 
with Gorbachev’s Union forces with the purpose of gaining a Union republic status for 
Tatarstan (Beissinger 2002:266). Hence, when Yeltsin tried to introduce in Gorbachev’s 
referendum the question on the formation of the Russian presidency, the republican elite 
excluded this question from the referendum.
Yet, the Tatar political elite decided not to ban the subsequent Russian 
presidential elections. Although the general public, seemed initially apathetic to political 
activism – with two-thirds of the electorate not supporting any political party (Toft 
2003:52) – by the election date of both Tatarstani and Russian presidents (June 1991) 
support of the public increased and led to “largest demonstration of the independence 
movement” (52). The decision by the Tatr political elites “evoked the first sustained 
wave of separatist mobilization within the republic in May 1991” (Beissinger 2002:266). 
Nationalist organizations resisted the elections of the Russian president on the soil of 
Tatarstan and by the end of April 1991 approximately 10,000-strong rally stipulated the 
recall of the Tatar deputies from the Russian parliament (Beissinger 2002:266; Toft 
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2003:52). Scholars also note a demonstration of some 15,000 participants on May 21, 
which included the members of İttifaq, who went as far as to start a hunger strike; 
newspaper Novosti wrote of daily rallies and protest meetings (Toft 2003:52). The 
moderates in these protests wanted to see a fast adoption of the Constitution of Tatarstan, 
which would annul Russian laws on the republic’s territory; radicals expected an 
establishment of a Tatar state and a subsequent demographic change in Tatarstan’s 
population (52). Although the general public, seemed initially apathetic to political 
activism – with two-thirds of the electorate not supporting any political party (Toft 
2003:52) – by the election date of both Tatarstani and Russian presidents (June 1991) 
support of the public increased and led to “largest demonstration of the independence 
movement” (52).
These events were critical as they led to the onset of negotiations between the 
Tatar and Russian political elites. The Russian forces both within Tatarstan as well as in 
the federal government acknowledge that protest were an important bargaining chip at 
the disposal of the Tatar side. The leader of the pro-Russian movement within the Tatar 
republic, Soglasie, Vladimir Beliaev noted that political elites condoned the 
establishment of an ethno-territorial movement so that they could use the reference to the 
will of people in the negotiations with Moscow. In the view of the leader of a pro-
Russian movement within Tatarstan, political elites exaggerated it, so that they “could 
literally refer to the ‘will of people’” (Kahn 2002:112).
Similarly, Tishkov, a Russian negotiator and Ethnology and Anthropology 
professor in Moscow suggests that the Tatar team ‘had tried to find a creative approach 
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to the text [of the Sovereignty Declaration] that would allow them to satisfy all major 
public forces and at the same time exploit ethnonationalism as the major argument to 
provide bargaining power with the Center’ (113). In an interview, a non-Tatar official in 
the Parliament of Tatarstan, has noted that the popular pressure was masterminded by 
the political elites of Tatarstan34. Such statements of the Russian side suggest that 
petitions and protest, which were predominantly peaceful in nature, were an important 
bargaining tool at the disposal of the Tatar political elites. They led to the opening of the 
first round of negotiations between the Tatar and Russian governments on August 12, 
1991.
It is, however, important to keep in mind that all of the parties who expressed 
these views have a particular political agenda. Beliaev was the leader of a pro-Russian 
movement within Tatarstan; Tishkov—a Russian negotiators from the federal side;
Isaev—a non-Tatar official within the Tatar Parliament. Even Jeffrey Kahn, who cites 
Beliaev, is in apparent contradiction with his source in effort to underline his argument: 
“TOTs was not a spontaneous movement, but an organization engineered from the top 
echelons of Tatar power”, meaning political leadership of Tatarstan (Kahn 2002:112, 
emphasis added). At the same time, Vladimir Beliaev claims: “I do not think Shaimiev 
created an ethno-territorial movement. He just played it up” (Kahn 2002:112, emphasis 
added). It is conspicuous that this contradiction between two statements appears on the 
same page just three lines apart from each other!
                                                          
34 Interview by author with Georgii Isaev, aide on political affairs to the speaker of the Tatar Parliament. 
May 20, 2005. Kazan. Tatarstan Parliament.
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Other scholars see the movement more as a grassroots organization independent 
of the Tatar political elites. As Gorenburg claims, the 
initial meeting of the first Tatar nationalist organization illustrates most of 
the key factors that shaped the emerging Tatar movement: its origin in 
academic institutions, its use of existing social networks for the 
recruitment of new activists, and the importance of a sense of common 
identity among those who joined (Gorenburg 2003:54).
Such scholars do not deny that the national movement engaged in cooperation 
and bargaining with other groups—Tatar political elites and pro-Russian forces. 
However, it is implied that they do so as an independent force:
The Tatar nationalist movement came into existence in institutional 
spaces created by the Communist government. It quickly used to social 
ties, collective identities, and organizational resources provided by these 
institutions to establish itself as viable political movement in the republic. 
But it also made sure to separate itself from the ruling elite by working 
together with pro-democracy activists and Tatars living outside the 
republic (Gorenburg 2003:57-58).
Similarly, Toft implies the independence of Tatar nationalist movement from the 
Tatar political leadership, while describing the power game between the two:
The first significant effect of the nationalist demonstrations was nearly 
immediate. On May 28 the Tatarstan Parliament, probably surprised that 
such a degree of mobilization could be achieved in the thus-far quiet 
republic, capitulated to the demands of the protesters and ruled that the 
only elections to be held in Tatarstan would be only for the president of 
Tatarstan, and not for that of Russia…When the nationalists became too
threatening, as they did in October 1991…Shaimiev clamped down, 
closing the capital and declaring an end to all militia movements (Toft 
2003:53).
Phase II: First Round of Negotiations
The Russian negotiating team was headed by Gennadii Burbulis, Yeltsin’s State 
Secretary; among the principle Tatar negotiators were Rafael Khakimov – President 
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Shaimiev’s advisor on political affairs and Indus Tahirov – an expert of Tatar studies 
and Dean of the Faculty of History at Kazan University. The Tatar side “invoked the 
resolution of the third Russian Congress of the Soviets, which was held in January 1918, 
saying: (1) that the Russian Federation was based upon the principle of freedom and 
equality of Soviet republics; (2) the republics were to join the Federation voluntarily; 
and (3) it was up to the republics to decide for themselves whether to join or get out of 
the Federation” (Malik 1994:14). These points were accepted by Yeltsin during his visit 
to Kazan. Burbulis agreed, but dismissed them as simply ideological.
Nevertheless, the first signed document as a result of these talks appeared on 
August 16 three days before the failed coup in the Soviet Union35. The signed protocol 
recognized the parties as two sovereign states seeking to continue their joint 
consultations in both Kazan and Moscow. Another 3-point protocol was signed in the 
aftermath of consultations in Moscow on October 4, 1991. In this document, both sides 
(1) recognized that the relationships between RSFSR and Tatarstan should be built on 
the basis of an agreement; (2) acknowledged the importance of joint decision-making on 
a number of economic issues; and (3) reaffirmed their willingness to continue 
consultations in October in Moscow (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). Although this 
protocol might be perceived as purely symbolic, it nevertheless signifies a positive 
response by the Russian government to Tatar demands.
                                                          
35 Interview by author with Marat Galeev, a Tatar negotiator and Chair of the Economy, Investments, and 
Business Committee of the Tatar Parliament. May 20, 2005. Kazan. Tatarstan Parliament.
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The second protocol was signed when popular protests were on the rise. The 
peak of the support for the nationalist demands came in the wake of the failed coup in 
the USSR in August 1991. The perceived support of the August putsch (takeover, coup)
by the republican political elite prompted protests demanding President Shaimiev’s 
resignation, which drew up to 50,000 supporters (Figure 3) (Beissinger 2002:267). A 
crisis situation occurred at the anniversary of the Kazan conquest by Ivan the Terrible in 
mid-October when nationalist demonstrators, inspired by events in Chechnya demanding 
Shaimiev’s resignation and complete independence of the republic, attempted to seize 
the parliament (Figure 3) (Beissinger 2002:267). As a consequence, seven demonstrators 
and sixteen police were injured (Beissinger 2002:267). Nobody, however, was killed. 
Although by that time 86 percent of Tatars and 24 percent of Russians favored 
Tatarstan’s independence, following this crisis event, support for the national groups had 
drastically dropped (Beissinger 2002:267).
This event also resulted in the precautionary measures taken by the political 
elites against potential violence, sending an important sign to the domestic publics and 
the federal authorities. On October 17, 1991 President Shaimiev issued an ukaz [decree] 
outlawing the formation and activities of public militarized units and armed entities on 
Tatarstan’s territory (Shaimiev 1991). In the wake of the drop of nationalists’ popularity, 
Shaimiev skillfully outmaneuvered the nationalist rivals by taking over some of their 
issue concerns (Beissinger 2002:267). The republican political elite was eventually able 
to consolidate its power, while nationalist intellectuals undergoing numerous divisions 
and declines were taken over by the structures of state or para-statal institutions 
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(Beissinger 2002:267). Giuliano explains this process arguing that Tatarstan presents an 
interesting case, whereby strong sense of belonging and ethnic identity present in the 
region did “not necessarily translate into support for nationalist politics” (Giuliano 
2000:296). In this context, the Tatar political elite was able to alternate the key issue—
the sovereignty vote—from an ethnonational question to the issue of the regional 
economic rights for Tatarstan and all of its citizens (Giuliano 2000). Now, “[n]egotiation 
with Moscow over the republic’s resources came to be determined by [ruling] elite 
interests” (McAuley 1997:54).
In the meanwhile, on December 24, the Tatarstan parliament openly expressed its 
frustration regarding the fact that Tatarstan was deprived of quotas in the Supreme 
Soviet (parliament) of the Soviet Union and signatory membership in the Agreement on 
the economic commonwealth of independent states. As a result, the parliament adopted 
the Act of State Independence of the republic (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). Two 
days later (December 26), the republic’s parliament declared that Tatarstan joined the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a co-founding member – a symbolic 
move reaffirming its special status (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).
In light of these developments, as a result of the first round of negotiations with 
the Russian side, the Tatar government signed the first substantive agreement 
[soglashenie] on economic collaboration with Russia in Moscow on January 22, 1992. 
The fourteen-article document postulated that land, water, and natural resources located 
on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan belong to her people. The sides also 
acknowledged that federal (Russian), republic (Tatar), and joint property, might exist on 
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the republic’s territory. The ownership of the property was to be defined in accordance 
with mutual interest and free agreement (article 1) (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). 
Article 6 of the agreement is especially prominent as the parties recognize that Tatarstan 
independently controls production and marketing of the natural resources, primarily, oil 
and oil products on its territory. Delivery of the Tatar oil to Russia was to be regulated 
through annual agreements. The parties also agreed to conduct independently external 
trade on all items with the exception of the products that have quotas and licenses 
(article 8). Moreover, the parties agreed to jointly regulate social security and 
employment in the territory of Tatarstan (article 9), collaborate in science, education, 
health policy, and culture (article 10), conduct independently, yet through coordination, 
environmental policies, and establish permanent representative offices of their 
governments (article 11) (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).
During the negotiations process, the Russian side, especially Burbulis, claimed 
that the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Tatarstan was no more than a mere 
statement of Tatar elites’ intent unsupported by public will and called for a plebiscite. 
The calculations of the Russian side were evidently based on the ethnic factor, as at the 
time only some 48.5% of population were Tatar36. Moreover, a Tatar negotiator and 
Chair of the Economics, Investment, and Business Committee of the Tatar Parliament, 
Marat Galeev points out that Tatarstan’s dependence on Russian demand for its huge 
military industrial complex was another important factor in explaining the Russian 
                                                          
36 Interview by the author with Marat Galeev, a Tatar negotiator and Chair of the Economy, Investments, 
and Business Committee of the Tatar Parliament. May 20, 2005. Kazan. Tatarstan Parliament.
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delegation’s move. Those employed in the defense industry were expected to vote 
against Tatarstan’s sovereignty. Due to the conciliatory nature of the Tatar government, 
the demand was accepted. On February 21, 1992, the parliament announced that the 
referendum on the State Sovereignty would take place on March 21. People would have 
to respond to the following question: “Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a 
sovereign state, the subject to international law, which builds its relationships with the 
Russian Federation and other republics and states on the basis of agreements between the 
equal parties?” “Yes” or “No”. (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). Surprisingly, 61% of 
all voters were in favor of Tatarstan’s sovereignty. The turnout rate was 79% out of 2.5 
million eligible to vote (Malik 1994) (see Table 7).
Surprisingly, before the referendum Yeltsin and the Russian side took a negative 
position. In a TV address, Yeltsin noted that the referendum aimed to divide Russia and 
lead to ethnic violence (Malik 1994). The vice-premier for nationalities and regional 
policies of the time, Sergei Shakhrai, characterized the referendum as a coup d’état, the 
Russian Parliament appealed to the Court and a week before the referendum the Russian 
Constitution Courts ruled that the referendum along with the Declaration of State 
Sovereignty of 1990 and the changes to the Tatar Constitution were not in line with the 
federal Constitution. Consequently, an economic blockade was imposed against the 
republic (Kahn 2002:153-54). Both Galeev and Khakimov – the members of the Tatar 
negotiating team – note that the pressure from the Russian side was high. Military 
exercises were conducted around Tatarstan just some 60 kilometers (37 miles) away 
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from its border. Marines previously deployed in Latvia were transferred to Ul’yanovsk37. 
On all federal highways, Russian troops were present. At the eve before the referendum, 
the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov traveled to Volzhsk. 
This move bore an important symbolic meaning as Ivan the Terrible was also located 
there before the takeover of the Kazan. According to Galeev, Khasbulatov emphasized 
that President Shaimiev would be brought in an iron cave to Moscow just as was the 
Tatar-supported Russian rebel Pugachev in the Middle Ages38. The last ruler of the 
Kazan Khanate Queen Söyembikä was allegedly also forcibly brought to Moscow.
I suspect that the key reason why Moscow troop did not intervene and the 
referendum go is due to the moderate rewording of the referendum question. Giuliano 
shows that newly-elected President Shaimiev and his supporters did not have a secure 
place in Tatarstan’s Parliament. They were caught between a growing popular support 
for the Tatar nationalists and a large population of Russians in Tatarstan. In the 
meanwhile, different factions in the Tatar Parliament argued for various wordings of the 
referendum question. For instance, Russian unitarists, Narodovlastie and Soglasie, 
advocated a direct question “Are you in favor of Tatarstan seceding from the Russian 
Federation?” hoping that it would attract a negative vote. Ultimately, the Parliament 
adopted the (Shaimiev’s) version with indirect wording: “Do you agree that the Republic 
of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject of international law, building its relations with 
the Russian Federation and other republics and states on the basis of treaties between 
                                                          
37 Interview by author with Rafael Khakimov. May 17, 2005. Kazan Kremlin.
38 Interview by author with Marat Galeev. May 20, 2005. Kazan. Tatarstan Parliament.
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equal parties?” Shaimiev, in effect, “stole the middle ground” from the nationalists who 
were at the peak of popularity, while attracting moderate Russians (Giuliano 2000:311).
President Shaimiev and the Tatar team employed a conciliatory and moderate 
approach toward the Russian side and on a number of occasions tried to alleviate the 
situation while still determined to conduct the referendum (Malik 1994). In one of its 
announcement, for instance, one could see an attempt to downplay their demands from 
independence to autonomy.
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet [parliament of Tatarstan] 
draws special attention that the acts of state sovereignty and 
referendum of the Republic of Tatarstan in no way question the 
state and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. They do 
not discriminate or divide the citizens of the republic on national 
or religious basis. Rather, they assume that the citizens are equal 
regardless of their national or religious affiliation, establish Tatar 
and Russian as state languages, and unconditionally recognize the 
citizenship of the Russian Federation for all citizens of the 
Republic of Tatarstan while respecting citizen’s right to freely 
change their citizenship (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).
In another petition to the people of the Republic of Tatarstan, issued in response 
to petition of the Russian parliament, the Presidium of the Tatar parliament declared on 
March 6 that they “…categorically reject the accusations against the Republic of 
separatism in its willingness to “sever centuries-long links of the Tatar people with the 
other peoples and get out of the Russian Federation”, expressed in the Petition of the 
Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation” (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).
They reaffirmed that “Tatarstan has been and will be resolving all existing 
problems only through civilized means”. “Once again, we declare our readiness to 
continue the broad negotiations with the Russian Federation on political, economic, and 
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humanitarian issues and express our confidence that they would conclude in the signed 
Agreement contributing not only to the renovation of the Russian Federation, but also to 
the establishment of the Union between Tatarstan and Russia” (Khakimov 1996, the 
White Book).
Similarly, article 2 of the five-point petition issued on March 16 by the Tatar 
parliament to clarify the nature of the referendum’s question stated that separation of the 
Republic of Tatarstan from the Russian Federation, alteration of its borders and 
territorial integrity are not the subject of this referendum (Khakimov 1996, the White 
Book). My understanding is that they wanted to gain a greater domestic legitimacy for 
further negotiations through the referendum. In an interview with Shaimiev’s advisor on 
political matters, Rafael Khakimov39, it was made clear that they opted for the peaceful 
strategy and ruled out the Chechen variant right away. A cofounder of TOTs, who to the 
dismay of some, is now close to the ruling elite of the republic, Khakimov spelled out 
the tactics of both the ruling Tatar elite and the mainstream nationalists. The rhetoric of 
Tatarstan’s political elites regarding the referendum on State Sovereignty appealed to the 
median Tatarstani and ensured the support of more than 61% of Tatarstan’s inhabitants 
(Giuliano 2000) (Table 7).
                                                          
39 Interveiw by author with Rafael Khakimov. May 17, 2005. Kazan Kremlin.
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Table 7. Results of the Referendum on State Sovereignty of Tatarstan, March 21, 
1992
1. Total number of eligible citizens 2,600,297
2.
Number of citizens who received 
ballots
2,134,271
3. Number of participants
2,132,357
(82.00% of #1)
4. Number of citizens who answered yes
1,309,056
(61.39% of #3)
5. Number of citizens who answered no
794,444
(37.26% of #3)
6. Number of invalid ballots
28,851
(1.35 of #1)
In the meanwhile, the Russian side decided to shelf the Rumiantsev plan for the 
Russian constitution of 1990. Rumiantsev suggested replacing ethno-territorial system 
with a nonethnic federal system of territories enjoying equal rights and modeled after the 
Länder of the Federal Republic of Germany (Teague 1996). Due to the protests from 
ethnic republics the center was concerned that this model of federal structure would 
facilitate Russia’s split. Even though Rumiantsev’s draft was rejected, the new 
constitution could not be adopted due to the struggle between the President and the 
Parliament in Russia. A new mechanism—the Federation Treaty—was adopted instead 
in order to keep the integrity of the Russian state. The Federation Treaty was signed by 
18 republic ten days after the Tatarstani referendum. Yet, Tatarstan alongside with 
Chechen-Ingushetia refused to sign it (Teague 1996:19).
113
During the negotiations the team from Tatarstan realized that Russia was not 
prepared to accept the independence of Tatarstan. In Burbulis’ conception, the 
relationship between Russia and Tatarstan should be asymmetrical (Malik 1994). The 
Tatar team pressed Burbulis to recognize the sovereignty of Tatarstan in the bilateral 
Treaty. In response, Burbulis uttered forcefully: “Then the sovereign rights of Russia 
must also be included in the Treaty” (Malik 1994). Burbulis suggested that parts of the 
Federation Treaty signed by other republics should be included in the Treaty with 
Tatarstan to establish the sovereign powers of Russia. The Federation Treaty had 18 
policy issues under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Russian Federal government, 12 
under the joint control of the Federal government and the republics and a much shorter 
list of powers belonging exclusively to the republics (Federation Treaty, Appendix to the 
Russian Constitution). The highly inclusive nature of items reserved for exclusively 
Russian jurisdiction made it impossible for any autonomous republic to evade total 
supremacy of Moscow (Malik 1994). In Malik’s view, Article I of the Federation Treaty 
gave Moscow sweeping control of the republics. Article II enumerating joint jurisdiction 
further diminished the republics’ power. Article III diminished them to the level of local 
municipal corporations. Teague seconds this analysis suggesting that the document 
clearly specified the rights of the center. In contrast, the shared responsibilities were a 
source of confusion and the residual rights of the provinces were the vaguest (Teague 
1996). 
Only 18 republics accepted this arrangement proposed by Moscow. After signing 
the treaty the provinces complained that the center did not execute its provisions (Teague 
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1996). Bashkortostan signed the Federation Treaty at the last minute only after an 
appendix on economic concessions was agreed with the republic and attached to the 
Treaty. Tatarstan and Chechen-Ingushetia refused to sign it.
Phase III: Second Round of Negotiations
In contrast to Chechnya, Tatarstan wanted to continue the negotiations process. 
The Russian delegation had a similar will. The second round of negotiations started in 
March 1992 and was over by January 1993. Joint consultations held in Moscow between 
March 30 and April 2 resulted in a three-article protocol, which (1) recognized the need 
to establish a special relationship for the Republic of Tatarstan with the Russian 
Federation, urged to (2) quickly implement the intergovernmental agreement on 
economic matters signed in January 22, and (3) guarantee human rights and freedoms 
irrespective of national, confessional or other differences, regulate citizenship and 
recognize the equal use of the Tatar and Russian languages. During this meeting, the 
draft of the bilateral treaty prepared by Tatarstan was discussed and the Russian proposal 
to Tatarstan to join the Federation Treaty considered. An agreement was reached to 
continue negotiations in April-May 1992 (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).
The next ordinary meeting that resulted in a written document took place on July 
2. During the meeting the working groups once again considered the draft of the Treaty 
prepared by Tatarstan. The Russian party was apparently not content with the contents of 
the Treaty and both sides decided that Expert Groups should be formed to prepare a 
detailed draft of the Treaty. They have also agreed that (1) the process of Treaty 
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preparation should be expedited and completed by July-August; (3) recommendations 
should be given to the experts to account for the sovereign status of the Republic of 
Tatarstan while drafting the Treaty; (4) a legal personality should be established for 
Tatarstan in international law; (5) the principle of border inviolability; and (6) human 
rights should be unconditionally respected as well (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).
By August 15, 1992, the draft of the Treaty elaborated by both the Tatar and 
Russian experts was complete (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). Article I of the draft 
spells significant concessions given to the Tatar side, as it recognizes that the Republic 
of Tatarstan is a sovereign state that independently executes all powers of state 
authority, including, among others, adoption and inaction of its Constitution and 
lawmaking on budget and budgetary process, taxes, banks, court structure, and 
procuracy (office of the Attorney General). Tatarastan would also be able to establish 
foreign relations, and have its own treasury and citizenship. This was an important step 
forward as the heads of both Russian and Tatar Expert Committees—Boltenkova and 
Khamidullin—signed the draft leading to the expectation that political leaders of both 
sides would accept Tatarstan’s sovereignty (Malik 1994).
Less than two weeks later, on August 27, Prime Minister of Tatarstan Sabirov 
promulgated the official news regarding the conclusion of an economic agreement 
between Tatarstan and Russia at the end of the talks. Sabirov noted that the leaders of 
Russia are becoming more and more understanding of Tatarstan’s needs. He also 
mentioned that the Russian government removed the economic blockade of Tatarstan 
levied by the Russian parliament (Sabirov 1992). 
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It is crucial that Sabirov restated the adherence to peaceful strategies. In his view, 
“Tatarstan did not need its own army – all defense matters are delegated to the federal 
Russian government and participation in maintaining CIS defenses will be effected 
physically and materially through agreements with Russia” (Sabirov 1992:28).
In light of the progress made in the relationships between the two sides popular 
protests grew less relevant. One of the last came three days later, on the second 
anniversary of the Declaration of Sovereignty of Tatarstan.  The All Tatar Public Center 
organized a rally demanding an equal treaty with Russia and the Russian recognition of 
Tatarstan’s independence (FBIS 1992).
In the meanwhile, within the Russian camp, Sergei Stankevich – a member of the 
negotiating team – waged a vicious internal campaign against Burbulis in the Russian 
Parliament. Stankevich took an inflexible stance against Tatarstani aspirations for greater 
sovereignty and independence (Malik 1994). Right-wing nationalist forces were also 
accusing Burbulis of being too “soft” on ethnic republics. Eventually, Yeltsin cancelled 
his visit to Japan [in September] organized by Burbulis and removed him from the 
leading position in the negotiations with the Tatar side. Sergei Shakhrai, a would-be 
Vice-Premier of Russia, assumed a primary role in the Russian team during the talks 
(Malik 1994).
Consequently, the talks did not resume until the second half of the winter of 1993 
(Malik 1994). In the meanwhile, the Parliament of Tatarstan adopted the Constitution of 
the Repbulic on November 6, 1992, ahead of the Russian Constitution. The preamble of 
the Tatar Constitution refers to the results of the referendum on the state status of 
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Tatarstan, in accordance with which the Constitution was adopted. The first article of the 
first chapter of the Constitution proclaims Tatarstan a sovereign democratic state, which 
expresses the will and interests of the entire multiethnic people of the republic. A special 
provision regarding the Agreement with Russia was made in article 61 of chapter 5 
stating that, “Tatarstan is a sovereign state, subject to international law, associated with 
the Russian Federation – Russia on the basis of the Treaty On Delimitation of 
Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Powers” ("Konstitutsiia Tatarstana" 
1993:14).
Adherence to the peaceful means yet again was expressed. It appeared on the 
second substantive page of the new Constitution. Specifically, it was proclaimed that 
The Republic of Tatarstan rejects violence and war as a means for conflict 
resolution between peoples and states.
The territory of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be a zone free of weapons of 
mass destruction.
In the Republic of Tatarstan, propaganda of war is prohibited 
("Konstitutsiia Tatarstana" 1993:4, chapter 1, article 8).
The two delegations eventually met in January 1993. Yet, this time they were 
headed by two Presidents – Shaimiev and Yeltsin. The high-profile negotiations were 
also attended by the Chairman of the Tatarstan’s Supreme Soviet (parliament) F.M. 
Mukhametshin, Vice-Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet N.T. Ryabov, the Head 
of the Russian Cabinet V.S. Chernomyrdin, Tatar Prime-Minister M.G. Sabirov., Vice-
President of Tatarstan V.N. Likhachev, Vice-Chairman of the Russian Cabinet S.M. 
Shakhrai, Vice-Chairman of the Russian government Yu.F. Iarov, deputy from Tatarstan 
G.V. Kobelev, and the Advisor to the President of Tatarstan R.S. Khakimov. The sides 
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held the discussion about the project of the Treaty and reaffirmed that their relationships 
should be built on treaty-constitutional basis. It was noted, as the Treaty was drafted, 
priority should be given to the realm of economics, environmental protection, foreign 
economic interactions, and crime. Both Yeltsin and Shaimiev were content with the 
work of the expert committees and agreed on all issues that were considered. However, 
no overarching treaty was signed at the end of this negotiations period. The next meeting 
was scheduled for February (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). No record was found as 
to whether it has ever taken place. 
Phase IV: Third Round of Negotiations
By this time, relationships between the sides were  less warm. Less than a month 
after the Constitution of Tatarstan was adopted, Shaimiev signed a law, requesting the 
Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation insert a special provision in the draft of the 
Russian Constitution that would establish treaty-constitutional relations between the 
Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). 
The Tatar President publicly expressed his frustration regarding the progress on the 
Treaty three weeks prior to the Russian referendum on the approval of Yeltsin and his 
economic policies. Shaimiev stated that all branches of the federal authority, its 
President, his circle, as well as parliamentarians do not value enough the significance of 
the regions (Shaimiev 1993b). Shaimiev forecasted that “the people of the republic 
would treat the referendum with restraint” (Shaimiev 1993b:2). He further said that the 
relationships between Russia and Tatarstan (i.e., the Treaty) should be defined before the 
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Russian draft constitution is promulgated. Nevertheless, the conditions to conduct the 
referendum were put in place. However, its execution and financing was carried out by 
Russia (Shaimiev 1993a). Shaimiev was right in his prediction as in the referendum only 
22.8% of eligible voters came to the polling booths to cast their votes (Khakimov 1996, 
the White Book).
On May 10, Shaimiev together with the Chairman of the Parliament 
Mukhametshin coauthored a letter to Yeltsin. In the letter, they drew attention to the 
sharp contrast between the results of the referendum on State Sovereignty (that was 
endorsed with a 61.4% approval rate) and the failed referendum on the approval of the 
Russian presidency. Pointing out that the treaty negotiating process was conducted 
thanks to the joint initiative of the Tatar and Russian Presidents with the involvement of 
both parties’ parliaments and governments, Shaimiev and Mukhametshin boldly stated 
that the talks and implementation of the agreed provisions were stalled not because of 
the Tatar side. Consequently, they expressed concerns that the people of the republic as 
well as international observers may doubt the Russian leadership’s commitment to the 
Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation and the democratic 
reformation of the Federation. They have also warned that this situation might lead to 
real difficulties in the formation of political institutions of the Russian Federation and 
disappearance of the Tatar representation from the federal structures. The letter 
concluded that “Tatarstan deem[ed] that the time has arrived to officially recognize its 
new state status and include a special provision in the draft of the new Constitution of 
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the Russian Federation accounting for the treaty-constitutional relations between the 
Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan...” (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).
In response, Yeltsin decided to give a green light to the new negotiations. On 
May 27, he signed a presidential order confirming the names of the Russian negotiators. 
The talks started the same day. The five person Russian team consisted of Yeltsin 
himself, Vice-speaker of the Russian parliament Riabov, and three Vice-Premiers –
Lobov, Federov, and Shakhrai. The Tatar side consisted of Shaimiev, Speaker of the 
Parliament Mukhametshin, Prime-Minister Sabirov, Vice-President Likhachev, and the 
Chair of the budget committee of the Tatar Parliament Kobelev (Khakimov 1996, the 
White Book). The sides noted that separate soglasheniia [agreements] on environmental 
protection, higher education, oil and oil products transportation, as well as the property 
agreement are ready and would be signed as soon as possible. Work on customs 
regulation, banking, taxing policy, budgeting, and others will continue (Khakimov 1996, 
the White Book).
Although some progress seemed to have taken place during the May talks, the 
Tatarstan leaders desired to enshrine the special status of the republic in the Federal 
Constitution. On June 4, 1993, the Tatar Parliament addressed its legislative initiative to 
the Chairman of the Constitutional Committee of the Russian Federation – Boris Yeltsin. 
The initiative urged Yeltsin to amend the existing constitution through introducing a 
special clause for Tatarstan. The amendment envisioned exclusion of Tatarstan from 
article 56 and introduction of a new article 56.1, which stated that “The Republic of 
Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject to international law, associated with the Russian 
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Federation - Russia on the basis of the Treaty on mutual delegation of authorities and 
subjects under jurisdiction” (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).
As the appeal fell on deaf ears, both Tatar President and the Speaker of the 
Parliament expressed their frustration in a joint petition on June 24 (Khakimov 1996, the 
White Book). Consequently, Tatarstan withdrew from the Russian Constitutional 
conference and the discussions on the new Russian Constitution (Khakimov 1996, the 
White Book).
Russian authorities interpreted Tatarstan’s moves as an attempt to secede. 
Fearing that other ethnic areas may follow the suit, Shakhrai eventually traveled to 
Kazan in June and convinced the Tatar President to take part in the Russian 
Constitutional conference (Malik 1994). He threatened that if Tatarstan did not 
participate, Moscow will discontinue negotiations on the status of the republic (Malik 
1994). The Tatar side gave in.
At the Constitutional conference in July 1993, all issues and suggestions were to 
be adopted via majority vote. The member of the Tatar delegation, Rafael Khakimov, 
noted that he faced an unknown Tatar Mulla who was allegedly a leader of a Tatar 
political party in Moscow. Apparently, artificial political parties have been created to 
outmaneuver the nationalist leaders in the republics and forge a positive outcome on the 
version of the federal constitution favorable to Moscow’s desires and needs (Malik 
1994).
The bilateral negotiations continued and were presided over by the highest 
figures on both sides. During the talks, Shaimiev restated the familiar position that 
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Tatarstan was a sovereign state, subject to the international law, associated with Russia. 
Yeltsin suggested that the discussion of Tatarstan’s political status should be delayed 
and the easily negotiable issues settled first (Malik 1994). The Tatar side was in favor of 
this arrangement, reserving the negotiation on less tractable issues for a latter period40. 
The sides instituted the agreements over “joint” and “exclusive” powers (Malik 1994).
A package of 3 soglasheniia [agreements] was agreed and signed on June 5, 
1993. It included the agreement on higher education; oil transit and transportation of oil 
products; and environmental protection. All three were concluded for five years and 
could be renewed. The agreement on higher education stipulated independence of the 
institutions of higher learning on the territory of Tatarstan. The language of education 
was agreed to be both Tatar and Russian. The government of Tatarstan would grant 
property to the institutions of higher learning land and basic funds at no charge, establish 
or contribute to, if the tax is out of its jurisdiction, the tax breaks for such institutions. 
An agreement on transportation of oil and oil products allowed both the Tatar and 
Russian industries to have equal access to the pipelines located both on the territory of 
Tatarstan and the Russian Federation. Oil transfers were to be conducted under equal 
tariffs for all industries irrespective of their party and form of ownership. It was also 
agreed that the transportation of the Tatar oil outside the Russian Federation would be 
regulated by the separated agreements between the Republic of Tatarstan and foreign 
nations. The industries of Tatarstan would also conduct customs proceedings for their oil 
                                                          
40 Interview by author with Rafael Khakimov. May 17, 2005. Kazan Kremlin. 
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in accordance with the customs law of Russia and the customs agreement between 
Tatarstan and the Russian government (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).
The latter agreement contained six articles ensuring the adoption of both sides’ 
environmental laws through mutual consultations. To implement the concurrent powers, 
the parties established the Coordination Council composed of environmental experts. For 
a small landlocked republic with a multitude of the institutions of higher education, large 
industries, and environmental concerns these agreements signaled vital concessions.
Relatively, for Russia these concessions were not as large as the gains for Tatarstan, 
which they represented. Although many complained that Tatarstan was “more equal than 
other regions”, the concessions given by the Russian side was apparently a reasonable 
price for preserving stability in the region.
During this round of negotiations, the Russian side expressed willingness to 
control policies in outer space, standardization, defense, and military production. The 
Tatar delegation refused to accept this, and eventually Russia put defense and military 
industrial complex under the “mutual” authority, [in addition to customs authority,
banking, payments to the Russian Federation, scientific research, definition of mutual 
property and division of state property] (Malik 1994).  Tatarstan agreed that defense-
related industries and installations should be under Russian jurisdiction, but was not 
confident that it was practical to manage them jointly (Malik 1994). Russian reaction to 
this argument was negative. Hence, to show the degree of the Tatar industries’ 
dependence on Moscow, they cut the financing of the military industrial complex in 
Tatarstan. State orders were reduced by 40% and in some products by 90%; under such 
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conditions no meaningful conversion of military production for civilian purposes could 
be conducted. These threats changed the Tatar position on this issue (Malik 1994). Yet, 
quite in line with the Tatar style, the government of Tatarstan received the control of the 
peaceful industries of the military industrial complex. Russia has certainly duplicates of 
such industries elsewhere. Nevertheless, it was an important concession for Tatarstan.
Specifically, in the soglashenie on defense industry signed on June 22, it was 
stipulated that in the territory of Tatarstan, the Russian government regulates the 
development, application, and production of weapons and military technology; prepares 
and applies the konversiia programs [aimed at converting military technology for 
civilian goods production]; conducts programs involving products of dual military and 
civilian purpose (article 2). The Tatarstani government was to regulate and coordinate 
defense industries on its territory, which involved development and production of the 
civilian products and consumer goods [exclusively]. Appointment and dismissal of the 
leaders of these industries as well as their bylaws were to be coordinated jointly by both 
governments (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).
In the same package of agreements, the soglasheniia on property and customs 
were also signed. The customs agreement specified that the head of the Tatar regional 
customs should be appointed by the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation 
through consultation with the Tatarstani government. The Russian customs was agreed 
to completely satisfy the idiosyncratic needs of the Republic of Tatarstan with regards to 
customs affairs. My understanding that this is true only for the items delivered from 
outside the Russian Federation. Those produced inside Russia would not be covered by 
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this agreement. The distribution of customs fees, taxes, excises, and collections between 
the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan was to be determined by the 
interbudgetary regulations agreement (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).
In terms of property, Tatarstan would possess much of the state property located 
on its territory except for items regulated by the Russian Defense Ministry, the Russian 
Security Ministry, and the Russian Interior army and financed from the Russian budget.  
Moreover, with certain exceptions, property possessed by the Russian Transportation 
Ministry, the Russian Committee on Standardization, Meteorology, and Certification, as 
well as the Russian Sanitation-Endemic Committee, are excluded from the Tatar control 
as well (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).
It is important to note at this point that the agreements signed on June 5 and June 
22, 1993, relate, in large part, to the previous steps taken by the Tatar government. As 
shown above, during the third round of negotiations, by December, 1992, Shaimiev 
formally asked the Supreme Soviet (Parliament) of the Russian Soviet Federated 
Republic to include a special provision for Tatarstan in the draft of the Russian 
Constitution. On May 10, 1993, both Shaimiev and Speaker Mukhametshin coauthored a 
letter to Yeltsin accusing the Russian side of stalking the talks and obstructing 
implementation of the already agreed provisions. On June 4, the Tatar Parliament 
forwarded Yeltsin the legislative initiative to enshrine a special status for Tatarstan in the 
Russian Constitution. These low level expressions of political demands sent a signal to 
the Russian authorities that certain concessions had to be made. These requests by the 
Tatar side could not have been easily ignored by the Russian government in Moscow as 
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high-level nonviolent protests had been taking place just several moths ago and were still 
fresh in their memory. They did not want the repetition of those events, which could 
potentially escalate into violence.
Despite these successes of the Tatar strategies, a full-fledged Treaty between the 
two sides was not yet signed. Tatarstan still wanted to gain a seat in the United Nations, 
similar to that of Ukraine during the Soviet Union (Malik 1994). This did not necessarily 
imply demand for full independence, as Ukraine was still a part of the USSR, even 
though it held a UN seat along with USSR (and Belorussia). In the framework of 
Russian constitutional negotiations, Tatarstan formed a team of ten ethnic areas which 
agreed they should enjoy a sovereign status and, therefore, ought to press for the 
development of the Russian Constitution on the basis of the Federation Treaty. In 
addition to these demand, Tatarstan had an idiosyncratic desire to be excluded from the 
ordinary list of the republics within Russia and recognized as an area with a special 
relationship to the Russian government (Malik 1994).
Shakhrai refused to talk about these issues, sending the question to the 
Presidential Group of Negotiators to settle. The group exhibited a negative attitude 
against conditions proposed by Tatarstan. In the ideal world, however, the Tatar side 
wanted the clause to be inserted first in the constitution and then continue to negotiate 
delimitation of policy issues with the Russian government. In contrast, the Yeltsin’s side 
wanted Tatarstan to join the Russian Federation first, and then determine the relations of 
both sides on these issues (Malik 1994). As a result, Tatarstan left the Constitutional 
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conference once again. The nine collaborating republics, however, stayed helping 
Yeltsin to isolate Tatarstan (Malik 1994).
In Tatarstan, the government declared that Tatarstani laws were supreme to those 
of the Russian Federation and welcomed the will of the Russian oblast’s [provinces] to 
increase their status to that of republics (Malik 1994). Although the final settlement was 
not yet reached and some of the Tatar desires, such as a seat in the United Nations and a 
special provision in the Russian Constitution, refused, the agreement signed in June 
enabled Tatarstan to establish [exclusively] economic [and rather lucrative] partnership 
with Lithuania, Hungary, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and Crimea and supply them 
600,000 barrels of oil daily (Malik 1994).
Phase V: Fourth Round of Negotiations
The long standoff between the Russian President and the Supreme Soviet 
concluded in a bloody conflict and bombing of the Russian Parliament by the 
Presidential forces in October 1993. This development resulted in a psychological 
change for both Yeltsin and the leaders of republics within Russia. After the bloody 
conflict with the parliament Yeltsin found out that many leaders within ethnic entities 
did not support him (Teague 1996). Yet, he was emboldened by his victory over the 
parliament and consolidation of the federal-level power. Hence, in the new constitution 
Yeltsin withdrew most of the privileges the Federal Treaty gave to the ethnic republics. 
The resultant constitution, however, was still as ambiguous as the Federal Treaty itself 
with regard to the power shared between the center and the provinces (Teague 1996:22). 
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Because of that, the pressure for autonomy did not subside (23), especially in Tatarstan. 
The referendum on Yeltsin’s constitution was conducted in the Tatar republic. However, 
its results had the effect of cold shower on those who expected good turnout. Out of 2.6 
million registered and eligible voters only 13.88% came to the voting booths to cast 
valid votes (and, of them, 25.16% expressed their disapproval of the draft) spelling the 
failure of the referendum in Tatarstan. The results of the referendum in Tatarstan stood 
in sharp contrast to those in Russia, as the turnout rate in Russia overall was 54.81%
(Table 8)41.
Table 8. Results of the General Referendum on the Russian Draft Constitution in 
the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation, December 12, 1993
Tatarstan Russia
1. Total amount of citizens eligible for voting and 
registered
2,638,886 106,170,835
2. Number of citizens who took part in voting 367,088(13.91% of #1)
58,187,755
(54.81% of #1)
3. Number of ballots found in ballot boxes 366,220(13.88 of #1)
4. Number of invalid ballots 13,434(3.67% of #3)
5. Number of valid ballots 352,786(96.33% of #3)
56,371,093
(53.10 of #1)
6. Number of votes that approves the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation
264,028
(74.84 of #5)
32,937,630
(58.43 of #5)
7. Number of votes that disapproves the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation
88,758
(25.16% of #5)
23,433,463
(41.57% of #5)
                                                          
41 The figures for the referendum results in Tatarstan have been taken from the Protocol of the Electoral 
Commission of the Tatarstan electoral district #16, which appeared in the White Book (Khakimov 1996). 
Data for the referendum results in the Russian Federation have been obtained from the Federal Center of 
Informatization, Federal Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation ("Rezul'taty referenduma 12 
dekabria 1993 goda po proektu Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii" 1998-2001), website last accessed 
November 15, 2006. Figures in cells 5 and 7 have been calculated by author based on the available 
information. Number of invalid ballots for Russia is not available.
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In this situation Tatarstan wanted to negotiate its own Treaty as soon as possible. 
On February 15, 1994, two months after the failed referendum, negotiations resumed and 
the parties signed a series of five agreements on (1) foreign trade; (2) monetary, credit, 
and foreign currency policy; (3) budgetary interactions between the governments of 
Russia and Tatarstan; (4) law enforcement; and (5) the military sphere.
The first agreement in the package stated that Tatarstan had an exclusive 
authority to conclude trade and economic agreements with foreign states and their 
territorial units; borrow foreign public and commercial loans and control their use; form 
and regulate the foreign currency fund of the republic; form and conduct policies on 
foreign direct investments to Tatarstan; take part in international economic and financial 
organizations; receiving and using foreign aid; give credits and loans to foreign partners; 
and form free economic zones in Tatarstan (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).
The agreement on monetary, credit, and foreign currency policy prescribed that 
the Central Bank of Russia would conduct the emission of cash money after consulting 
the Tatarstani cabinet; and the National Bank of Tatarstan could differentiate credit rates 
between certain commercial banks provided that on average it would agree with the 
accounting rate of the Russian Central Bank (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).
With respect to the budgetary interactions, Tatarstan would pay a 13 percent 
profit tax to the republican budget of Russia, 1 percent income tax from individuals, and 
Value Added Tax determined by yearly agreements between the Ministries of Finance of 
Tatarstan and Russia (article 1). To financially backup the environmental programs of 
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the Republic of Tatarstan and protection of natural resources, the following was to 
remain in the budget of the Republic of Tatarstan: excises on spirits, vodka, [other] 
alcohol products, oil and gas excises, land fees, privatization profits, special tax on the 
financial support for crucial industries. It was concluded for a five-years term 
(Khakimov 1996, the White Book). 
Agreement on law enforcement stated that another special agreement on the 
relationship of Tatarstan with Interpol would be concluded and law enforcement and 
courts would be funded mutually (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). Agreement in the 
military sphere envisioned that recruitment would be conducted jointly as well; Tatarstan 
could influence the defense doctrine of Russia through her representatives in the Russian 
government. Land could be given to the military forces of Russia with the agreement of 
the Tatarstani government. The land under the auspices of the Military Forces of Russia 
would be used only as prescribed. The harm inflicted on the environment, industries, and 
population of the Republic of Tatarstan by the Russian Military Forces would be 
compensated by the Russian Federation and quotas for the Tatarstani citizens in the 
Russian Army would be determined in consultation with the Government of Tatarstan 
(Khakimov 1996, the White Book).
The negotiations process culminated in signing of the Treaty On Delimitation of 
Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Powers between the State Bodies of 
the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan on the same 
day. In the Treaty, the Republic of Tatarstan was defined as a state “united with the 
Russian Federation” (Appendix C). The Treaty granted broad powers to the republic’s 
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government, which received an exclusive jurisdiction over 16 important policy issues 
(Appendix C, article II), and mutual jurisdiction with the government of the Russian 
Federation over 23 areas (Appendix C, article III).
The agreement was not unproblematic. It was not ratified by the parliaments of 
both entities to avoid the implication of an international agreement. Yet, through 
parliamentary approval it would have received more legitimacy and a better guarantee 
for preservation. Further, it contained potentially contradictory and ambiguous 
provisions recognizing mutually inconsistent documents—the Constitution of the 
Republic of Tatarstan and the Constitution of the Russian Federation, with arguments 
over their interpretation almost certain to erupt (Teague 1996:26). Moreover, its 
conclusion and negotiation in less than a fully democratic way has also been pointed out 
in the literature (Kahn 2002; Teague 1996).
Despite the faults that the Treaty contained, its ambiguity contributed to its 
eventual conclusion preserved peace in the republic. Although extreme forces on both 
sides opposed it, the Treaty was generally received with excitement and enthusiasm.
Shaimiev’s political ranking as a leading politician in Russia skyrocketed from number 
27 in January 1994 to top 10 in February, after the Treaty was signed. Moreover, in the 
wake of its conclusion, Shaimiev was able to focus on solidifying Tatarstan’s national 
identity through an emphasis on its civic Tatarstani part than a more exclusive ethnic 
Tatar definition (Tanrısever 2001). The treaty has also contributed to the improvement of 
the economic situation in Tatarstan.
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It is important to emphasize that the conclusion of this Treaty was preceded by 
Five Phases of peaceful demands. The first and second phases were characterized by 
high-level peaceful protests and demonstrations in the streets. The protest dynamics 
changed in the third through fifth phases. This period was dominated by low-level 
political rhetoric and appeals by the Tatar political elites directly to the Russian 
authorities.
It is important to note that low-level peaceful approach was, arguably, also 
responsible for the development after 2000, during the reign of President Putin. In post-
2000 period, the importance of the 1994 Treaty was drastically diminished. Yet, the talks 
on a new, albeit a much more restricted, Treaty have been recently concluded. Unlike the 
1994 Treaty, the new abridged version was passed by the Tatarstani legislature and has 
been submitted for legislature by Putin to the Russian State Duma. The legislative seal of 
approval might grant the Treaty a flavor of democratic legitimacy giving the hope that it 
will continue to contribute to the stability and ethnic concord in the Eastern-most corner 
of Europe.
Conclusions
Most conflicts today take place within the borders of nation-states with many 
centering on identity politics. Hence, there is a pressing necessity to design institutional 
arrangements that can alleviate an ongoing ethnic strife and prevent militarized disputes. 
In this chapter I considered the process of development of one of such institutional 
arrangements – territorial autonomy. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, I have 
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shown that territorial autonomy may be achieved through peaceful strategies employed 
by ethnic groups. Using the case of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation I illustrated how 
ethnic groups can achieve territorial autonomy through a battery of peaceful tactics, 
including protests, petitions, and rallies. My analysis implies that ambiguity regarding 
the ultimate group demands as well as high levels of initial protests facilitate the 
formation of territorial autonomy in the long run. These findings affirm the theoretical 
idea developed in this dissertation that there exists a nonviolent means for settling 
interethnic disputes and preventing their escalation.
The case of Tatarstan has been important for ethnic groups within the Russian 
Federation as an example for developing strategies of peaceful action. It stands in a 
sharp contrast with the Chechen experience, where demands for larger self-governance 
escalated into violence. It also shows that expressing demands peacefully is more fruitful 
than preserving the status quo with no articulation of claims.
Tatarstan was one of the better known cases of peaceful autonomy formation
beyond the former communist bloc due to its Tatarstan Model. However, observation of 
the autonomy development through peaceful means has been rather unsystematic in this 
case. While systematizing the evidence on the peaceful formation of territorial autonomy 
in Tatarstan in 1994, we still do not know much about the recent and rather clandestine 
negotiations that have to the conclusion of the 2006 Treaty. It is my hope that this 
question will be studies in the future.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATION
In this dissertation project I asked a simple, yet important question – why do 
territorial autonomies form? This question is significant as territorial autonomy has a 
potential for restraining mass political unrest. Over past decades, ethnic clashes have 
become a primary form of collective political violence (Wimmer 2004). The majority of 
civil war in the nineteenths and twentieth centuries as well as those observed since the 
end of the Second World War have been fought for the sake of larger ethnonational 
autonomy or independence (Wimmer 2004). As figure 4 indicates, the trend in 
ethnopolitical wars as well as peaceful protests and violent rebellions of ethnic groups 
has been on the rise since 1945. Of all wars fought only between 1983 and 1993, 60 
(63.8 percent of the total) were ethnic in nature (Scherrer 1994:74).
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Fig. 4. Global Trends in Ethnopolitical Conflict, 1945–2002
Source: Wimmer (2004), using protest and rebellion data from Bennett & 
Davenport (2003), civil war data are from Eriksson, Wallensteen, & Sollenberg (2003)
(at www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict/).
Territorial autonomy is a political institution that allows preservation of 
sovereign states’ territorial integrity, while simultaneously permitting ethnic groups to 
express their distinct identities. Territorial autonomies thus tend to change the view of 
both ethnic leaders and central state elites regarding each others’ actions from a zero-
sum calculus to one of mutual benefit. Formation of territorial autonomies by national 
elites sent a signal to ethnic groups that the central government perceives ethnic diversity
as a value than a threat and treats the expressions of their identities with respect. The
every event of territorial autonomy formation may break the peril of the security 
dilemma whereby the security of one collectivity is perceived as a threat by another. In 
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fact, establishment of territorial autonomy may send a strong enough signal that reverses
the security dilemma spiraling cooperation between a majority-dominated central 
government and an ethnic minority group. Territorial autonomy is a substantial 
concession by the central government that could hardly be overlooked by the ethnic 
minority group thus delivering a soothing effect on minority concerns and grievances. In 
fact, a global empirical study by Rothchild and Hartzell (2000) suggests that territorial 
autonomies do in fact reduce ethnic strife. 
In this dissertation, I have put forth and tested a theory of territorial autonomy 
formation, which sees peaceful protest as an effective strategy for ethnic groups in their 
quest for territorial autonomies. I argued that nonviolent means used by ethnic 
collectivities knocks their repressive opponents off balance and allows these groups to
attain their desired goals. I further have shown that groups which resort to peaceful 
strategies are somewhat weaker than those who employ violence. Yet, peaceful groups 
have lower grievances as well. These finding, however, should not mean that peaceful 
strategies are deterministically employed in response to the underlying conditions. They 
can be and are as a conscious tactic by ethnic collectivities. In the rest of this chapter, I 
will summarize the argument and its place within the extant literature, discuss policy 
implications of the research in this dissertation, and provide the venues for future 
research.
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The Origins of Territorial Autonomies: The Argument
The literature that examined the central question of this dissertation – why 
territorial autonomies are formed – is relatively old, dating back to Riker’s seminal 
work that came into existence in 1960s (Riker 1964). Yet, much of the work that dealt
with the question focused on hard power politics that gave precedence to explanations 
involving violence and military power as a primary mechanism for territorial autonomy 
formation. I took a diametrically opposite view and claimed that peaceful protest 
strategy is a more effective way to achieve territorial autonomy for ethnic collectivities 
than violent tactics. Bringing in the literature on nonviolent protest I have shown that 
peaceful autonomy movements have a moral advantage over those that exercise violent 
action. Specifically, groups that use nonviolent tactics are able to divide central 
governments as some within the governments might oppose the use violence while 
others back such policies. Further, certain factions within the central governments might 
feel unthreatened and physically secure to start negotiations with ethnic group leaders. 
Moreover, the tactics of peaceful resistance imply a long-time commitment on the part 
of the protesting collectivities. Hence, they also imposed substantial economic, political, 
and military costs on their repressive opponents in the long run. All of these arguments 
can be gathered under the umbrella concept of political jiu-jitsu.
One of the most immediate questions raised by this reasoning is why do the 
supposedly rational ethnic collectivities choose to employ violent tactics in the face of 
more effective nonviolent strategies? This question is important not only for the 
theoretical objectives of my dissertation, but also due to the larger policy implications 
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regarding violent strife. To address this question I resorted to the rational choice model 
which views the problem as a collective action issue. Much of theoretical and empirical 
literature developed so far views opportunities as important explanations for violent 
rebellion disregarding incentives for doing so. I, therefore, started with bringing into the 
equation the material private rewards factors developed in the “greed” vs. “grievance” 
literature on violence, as a primary element. This literature, however, fails to consider 
peaceful protest as a separate category. At best, one may infer that the “greed” vs. 
“grievance” scholars would suggest the same explanation for nonviolent action as they 
do for violence. Consequently, one may conclude that this literature leaves no 
theoretically meaningful explanation for the distinction between violent and nonviolent 
tactics as, at the end of the day, it equates violent action with all types of mass behavior.
To circumvent this impasse, I utilized a metaphorical notion of the “weapons of 
the weak” (Scott 1985) to understand the decision of groups to use nonviolent tactics. 
The idea of valuable and easily extractable resources as promoters of violence was 
employed to explain collectivities which resort to brutality. Such theoretical setup is 
consistent with an earlier (case) study (Schwarz 1970) suggesting that factors offered by 
the theories of violence are also associated with peaceful movements, but at quite lower 
levels. Thus, though factors explaining peaceful protest are not distinct from those 
employed for violent action, their degree is.
I, however, also draw on the previous literature on relative deprivation, which 
also finds support in my analysis.
139
Statistical Analyses
To substantiate these claims with empirical evidence, I use data on 197 ethnic 
groups in 95 states. Event history analysis was utilized as the primary statistical 
methodology to explain formation of territorial autonomies. I find consistent support for 
the idea that peaceful autonomy is best achieved through peaceful means. To empirically 
test the hypotheses pertaining to the strategies employed by ethnic groups I have used a 
novel modified Heckman Selection model suggested by Sartori (2003). This method 
allows me to estimate simultaneously the model of the general collective action along 
with the equation that distinguishes between violent and peaceful movements without 
the faults of selection bias or exclusion restriction. The results support the idea that 
ethnic groups engaged in violence are likely to do so due to the existence of easily 
available resources, which ethnic leader can distribute in return for a rebellion-prone 
loyalty. The findings, however, show that the grievance, or relative deprivation, factors 
are important as well.
Case Study
While statistical methodology allows me to test the external validity of my 
theoretical propositions, it has only a limited, if any, capacity to show the process of 
territorial autonomy formation. To answer the question how regarding the origins of 
territorial autonomy and strategy choice, I conduct a case study of Tatars in the Russian 
Federation. Tracing the actual mechanism of decisions with respect to strategy choice 
and its subsequent influence on the concessions from the central government, this 
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chapter provided an intuitive illustration of the process and confirmed the claims 
advanced in the dissertation.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
The three chapters elaborate on the formation of territorial autonomy 
arrangements and the relevant issue of strategy choice by ethnic collectivities. This 
dissertation does not rule out the effectiveness of violent strategies in demanding 
territorial autonomies. It, however, underlines that violence is useful to the extent lower 
than that of peaceful tactics. The findings from this dissertation may lead readers to think 
that peaceful strategies are mechanically chosen by weak collectivities, while violence is 
the domain of groups that possess diamonds, oil, drugs, and gold. This interpretation 
should not discount the conscious moral choice of nonviolent tactics by ethnic groups. 
Weaker groups are more likely to select nonviolent tactics. Yet, groups with access to 
easily extractable resources do so only under particular circumstances. Under the 
conditions when other variables are held at their mean or mode levels, the effect of the 
private material rewards on the eruption of violence, as pointed out in chapter III, is 
minimal. In other words, under the average normal conditions ethnic groups are likely to 
employ peaceful strategies. I link this choice to the morally superior nature of such 
strategies, which cannot be easily quantified.
What do we learn from this study? On the theoretical level, there are at least two 
major contributions. One is related to the application of the peaceful strategy idea to the 
formation of territorial autonomies. This bears importance for the origins of territorial 
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autonomy literature as it is rather sparse. Moreover, it draws largely on hard-line 
violence-prone political factors as the source of explanation for the emergence of 
territorial autonomies.
The literature on nonviolent protest has also gained from my dissertation. Two of 
the three major criticisms faced by the proponents of nonviolent movements are limited 
applicability of the framework of nonviolence to international relations and absence of a 
solid empirical grounding (Koch 1984). The study of ethnic politics, and ethnic conflict, 
specifically, lies at the crossroad of domestic politics (usually examined by 
comparativists) and international politics (which is typically the turf of the subfield of 
international relations). This dissertation and its author root themselves in the study of 
ethnic politics, which lies at the nexus of comparative politics and international relations. 
It, therefore, signifies one of the attempts at dialogue between comparative politics and 
international relations using the arguments from the literature on nonviolent protest.
My dissertation addresses the latter criticism as well, as it is an empirical study 
of the effects of nonviolence on the formation of an important political institution. As 
shown in the previous pages, my study lends support to the theoretical claims developed 
in the peaceful movement literature.
Second, this dissertation contributes both theoretically and empirically to the 
resolution of the peace vs. violence dilemma faced by ethnic collectivities while they 
choose a proper mode of collective action. The only study (Schwarz 1970), to the best of 
my knowledge, that addressed this issue explicitly was a case study, which did not 
provide a generalizable test of its claims. Secondly, as it was published in 1970, it did 
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not benefit from almost forty years worth of theoretical advances, which currently 
revolve around the collective action problem. Both of these concerns are addressed in 
my dissertation. It is an empirical and generalizable study that uses collective action 
paradigm in developing theoretical arguments.
Policy Implications
It is important to address the relevance of this project to the policy making realm 
of state leaders, ethnic collectivities, and international actors. This project is relevant for 
ethnic communities seeking certain freedoms linked to territorial autonomy. Theoretical 
arguments and empirical findings of this work would advise the leaders of ethnic 
autonomy movements to consider nonviolent strategies as a potent tool for attaining their 
political aims. Nonviolent tactics are found to be effective due the morally superior 
articulation of interests free of antagonistic wrath and suspicion associated with 
violence. Although the groups who do not have access to valuable and easily extractable 
resources are more likely to adopt nonviolent tactics, even those collectivities that have 
private material rewards are under the normal real life conditions are likely to use 
peaceful tactics. The audience both within and outside the state value the moral 
advantage of peaceful protest and see collectivities engaged in peaceful expression of 
demands as having the potential to be reliable political partners rather than despicable 
enemies.
Another major policy implication relates to central government elites. This 
dissertation shows that the amount and type of the resources that group entrepreneurs 
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deliver to group members are positively associated with violent outbreaks when the 
democracy factor kept at its minimum. One possible recommendation may suggest that 
the ways allowing easy access to valuable resources, such as oil and monetary 
remittances from the kins living abroad, should be controlled and guarded by neutral and 
impartial forces. Yet, an equally, if not more so, important advise to central governments 
is to strengthen institutions and culture of democracy for a more desirable peaceful 
protest to take place.
International mediators have only limited influence in formation of territorial 
autonomy, as my findings indicate. This, however, does not mean that third parties 
should refrain from providing logistic and material support for both ethnic collectivities 
and central governments in establishing territorial autonomy arrangements, if these 
institutions are viewed as viable options for the regions in question. Second, foreign 
governments and international organizations can serve both ethnic groups and national 
leaders by helping halt the flow of foreign support intended for violence. This task is 
much less complicated in the aftermath of the Cold War, as, at least initially, the 
superpowers had lower incentives and/or capabilities to fund rebel groups overseas. 
Most importantly, help in building up long-term democratic institutions and culture 
within the disputed territories is another useful way for the international community to 
contribute to peace. Specifically, helping build up territorial autonomy may contribute to 
both democratization of the state and peaceful coexistence.
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Venues for Future Research
What are the implications for future research that this dissertation brings? A 
logical extension of this dissertation is to examine whether the argument regarding the 
effectiveness of peaceful protest in carving out the concessions from the central 
government would still hold if the institutions at stake are different from territorial 
autonomy. Would the response from the central government be any different, if ethnic 
collectivities demanded quotas in the national parliament or the cabinet or asked to allow 
the establishment of ethnic parties and affirmative action policies? It is especially 
interesting to see whether the influence of peaceful strategies on the likelihood of central 
government concessions is moderated by the issue at stake. A critic of the nonviolent 
movements argument might expect that national leaders are much more indisposed to 
cede a share in the central government than a part of the territory.
In the debates regarding the formation and maintenance of territorial autonomies 
and other political institutions of power-sharing, both ethnic leaders and central 
government elites have to appeal to at least two major constituencies – the dominant 
ethnic group within the country and the minority ethnic group within the ethnic 
homeland. Assuming that both types of leaders are rational actors, they would like to 
garner support from both constituencies. In other words, both types of elites have the 
incentives to frame the language and issues at stake differently for different 
constituencies. The room for rhetorical maneuverability is especially wide-open, when 
the dominant group and the minority ethnic collectivity speak different languages. Two 
sets of elites under such conditions would have a temptation to say different things in 
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different languages not only in form but also in substance. This effect will admittedly 
decrease if both dominant and minority collectivities speak each other’s languages well 
or have similar policy preferences. This, however, is rather an exception than a rule. This 
idea, therefore, could be further developed and tested empirically in the future.
It is also interesting to see the effect of territorial autonomies and power-sharing 
institutions, in general, on political behavior of ethnic group members and the dominant 
groups within the state. Does implementation of territorial autonomies increase people’s 
satisfaction with the current political regime in the country? Does it have any effect on 
their life satisfaction, more broadly? This may constitute as another broad topic for 
prospective studies.
Further, if power sharing arrangements are debated and voted in the parliament 
of the central government, one might be curious about the determinants for their support 
or rejection among individual parliamentarians. In this dissertation I looked mostly at the 
group and country-level explanations for the formation of territorial autonomy 
arrangements. However, to answer the questions in this and preceding paragraphs, one 
should consider the individual-level unit of analysis and seek explanations there as well. 
Therefore, in order to answer these questions, a thorough review of the political behavior 
literature from comparative and American politics literature should be conducted. To test 
the hypotheses derived from this literature, an advantage could be taken of the existing 
data sources. However, it should be expected that original surveys and archival work 
would have to be carried out in order to address these questions.
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Most conflicts today take place within the borders of nation-states centering on 
issues of identity. In the today’s world policy makers and theoreticians face a task of 
finding proper institutional arrangements to alleviate ethnic rivalry. In this study I 
examine the origins of an important form of accommodation between ethnic groups –
territorial autonomy arrangements – suggesting that peaceful demand strategies are 
superior to violent tactics. I further examine the conditions, under which peaceful, as 
opposed to violent, conflict takes place. It is my hope that this dissertation project as 
well as any future studies inspired by it will have a positive influence on our theoretical 
understanding and practical leverage of the pressing issues in ethnic and identity politics 
and conflict, more broadly.
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APPENDIX A
MINIMUM, MAXIMUM, MEAN VALUES, AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
FOR THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES IN CHAPTER II
Variable Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max
Nature of the Dispute
Peaceful Autonomy Demand 0.088 0.508 0 4
Peaceful Independence Demand 0.035 0.332 0 5
Violent Autonomy Demand 0.178 0.904 0 7
Violent Independence Demand 0.251 1.154 0 7
Mediation by a State 0.031 0.172 0 1
Mediation by an International 
Organization 0.017 0.128 0 1
Government Characteristics
Democracy Level 0.106 7.311 -10 10
Economic Development of the State 3.320 3.633 0.064 27.007
Stability of Political Institutions 50.192 60.891 0 248
Ethnic Group Characteristics
Groups' Capability Ratio (vis-à-vis the 
state) 0.003 0.026 0 0.7375
Groups' Population Ratio (vis-à-vis the 
state) 0.120 0.226 0.00 2.44
Concentrated Majority in the Region 0.233 0.423 0 1
Resources in the Region 0.433 0.496 0 1
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APPENDIX B
CODING RULES AND DATA SOURCES FOR CHAPTER II
Rebellion and Protest:  In those cases in which MAR indicates that demands for regional 
autonomy or political independence were highly salient or significant for the relevant 
collectivity, I consider them to have had an active movement. The level of nonviolent 
protest is reflected in MAR’s PROT variable while the dataset’s REBEL indicator 
reflects the level of violent activity.
For the PROT variable, value 0 is assigned to the group when no protest is recorded; 1 
indicates verbal expression of discontent and includes public letters, petitions, and 
publications; 2 reflects acts of symbolic resistance, including sit-ins, sabotage, and 
blockage of traffic; 3 signifies small demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots with a 
total participation of less than 10,000; 4 is assigned to the instances of medium 
demonstrations with the total number of participants of less than 100,000; 5 shows the 
instances of large demonstrations with more than 100,000 participants.
For the REBEL variable, similarly, 0 is assigned if no protest has been recorded for the 
group; the instances of political banditry and sporadic terrorism are given the value of 1; 
a group is scored with a 2 if conducts terrorist campaigns; 3 reflects local rebellion; 4 
signifies small-scale guerilla activity, which includes (1) less than 1,000 armed fighters 
who (2) engage in sporadic armed attacks—less than six per year—(3) conducted in a 
small number of locales; 5 is assigned to intermediate guerilla activity, which has one or 
two characteristics of a small-scale guerilla activity and one or two traits of the large-
scale guerrilla activity; 6 reflects large-scale guerrilla activity, which is defined by (1) 
the involvement of more than 1,000 armed fighters (2) frequently engaged in armed 
attacks—over six in a year—(3) which took place over an extended area of land of 
group’s residence; if the group is engaged in a protracted civil war they are scored as 7.
To capture ethnic groups’ demands for territorial autonomy, MAR variables AUTGR4 
(Interest in greater regional autonomy in 1980s through 90s) and AUTGR5 (Interest in 
limited autonomy in 1990s) were employed. The supplemented data were acquired from 
Monica Toft (2003).
Demand for autonomy is coded as 1, if value on AUGR4/AUTGR5 equaled 1 (Issue is 
highly salient or important for most) or 2 (Issue significant/relative importance unclear). 
As an indicator for independence demands, MAR variable AUTGR3 (Political 
independence in 1980s-90s) was used.
For both variables, missing data for the decades preceding 1980 were complemented 
using Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. If no contradictory information was found, the 
data from the archives was extrapolated to the rest of the decade, as public sentiment 
within the group regarding autonomy or independence grievances were likely to persist. 
If no information was found in a decade regarding territorial autonomy, no autonomy or 
independence demands were recorded.
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International Mediation: Data on international mediation were collected from Keesing’s 
Contemporary Archives and Jacob Bercovitch’s dataset. Two dichotomous variables are 
coded for the mediation by 1) states, and 2) international organizations including both 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations. An instance of state mediation was 
recorded for the case Cyprus in 2000; organizational mediators were involved in the East 
Timorese issue in Indonesia in 1996. In contrast, such groups as Tuvinians and Lezgins 
in Russia have experienced neither organizational nor state-sponsored mediation in their 
dealings with the central government.
Democracy: The democracy variable is constructed by combing autocracy and 
democracy scores employing variables from Polity IV project. Data for the period from 
1945 to 1994 are obtained using Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
(http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/) and from 1995 to 2000 using Polity IV project 
directly. An example of a minimally democratic state scored as “–10” on Polity score is 
Iran between 1955 and 1978. The United States is coded among the most democratic 
states throughout the period with a score of “10”. 
Economic Development: The measure of economic development, GDP per capita, was 
obtained from Fearon and Laitin (2003) (http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/) for 1945-
1995 period; the 1996-2000 data are acquired from World Development Indicators and 
adjusted to 1985 constant US dollars. The minimal value for economic development is 
recorded for the Democratic Republic of Congo in year 2000—US $ 64 per capita, while 
the highest is for Japan in year 2000—$27,007 US dollars adjusted to year 1985.
Resources of Ethnic Homelands: These data are obtained from the MAR dataset. A 
number of missing data points have been complemented by the author.
Yakuts in Russia are among the groups whose territory is endowed with economic 
resources, while Basques in France do not have much of the vital resources. Values 
range from 0 to 1 with 1 representing ethnic territory endowed with economic resources. 
Economic resources include oil, natural gas, and diamonds because of the high legal 
commercial value of these products.
Military Capabilities: To capture military strength of both states and ethnic groups, I use 
the measure of men under arms. The data for this variable were collected from two 
sources: (1) the Military Balance, and (2) Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) yearbooks. An example of a group with minimal military capabilities 
are Hawaiians in the US—0. Among the groups in the sample, the highest ratio of men 
under arms vis-à-vis the state have the Armenians in Azerbaijan in year 2000—.74, 
meaning for every one government (Azerbaijani) soldier there are .74 Armenians under 
arms.
Relative Population: Data for ethnic groups are extrapolated using the MAR time points. 
The lowest population ratio of a group relative to the state is among the Karachay in 
Russia—0.05; the largest is among the Black Moors in Mauritania. In the case of 
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demographic variables, for a number of years, the data for ethnic groups are extrapolated 
using the initial MAR time points. Since the end of the World War II, the world has not 
experienced many forced displacements or genocides of entire ethnic groups. (The 
Soviet cases in the wake of the World War II of Chechen, Ingush, Crimean Tatar and 
Turkish Meskhet deportations seem to be exceptions rather than the rule. Ethnic 
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia of early 1990s that changed demographics of the 
region is reflected in the dataset). Hence, it is likely that the demographic factors that 
characterize ethnic groups would generally stay stable. In the case of the relative military 
capabilities of ethnic groups 0 is assigned for the missing points. This is consistent with 
the idea that in the majority of cases ethnic groups are badly outnumbered by state 
armies.
Ethnic Groups’ Settlement Patterns: To capture this variable I am using the MAR data 
complemented by Toft (2003). Arabs in Iran are an example of a regionally concentrated 
majority group, whereas the Karachay in Russia are not a concentrated regional 
majority.  Values range from 0 to 1 with 1 representing the most concentrated settlement 
pattern for regional majority groups.
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APPENDIX C
TREATY BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE REPUBLIC OF 
TATARSTAN “ON DELIMITATION OF JURISDICTIONAL SUBJECTS AND 
MUTUAL DELEGATION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE STATE BODIES OF 
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE STATE BODIES OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF TATARSTAN”, CHAPTER IV
Authorised representatives of the bodies of state power of the Russian Federation and the bodies 
of state power of the Republic of Tatarstan:
governed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the Republic of 
Tatarstan;
proceeding from the universally recognised right of peoples for self-determination, principles of 
equality, voluntariness and freedom of the will;
guaranteeing the preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of economic space;
promoting the preservation and development of historical and national traditions, cultures, 
languages;
seeking for ensuring civil peace, inter-ethnic accord and security of peoples;
implementing the priority of the basic human rights and freedoms and citizen irrespective of 
national origin, religion, residence and other differences;
taking into consideration the fact that the Republic of Tatarstan as a state is united with the 
Russian Federation in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the 
Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Treaty on Demarcation of the Objects of 
Management and Mutual Delegation of Powers Between State Bodies of the Russian Federation 
and Bodies of State Power of the Republic of Tatarstan, participates in international and foreign 
economic relations,
hereby have agreed on the following:
ARTICLE I
Demarcation of the objects of management and mutual delegation of powers between the state 
bodies of the Russian Federation and the state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be 
governed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of 
Tatarstan and the present Treaty.
162
ARTICLE II
The Republic of Tatarstan has its own Constitution and Legislation.
The state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall execute the authority of state power, and 
shall:
1) ensure protection of human and civil rights and freedoms;
2) form the budget of the Republic, define and impose the Republic's taxes;
3) decide the issues of the jurisprudence and notary public;
4) implement legal regulation of administrative, family, housing relations, as well as relations 
existing in the field of environmental protection and use of natural resources;
5) grant amnesty to individuals convicted by courts of the Republic of Tatarstan;
6) decide issues relating to possession, use and disposal of land, mineral wealth, water, timber 
and other natural resources, as well as state enterprises, organisations and other movable and 
immovable property, located in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan which is an exclusive 
property of the people of Tatarstan except for objects of Federal property.
Demarcation of state property shall be regulated by the separate Agreement;
7) establish the system of state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan, as well as their 
organisational structure and functioning;
8) decide the issues of the Republic's citizenship;
9) establish the procedures for alternative civil service in the territory of the Republic of 
Tatarstan for citizens having the right - in accordance with the Federal law - for substitution of 
military service;
10) establish and maintain relations, conclude treaties and agreements with republics, regions, 
districts, autonomous regions and autonomous districts, cities of Moscow and Saint-Petersburg 
of the Russian Federation which shall not contradict the Constitutions of the Russian Federation 
and the Republic of Tatarstan, the present Treaty and the other agreements between the state 
bodies of the Russian Federation and the state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan;
11) participate in international affairs, establish relations with foreign states and conclude 
relevant agreements not contradicting the Constitution and international obligations of the 
Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the present Treaty, 
participate in the activity of corresponding international organisations;
12) create a National Bank pursuant to a separate agreement;
163
13) conduct independently foreign economic activity.
Demarcation of powers in the field of foreign economic activity shall be settled by a special 
agreement;
14) decide, according to the procedure fixed by separate agreement, the problems of conversion 
for enterprises which are in possession of the Republic of Tatarstan;
15) establish the state awards and honorary titles of the Republic of Tatarstan.
ARTICLE III
The State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan 
jointly are authorised to:
1) guarantee the civil rights and freedoms, the rights of national minorities;
2) protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity;
3) organise mobilisation of the national economy, direction of the development and production 
of the weapons and military equipment in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan; matters 
concerning the sale armaments, ammunition, military equipment and other military property, as 
well as the conversion of defence industry.
The form and the share of Parties' participation shall be governed by a separate Agreements;
4) settle common and contradictory questions of citizenship;
5) co-ordinate international and foreign economic relationship;
6) co-ordinate pricing policy;
7) create funds for regional development;
8) pursue monetary policy;
9) manage the items of property of the Russian Federation or of the Republic of Tatarstan, that 
can be transferred to the joint management, according to their interest based on voluntary and 
mutual consent. The forms and the procedures for the joint management of the specific objects 
shall be governed by a separate Agreement;
10) co-ordinate activity on questions of geodesy, meteorology , calendar system;
11) create joint funds for the aim of financing joint programmes, elimination of the 
consequences of natural calamities and disasters on the mutual agreement basis;
12) co-ordinate joint management of power system, road, railway, pipeline, air and water 
transport, communications and information systems;
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13) ensure an unobstructed and duty-free regime for movement of vehicles, cargoes and products 
by air, sea, river, railway and motor roads, as well as by pipeline transport;
14) estimate the state of environment conditions in accordance with international standards and 
take measures for its stabilisation and rehabilitation; ensure environmental safety, co-ordinate 
actions concerning the use of land, water and other natural resources; prevent ecological 
disasters; matters of specially guarded natural areas;
15) implement common policy in social sphere: population employment patterns, migration 
processes, social protection, including social security;
16) co-ordinate the activities on the issues of health care, protection of family, maternity, 
paternity, childhood, education, science, culture, physical culture and sport; train national 
specialists for schools, educational, cultural institutions, mass media organisations and other 
institutions and organisations; provide pre-school and school organisations with native language 
literature; co-ordinate scientific research in the fields of history, culture of nations and their 
languages;
17) deal with matters of personnel for judicial and law enforcement bodies;
18) settle litigation, arbitration and notary public matters;
19) co-ordinate the activity of law enforcement bodies, interaction of security services, creation 
and use of the targeted programmes of crime control;
20) establish common principles for organisation of the state bodies and local administration 
system;
21) establish administrative, administrative procedural, labour, family, housing, land, water, 
forest, mineral wealth, environment protection legislations;
22) address the matters of joint use of land, mineral wealth, water and other natural resources;
23) exercise other powers, established by mutual agreement;
ARTICLE IV
The following are within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and its State Bodies:
1) the adoption and alteration of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws, 
control over execution of laws; the implementation of federal structure and territory of the 
Russian Federation;
2) regulation and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms; matters of citizenship in the 
Russian Federation; regulation and protection of national minorities' rights;
3) establishment of a system of federal legislative, executive and judicial bodies and the 
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procedures for their organisation and activities; formation of federal bodies of state power;
4) federal state property and its management;
5) establishment of the basis for federal policy and federal programmes in the fields of 
governmental, economic, environmental, social, cultural and national development of the 
Russian Federation.
6) establishment of the legal ground for common market; financial, foreign currency, credit and 
customs regulations, money supply, principals of general pricing policy; federal economic 
agencies including federal banks;
7) federal budget, federal taxes and duties; federal funds for regional development;
8) federal power systems, nuclear energy, fissile materials, federal transport, traffic, 
communication pathways, information and communication systems; space activities;
9) foreign policy and international relations of the Russian Federation, international agreements 
of the Russian Federation; matters of war and peace;
10) foreign economic relations of the Russian Federation;
11) defence and security; defence industry, the procedures for sale and purchase of armaments, 
ammunition, military equipment and other military material; production of toxic substances, 
narcotic drugs and the procedures for their use;
12) status and defence of state borders, territorial waters; air space, the exclusive economic zones 
and continental shelf of the Russian Federation;
13) the judicial system, the Prosecutor's Office; penal legislation, penal procedural and penal 
executive legislations; amnesty and clemency; civil, civil procedural and arbitration procedural 
legislations;
14) federal collision law;
15) meteorological service, standards, gauges, metric system and time calculation; geodesy and 
cartography; names of geographical points; official statistics and book-keeping;
16) state awards and honorary titles of the Russian Federation;
17) Federal State Service.
ARTICLE V
Legal documents issued by state bodies, institutions and officials of the Russian Federation and 
the state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be valid within the terms of reference for these 
bodies, institutions and officials.
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ARTICLE VI
The State Bodies of the Russian Federation, as well as the State Bodies of the Republic of 
Tatarstan, shall have no right to issue legal acts on the matters, which do not relate to their terms 
of reference.
The State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Federal State Bodies as well shall have the 
right to protest against the laws of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan when 
they violate the present Treaty.
Disputes on exercising the powers within the common terms of reference of the State Bodies of 
the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be settled 
according to the procedures agreed upon between the Parties.
ARTICLE VII
For the purposes of implementation of the present Treaty the State Bodies of the Russian 
Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall have the right to conclude 
additional agreements, establish joint structures and commissions on a parity basis.
ARTICLE VIII
The State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan 
shall have plenipotentiary representative offices in the cities of Moscow and Kazan, respectively.
ARTICLE IX
No unilateral cancellation of, alteration of or amendment to the present Treaty or its provisions 
shall become valid.
The Treaty shall come into force 7 days after its signing and shall be the subject to publication.
Made in Moscow on February 15, 1994 in two copies, each in the Tatar and the Russian 
languages, both texts having equal validity.
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